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 Preface
What began as an international conference successively became a colossal 
project. It took over six years from preparing the conference to subsequent 
publication of some of the papers, and thus far longer than planned. This 
is maybe not unusual, but this time the challenges were multiple and not 
always anticipated.
At the beginning we held the international conference ‘(Irregular) Transit 
Migration in the European Space’, which was held in April 2008 in Istanbul. 
It was funded by the Network of Excellence on Immigration, Integration 
and Social Cohesion (IMISCOE), organised by the editors, as well as Hein de 
Haas from the International Migration Institute (IMI) at Oxford University 
and Ahmet Içduygu, Biriz Karacay and their team from Koç University, 
which also generously hosted the event.
The conference brought together researchers from all relevant regions 
in Europe and its neighbourhood. Twenty-six experts from the Russian, 
French and English speaking scientif ic community presented papers on the 
cases of Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Hungary, Turkey, Cyprus, 
Egypt, Malta, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Morocco, Spain and Portugal, 
and on methodologies and research ethics; colleagues and PhD students 
from another ten countries (USA, UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, 
France, Italy, Turkey, Libya and Estonia) contributed to the discussion. This 
circled on concepts and definitions, constructions and discourses, EU and 
Russian migration and asylum politics, migrants’ strategies and smuggling, 
analyses and methods. Various perspectives were taken, as from sending 
(Moldova, Senegal) and receiving countries (Spain, Portugal), from staging 
posts (Mali), ‘dead end roads’ (Cyprus and Malta) and ‘transit countries’ 
(Ukraine, Turkey and Morocco).
For various reasons, not all papers could be considered for publication and 
not all papers could be published in one volume. Also, not all countries or re-
gions that are transited by migrants are covered in this book. This is because 
f irst, not all regions are equally well researched and there remain research 
gaps; second, the cases presented here are considered to be precedent cases 
which also throw light on the countries not explicitly covered here; and 
third, more case studies would inevitably produce repetitive results. Some 
papers were made available in a special issue of Population, Space and Place 
published in 2011. Others went into a Russian volume which was published 
by University Books, Moscow, in 2009, which contains some of the chapters 
presented in this volume as well as contributions that were considered less 
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relevant for a Western audience. Several papers were made available online 
at the Centre for Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford, at 
www.compas.ox.ac.uk/events/past_conferences_events.shtml. Finally, a 
policy brief was published at the IMISCOE website at www.imiscoe.org/
publications/policybriefs/documents/PB12-Transitmigration-Duvell.pdf.
All chapters in this book are revised and updated versions of the con-
ference papers. The main challenge, as it turned out, lay in the different 
scientif ic cultures of the scholars involved, the trilingual communication 
between editors, authors and translators and the actual translation of the 
chapters from Russian and French into a common language, English. All 
chapters were updated by additional research, they were revised several 
times, some had to be translated and retranslated (our thanks go to Alan 
Watt at the Central European University) due to quality issues, another 
translator had to be replaced and still some f inal language editing (thanks 
to Briony Truscott from the International Migration Institute) was neces-
sary. All this was only made possible by a team effort and the hard work of 
additional translators who remained anonymous to most of the editorial 
consortium. Our thanks also go to some anonymous referees who compelled 
us to make some cumbersome but necessary revisions that improved the 
volume. We hope the readers appreciate these efforts and enjoy the book!
Franck Düvell, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Oxford
Irina Molodikova, Central European University, Budapest
Michael Collyer, Sussex University, Brighton
Oxford, October 2013
1 Introduction
Transit Migrations and European Spaces
Michael Collyer, Franck Düvell, Hein de Haas & Irina 
Molodikova
The term ‘transit migration’ has a long history dating back to the movement 
of refugees out of German occupied Europe during the Second World War 
and covering immediate post-colonial arrivals of migrants in important 
gateway cities, such as Marseille (Temime 1989), but the use to which we 
refer may be traced to its appearance in policy documents from the early 
1990s onwards to refer to largely irregular migration into the European 
Union (EU), initially across the EU’s Eastern external border (Wallace, 
Chmouliar & Sidorenko 1996). It is now used, almost exclusively in a Eu-
ropean context, to refer to actual or potential irregular migration in the 
broader vicinity of Europe, to the east, south-east and south (Düvell 2006). 
Despite two decades of increasingly widespread use and growing signs that 
notions of ‘transit migration’ are f iltering into more academic treatments of 
migration with relatively little critical analysis (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula 
2008), there is no substantial comparative empirical work which examines 
the use and usefulness of the term in the variety of contexts in which it is 
used: Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and North Africa. 
This book aims to f ill that gap.
This book provides empirical evidence in support of arguments that 
the conceptualisation of what is called ‘transit migration’ is not currently 
suff iciently cohesive to provide a useful analytical category. This has been 
argued elsewhere, including in work we have completed ourselves (Collyer, 
Düvell & De Haas 2010), but has not previously received such broad based 
empirical support. As it is widely applied, the term refers both to individuals 
who have already migrated and individuals who are believed to be likely 
to migrate but have not yet done so. ‘Transit migrant’ may be used to refer 
to individuals who have arrived in Europe. Although the ambiguity of 
its usage is such that it is not possible to be certain that it has never been 
used in this way, we know of no clear evidence of an intention to use the 
term specif ically to refer to individuals on EU territory; in any case, once 
individuals have reached Europe, their means of entry becomes legally 
irrelevant. In the operation of the Dublin Regulation, for example, it is only 
the country of entry, not the means of entry, which is considered. We also 
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know that the majority of irregular resident migrants in the EU entered 
legally, mostly on a visa, and subsequently took up employment in breach 
of visa regulations or failed to depart and overstayed.
The term is more commonly used to refer to individuals in any of the 
countries bordering Europe or indeed several more distant countries. It 
therefore assumes an intentionality to migrate to Europe. For individuals 
who are actually engaged in the migration process, such intentions are clear, 
but the label is not limited to those whose intentions can be read in their 
behaviour. There is a wider assumption that irregular migrants from else-
where in the world who are resident in the countries surrounding Europe 
are also engaged in attempts to reach Europe. In countries with substantial 
legally and irregular resident migrant populations, such as previously was 
the case in Libya, politicians encourage the assumption that many such 
resident individuals also fall within the def inition, since this increases 
their potential value to European border control agents.1 Yet migrants, even 
undocumented migrants, frequently deny such intentions (Collyer 2010). A 
definition would inevitably rest on the intentions of particular migrants, 
which are not only uncertain but change regularly.
An alternative to basing a def inition exclusively on uncertain future 
intentions is only to consider transit migration to have occurred once it has 
been completed. Aspasia Papadopoulou-Kourkoula adopts this approach in 
the only existing monograph on the subject. She defines transit migration 
as ‘the situation between emigration and settlement that is characterised 
by indef inite migrant stay, legal or illegal, and may or may not develop 
into further migration depending on a series of structural and individual 
factors’(Papadopoulou-Kourkoula 2008: 4). This def inition has the merit 
of recognising that intentions may change, so that f inal destinations may 
become staging points (see Alioua, this volume) and points that were 
initially expected to be f inal destinations may simply be temporary stops 
while new destinations become the focus of further journeys. ‘It is only a 
posteriori that the observer (and the migrant) knows if a particular stay 
was temporary or not’ (Papadopoulou-Kourkoula 2008: 5).
This approach is clear from a sociological perspective and provides a neat 
definition, but it does not reflect the way the term is used in a policy context. 
Manifestly, migrants are labelled as transit migrants before they reach a 
presumed final destination in Europe, that is, the term is not used a posteriori. 
Indeed, once migrants have actually arrived in Europe their legal status 
1 For instance, on a visit to Italy in August 2010 the then Libyan leader Gaddaf i claimed that 
migration control cost Libya €5 billion a year (Guardian 1 September 2010).
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becomes more significant than their means of entry and from the perspective 
of the states in which they reside they are not treated any differently to the 
more numerous illegally resident migrants who overstayed visas. Their status 
as ‘transit migrants’ therefore has no meaning a posteriori, in policy terms. In 
order to focus on the policy context of the term, which is the intention of this 
volume, we must accept the centrality of migrant intentions in any definition 
of the term, though this is unsatisfactory from a theoretical point of view.
The centrality of intentions is not the only problem in this definition: the 
term also covers a variety of legal statuses, including the typically complex 
arrangements between legal/illegal border crossings, asylum, residence and 
work. Moreover, the adjective ‘transit’ is applied not just to migrants them-
selves, but to the practices in which they are engaged (‘transit migration’) 
and regions where they are to be found (the ubiquitous ‘regions/countries 
of origin and transit’). ‘Transit migration’ therefore appears as a confused 
political construction of dubious scientif ic value. In light of these criticisms, 
we are to some extent sympathetic to those who argue that the term should 
be abandoned entirely. However, as is apparent from the title of this book, 
we still see some value in its use, although only in reference to a migratory 
phenomenon, not to a label that can or should be assigned to individual 
migrants or to the countries through which they are considered to pass.
Finally, this volume is ultimately about the construction, def inition and 
use of categories and typologies in migration research and thus includes 
two methodological messages. First, that political categories should not be 
simply accepted but scrutinised for their discursive purpose, use and power. 
Instead, this volume suggests that scientif ic typologies are to be developed 
from rigid comparison of individual cases along criteria of similarities 
and differences, and that one should accordingly cluster cases along these 
criteria and f inally identify patterns which then warrant labelling (see 
Düvell and Vogel 2006). Second, the volume, by the way it is designed, 
implicitly promotes multi-sited research on transit and other similar forms 
of migration, notably research along the routes of migration and on both 
sides of the border, hence at exit and entry points. Indeed, only by including 
those in the research that have not yet or did not manage to arrive in the 
EU can the full reality of this type of migration become apparent.
1.1 The value of the concept of ‘transit migration’
Despite its problems, the term ‘transit migration’ has lasted. While other 
terms have come and gone, ‘transit migration’ has retained some wide 
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appeal in a variety of political and advocacy contexts over more than two 
decades. Given the impossibility of reaching a clear, workable def inition 
that is both scientif ically robust and reflects the dominant policy context 
of the term, we do not propose using ‘transit migration’ as a category of 
analysis in the book, but as a category of practice,2 a signif icant political 
label (Brubaker & Cooper 2000; Zetter 2007). The flexibility and ambiguity 
of the term, which make it inappropriate for scientif ic use, make it ideally 
suited to the politics of migration in the European neighbourhood. In such 
highly charged political environments, terms which can convey a variety 
of meanings are particularly popular. There may be good reasons for this, 
such as during the initial stages of complex negotiations when securing 
agreement on anything is a positive step. However, there are also significant 
problems, particularly when these terms begin to enter wider currency. 
Ambiguous language may then be used not to secure initial agreement but 
to mask continuing disagreement.
In the case of ‘transit migration’ to the European Commission and 
EU member states it refers to the perceived need to be seen to control 
undocumented migration across the EU’s external border; to neighbouring 
countries, it may initially have been imposed upon these neighbouring 
countries, but there are increasing signs that they are identifying elements 
of self interest in responding to new forms of immigration which are par-
tially shaped by attempts to control undocumented migration; f inally, 
for migrants’ rights groups it has provided a label for a range of primarily 
humanitarian concerns, and for ‘no borders’ advocates it is a useful illustra-
tion of the harmful and self-defeating character of EU migration controls.
In all of these contexts, ‘transit migration’ is used as shorthand for more 
signif icant changes within global migration systems, which require more 
detailed attention. As it is currently used, it may gesture towards important 
changes in migration systems in and around Europe. Indeed, while it is 
important to maintain a critical position on its broader application, it may 
describe an amalgamation of concerns surrounding immigration into 
states neighbouring Europe, particularly when that immigration is not 
authorised by those states. This includes the easier access that migrants 
are thereby assumed to gain to European territory, the (related) increasing 
stringency of controls at the European external border, the means of onward 
transportation and the physical risk this poses to the migrants. The situa-
2 Brubaker and Cooper def ine ‘categories of practice’ as ‘categories of everyday social 
experience, developed and deployed by ordinary social actors [in this case policymakers] as 
distinguished from the experience-distant categories used by social analysts’ (2000: 4).
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tion is complicated when individual migrants wish to register a claim for 
protection as refugees, which requires some attempt to classify the nature 
of refugee movement and distinguish it from that of other migrants, a situ-
ation described by a wide variety of labels in recent years such as ‘irregular 
secondary movement’, the ‘migration-asylum nexus’ or ‘mixed migration’. 
The increasingly common result is that migrants are ‘stranded’: unable 
to continue, unable or unwilling to return and often facing considerable 
hardships just to remain where they are.
At this stage we do not wish to focus this range of possible meanings and 
uses of ‘transit migration’ into a clear definition. This breadth of application 
is one of the secrets of the term’s success and any attempt at more specif ic 
def initions would inevitably exclude some important ways in which the 
term has been used. There is no single element common to everything 
that has been labelled transit migration. We wish only to recognise this 
plurality of uses, indicated by the plural ‘transit migrations’ in the title of 
this introduction. Much the same could be said of ‘European space’, a second 
deliberately broad term that draws attention to the euro-centeredness 
of all considerations of ‘transit migration’. The same range of migratory 
phenomena can be found in Central America and Mexico, in the south of 
Africa, across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen, from North Korea through China 
to South Korea, or in the vast open oceans between Sri Lanka, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Australia. Yet ‘transit migration’ as a term is applied almost 
exclusively to the European space.
1.2 Charting European spaces: Place or flow?
‘European space’ is most obviously the territory of the European Union 
and it is important to remember that ‘transit migration’ is an issue within 
the EU, as many EU member states have historically been transit points 
for migrants seeking to reach other parts of Europe and indeed many 
continue to be so. This is apparent at the few controlled borders within 
the EU, such as the informal settlements in and around the town of Calais. 
These points typically occur at the borders between the Schengen Zone and 
the EU member states situated outside Schengen (such as the UK). These 
are likely to change, as internal Schengen border controls are periodically 
re-established, as they have been between Italy and France in response to 
concerns around migration from Libya in April 2011. Recent enlargements 
of this core ‘European space’ have incorporated further transit points, repre-
sented by the chapters on Malta and Hungary in this volume. Yet European 
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space extends beyond the current external border of the EU, through the 
wide range of political agreements drawing surrounding countries into 
the European sphere of influence. We follow a hierarchical understanding 
of European space beyond the EU which may be imagined as a series of 
concentric circles (f igure 1.1).
Immediately beyond EU territory sit Norway and Iceland, politically 
distinct, since they are not involved in the EU political institutions, but vir-
tually an integral part of the EU from the perspective of migration through 
their participation in the Schengen system. Neither Norway nor Iceland are 
signif icant in terms of transit migration so we have no case studies of this 
section of European space. A step further from core EU space are candidates 
for EU membership, currently only two (Turkey and FYROM), though the 
EU recognises a further six ‘potential’ candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and Iceland). Turkey is in a 
special situation due to the duration of its accession negotiations, and to 
the widespread opposition amongst several EU member states to its f inal 
accession. Turkey is one of the most signif icant areas of concern to the 
European Commission in terms of transit migration and so an important 
case study for this book.
The third and f inal element of European space which we examine in this 
book is those countries which are more unlikely to become members, yet 
nonetheless retain a special relationship with the EU through the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This is Europe’s ‘circle of friends’, as Romano 
Prodi f irst described them, 16 countries who will eventually share in the 
basic freedoms of Europe without participating in European institutions. Mi-
gration is one of the key reasons for the importance of the EU’s relationship 
with these countries and this is reflected in the prominence of migration 
in all ENP action plans and country reports.3 We consider Morocco, Egypt 
and Moldova; Ukraine is another relevant country and looked at from the 
perspective of its EU neighbour, Hungary. Indeed, it falls in-between the 
categories. A previous president expressed an interest in EU membership, 
which however, is unlikely to materialise at any time in the near future. We 
also consider Russia, which is not included in the ENP, though it was initially 
invited and is therefore considered as belonging to this division of European 
space by the Commission. Russia rejected membership of the ENP, since the 
importance of Russia’s bilateral relationship with the EU (for both parties) 
cannot be considered as comparable with that of other ENP members.
3 Action plans and country reports for all 16 countries are available on the Commission 
website at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm.
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Figure 1.1  Schematic illustration of the ‘European space’
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As others have recognised, this understanding of levels of European space 
presents a fundamentally hierarchical division of territory. This division 
relates to the level of access that can be gained to the core European space 
of the EU and the imagination of this in the pattern of concentric circles 
translates to political and spatial proximity to the EU core. There are other 
parts of the world which may arguably form part of this European space, 
perhaps most obviously the European space inside consulates, embassies 
or, increasingly, private f irms where visas are delivered. These and other 
‘remote controls’ are important stages in the encounter between a non-
European migrant and the European border, but they are distinct from 
the more directly spatial imagination of concentric zones since there is 
no direct access from visa delivery points to the core EU territory except 
through regimented channels. The reason why transit migration raises such 
concerns from a policy perspective is the very avoidance of these channels, 
and this is seen as more likely from the more immediate spatial proximity 
of the European Neighbourhood.
Our choice of case studies in this book is not only inf luenced by an 
interest in representing the distinct policy regimes linking each of these 
concentric zones to the EU but also by a desire to reflect the variety of 
routes taken by transit migrants. This relates to a different, more linear 
imagination of European space, as a ‘space of f lows’ as much as a ‘space of 
places’ (Castells 1996), an understanding that is common to border control 
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agencies. In this interpretation, European space as understood above may be 
divided not into concentric rings but into zonal quadrants, identifying dif-
ferent geographical regions from which migrants originate and the nature of 
the barriers they have to encounter along the way. Following observations 
from border control agencies and common policy conceptualisations of 
transit migration (e.g., ICMPD 2007) we identify four clear zones within the 
European space: Western Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, Eastern 
Mediterranean/Middle East and Central and Eastern Europe.
The chapters which follow therefore also provide some insight into the 
contrasting situation in each of these zonal quadrants. With regards to 
Central and Eastern Europe, the chapters on Russia, Moldova and Hungary 
present different aspects of the policy framework and empirical context of 
migration in this quadrant. Turkey occupies a key position in the Eastern 
Mediterranean/Middle Eastern quadrant, bordering Greece and Bulgaria 
but also Syria, Iraq and Iran, and is in reach of Afghanistan, Eritrea and 
Somalia. The booming economy of Istanbul and the tourist zones of the 
south west of the country create the demand for migrant labour, its ports 
and airports are major hubs for internationally mobile populations and its 
proximity to some troubled parts of the world results in signif icant arrivals 
of refugees. But the rising migrant and refugee population just outside the 
EU’s external border also provokes concerns from the EU.
In the Central Mediterranean, Libya has attracted most attention re-
cently and has a similar mix of large-scale labour immigration, recently 
interpreted as an indication of signif icant transit migration. Nevertheless, 
it is important to emphasise that Libya is f irst and foremost a destination 
country for labour migrants from poorer North African and sub-Saharan 
African countries (Hamood 2006; Pliez 2005). Research in Libya remains 
extremely diff icult and our case study from this region is the situation 
in Egypt where substantial refugee migration, besides labour migration, 
provides a migration connection between the conflict affected countries 
of Eastern and Central Africa and the Mediterranean. This is supplemented 
by the chapter on Malta, which, since its entry into the EU in 2004 has been 
seen as an important outpost in the EU’s migration control system and as 
such has received a small but substantial number of migrants who arrive in 
their attempts to reach Italy or France. Finally, the Western Mediterranean 
quadrant describes a further distinct connection of migration systems 
between West and Central Africa, Algeria and Morocco, and Spain, which 
provides the regional case study.
Our conception of European space therefore relates to both place and 
flow. First, we are concerned with policy agreements and spatial proximity, 
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which combine to produce an imagined hierarchy of concentric spaces 
around the core EU space; and second, with a dynamic understanding of 
migration routes crossing these areas. Just as transit migration is more 
correctly thought of in the plural, it is obvious that this multiplicity of spaces 
and routes cannot be conceptualised as any kind of single homogenous 
‘European space’. We are really discussing many different European spaces 
that are produced and maintained in relation to each other in different 
ways. The production of this hierarchy of spaces is paradoxically reinforced 
by the intensif ied security apparatus, which has in turn driven up the rates 
that may be charged by smugglers or traff ickers across the EU’s external 
border and also around this neighbourhood region. The book sets out to 
disentangle the many themes involved in an analysis of the wide variety 
of practices of movement and non-movement subsumed under the label 
of transit migration in this patchwork of differently imagined European 
spaces.
1.3 Thematic analysis of transit migrations
There are a number of themes which emerge from this attention to transit 
migrations in European spaces which the book also aims to highlight. We 
identify six separate migration related issues which are brought into relief 
by the range of relatively new developments associated with the variety of 
migratory phenomena that are bundled into the single term ‘transit migra-
tion’. These are humanitarian, statistical, legal, geopolitical, technological 
and broader conceptual concerns. The signif icance of these themes is an 
important element in the justif ication of transit migration as a focus of this 
book. They relate to a diverse array of changes in migration into and within 
European space over the last decade or so.
The f irst of these, and the most pressing concern, is the humanitar-
ian issue posed by the very high risks involved in overland and maritime 
journeys. Such risks are now commonly recognised in media, policy and 
academic treatments of migration to Europe, though information on the 
numbers of individuals killed or injured during the course of their migra-
tion to Europe is inevitably tremendously uncertain. Those bodies washed 
ashore, found in the desert or mountains are grim testament to the number 
of individuals dying at sea by drowning, in the desert from dehydration 
or in the mountains from hypothermia. As journeys become increasingly 
lengthy and require much greater navigational skill, such as the passage 
from West Africa to the Canary Islands, or Libya to Lampedusa, death from 
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other causes, such as exposure or starvation, is common. Many bodies are 
never discovered, swept out to sea or buried by sand dunes leaving no trace. 
Statistics compiled by United against Racism (2013) provide evidence of 
more than 17,306 migrants who lost their lives in the decade 1993-2013 as 
a direct or indirect consequence of migration politics; almost 80 per cent 
of those lost their lives whilst attempting to reach Europe. These numbers 
seem to be increasing, though it is not clear if this is due to greater aware-
ness and so wider reporting or if fatalities have actually increased. These 
estimates are shocking, but are likely to be short of the mark given that in 
the absence of bodies, which is the case in so many maritime incidents, it is 
very diff icult to document the number of deaths. If we also consider those 
who die during a crossing of the Sahara, where information is similarly 
limited, the hazards of these high risk migrations to Europe may even be 
higher.
This uncertainty of basic data leads to our second theme of statistics. 
Few countries in the world collect perfect migration data, but within the EU 
social scientists have come to rely on officially produced migration statistics 
as a reasonably close approximation of reality. Notably in the f ield of ir-
regular migration, FRONTEX, the ‘European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union’, now almost holds a monopoly on data on irregular border 
crossings and thus considerable discursive power and it has become highly 
complicated, if possible at all, to control such data. In most cases, despite 
their f laws, off icial statistics are used as if they were reality, receive broad 
consensus and are generally adequate to detect trends and fluctuations in 
migration. This is very different in the case of transit migrations, where no 
information receives such consensus. This obviously arises from the lack 
of basic agreement on exactly who is a transit migrant. Not only is there 
no consensus on basic def initions but there is no data available on any of 
the possible alternative meanings: individuals illegally resident in Europe; 
illegally resident individuals who also entered Europe illegally; illegally 
resident individuals in countries surrounding Europe; illegally resident 
individuals outside Europe who also eventually intend to reach Europe, 
legally or illegally; individuals beyond the immediate fringes of Europe. 
The centrality of intentions to understandings of transit migration means 
that it is not only practically very diff icult to be certain of statistics (as with 
undocumented migration more generally) but theoretically impossible.
The only data which are certain and verif iable are the number of appre-
hensions of migrants, but the relationship of this number to the unknown 
number of migrants who evade controls is so uncertain that a fall and 
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a rise in apprehensions can both be interpreted as a sign of successful 
border control operations or a fall or rise in actual migration flows (Col-
lyer 2008; De Haas 2007). And because migrants try to cross borders more 
than once in the case they are apprehended they are sometimes counted 
repeatedly, hence the number of apprehensions is higher than the number 
of individuals apprehended (Düvell & Vollmer 2009). The understanding of 
transit migrations as encompassing migrants who are actively engaged in 
attempts to reach Europe and those who may well be content to stay where 
they are adds to the diff iculty of estimating numbers. This fact means that 
estimates of the number of migrants attempting to reach Europe can be 
easily manipulated, a fact we consider in more detail under the theme of 
geopolitics below. Evidence from surveys with undocumented migrants in 
Spain and Italy suggests that only a small minority of them (5 to 10 per cent) 
reached Europe in a clandestine manner.4 The vast majority arrived with 
legitimately obtained visas and overstayed. This suggests that the signif i-
cant media and policy attention devoted to transit migrations outweighs 
their numerical signif icance from an EU perspective. This is important to 
bear in mind. Indeed our argument for the signif icance of transit migration 
does not depend on its numerical signif icance, but on the challenges it 
poses to a range of accepted principles of studying migration, in this case, 
reliance on data.
A further challenge posed by transit migrations and the third theme we 
consider here is the legal context. Legal status is signif icantly more varied 
than more easily classif ied forms of movement. Concern about the human 
cost of transit migration is expressed by the European Commission and 
member state governments, by governments of neighbouring countries, 
by international organisations, such as the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and most forcefully by migrants’ rights and community organisa-
tions. What differs across this range of interest groups is the explanation 
given for the high incidence of migrant fatalities and with it the possible 
legal remedies to reduce the risks of migration. For many civil society groups 
it is migration legislation itself which is at the root of the regular tragic 
4 The Spanish Police Union (Sindicato Unificato de Policia) reported that only 5 per cent of 
undocumented migrants to Spain arrived by boat in 2006, compared to 80 per cent who arrived 
at Madrid or Barcelona airports (El Pais 4 January 2007). Similarly, according to Italian police 
data only 10 per cent of undocumented migrants in Italy had entered the country by sea (cited 
in Cuttitta 2005). The survey of 2,200 migrants from Morocco or Senegal to Spain and Egypt or 
Ghana to Italy by the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) found that, 
of those who reported illegal residence, 58 per cent had overstayed visas (Schoorl et al. 2000). 
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incidents at the land and sea borders of Europe. According to this argument, 
the displacement effect of increasingly strict controls on air travellers, 
since the late 1980s, initiated the rise in overland migrations. As border 
controls on the shorter routes, such as across the Straits of Gibraltar, have 
intensif ied, migrants put themselves in greater danger to avoid them, for 
example through the gradual migration of departure points down the North 
West coast of Africa from Tangier to Dakar and eastward to the Algerian, 
Tunisian and Libyan coastlines. In a limited number of cases border control 
off icials have actually been directly responsible for migrant deaths. This 
was the case in September 2005 at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla, when 
16 migrants died. On the Eastern European land borders, however, very 
few deaths are reported and increased border controls have not resulted in 
fatalities. Another issue that raises concerns of humanitarian organisations 
is the treatment of the apprehended migrants, notably detention conditions, 
which in Libya, Turkey and Ukraine are reported to be often inhumane.
The argument that border control causes migrant deaths is rejected by 
the European Commission and member states who point, rather, to the 
development of smuggling and traff icking operations as the main culprit; 
indeed members of the European border control organisation, FRONTEX, 
cite incidents where border control off icials have actually saved migrants 
stranded at sea. The policy priority is therefore to stamp out migrant 
smuggling and traff icking operations and to develop partnerships with 
neighbouring states to facilitate this. This polarisation of explanations 
with governments on the one side and civil society on the other is slightly 
over-simplif ied and there are plenty of examples when the complexity of 
the issues is acknowledged by both sides. The European Commission and 
Parliament, in particular, have been quick to acknowledge incidents when 
border control off icials appear to have been responsible for migrant deaths, 
such as Ceuta and Melilla in 2005. The EU also accepts some criticism of the 
detention facilities in certain neighbouring countries and through various 
programmes invests in improving these, as in Ukraine. Nevertheless the 
debate is taking place between questions of security and sovereign control 
over borders and migrants’ rights and protection needs on the other. In this 
debate, international organisations have tried to identify actions involv-
ing a compromise between respecting state sovereignty and supporting 
migrants’ welfare. IOM’s ‘Stranded Migrant Facility’ is one example of this 
more pragmatic approach. It was established in 2005 to return migrants 
who applied and who were unable to either continue or return unassisted 
and particularly operates in countries around Europe. UNHCR’s emphasis 
on ‘protection sensitive borders’ is another approach which recognises that 
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border controls and detention are an integral part of the state system, but 
attempts to prevent individuals with a claim to protection being completely 
shut out by the diff iculty of even reaching EU territory.
In addition to legal aspects of migration control, a further trend that we 
may associate with transit migrations is the development of new technolo-
gies, the fourth theme we wish to consider. These technologies encompass 
both border control technologies and the technology employed by migrants 
in order to evade border controls and navigate in hostile environments. Some 
research has focused on the historic antecedents for modern movements 
in trans-Saharan trade routes or (pre-) Soviet migration patterns (Bensaad 
2005). These examples are useful to focus attention on key elements of the 
landscape which may be favourable to migration, such as oases or easily 
negotiated valleys, but beyond these the context has changed radically 
from the pre-state organisation of territory into spheres of influence of 
shifting empires.
Borders themselves are of course one element of change,5 but even where 
physical borders have much longer histories, the application of technology 
in their control has expanded considerably over the last decade (CCTV, 
motion sensors, radar and thermal imaging, unmanned patrol vehicles and 
satellites are also deployed). Negotiating these borders, as migrants from 
sub-Saharan Africa or Central Asia must do if they are to get close to Euro-
pean space, can be a diff icult process. In some cases borders are reinforced 
by natural hazards, such as a trans-Sahara journey. Other land borders are 
easier to cross, as between Ukraine and Hungary; there the main issue is not 
any natural obstacles though occasionally people get lost in the forests and 
mountains. The main obstacles are f irst, intelligence, as conducted by the 
secret service; second, internal controls along the routes towards the border 
region; and third, border guard patrols and technology-based policing on 
the borders. This represents an echelon of controls combining intelligence 
and enforcement as well as a combination of physical and technical and 
remote controls. Therefore, most migrants in the Eastern quadrant require 
the service of smugglers from the day they arrive in Europe, for instance in 
Moscow, in order to navigate these obstacles.
5 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point. This varies from some areas of 
North Africa where borders have arisen relatively recently (as in the case of the border between 
Western Sahara and Mauritania, gradually imposed from the mid-1970s) to f ixed borders which 
have seen dramatic strategic changes over a similar period, such as the borders between Hungary 
or Slovakia and Ukraine following the collapse of the USSR and then the accession of the former 
Sovjet bloc countries to the EU. 
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Since the late 1990s some of this has begun to change. While having 
much deeper historical roots in the trans-Saharan trade, migration of 
nomads, traders and refugees to Mauritania, Algeria and Libya since the 
1970s set the stage for contemporary trans-Saharan migration. Against the 
background of economic decline and warfare in West and Central Africa, 
Libya’s new ‘pan-African’ immigration contributed to a major increase in 
trans-Saharan labour migration over the 1990s. Since 2000, a major anti-
immigrant backlash in Libya has contributed to a diversif ication of trans-
Saharan migration routes and the increasing presence of migrants in other 
Maghreb countries (De Haas 2007). Confronted with a persistent demand 
for irregular migrant labour in Europe, more and more sub-Saharan, mostly 
West African, migrants started to cross the Mediterranean. Illegal crossings 
of the Mediterranean by North Africans have been a persistent phenomenon 
since Italy and Spain introduced visa requirements in the early 1990s. The 
major change has been that, since 2000, sub-Saharan Africans have started 
to join North Africans (De Haas 2007).
In addition, technological changes and infrastructure development have 
encouraged migration along new routes. Handheld GPS devices are now 
no more expensive than a mobile phone, mobile phones can be used to 
communicate during the entire crossing of the Sahara, as signals are more 
widely transmitted and desert towns such as Tamanrasset in Algeria now 
have facilities to receive instant f inancial transfers, so migrants with family 
in Europe, or even support in their country of origin, can receive resources 
for onward movement. This implies that an increasing number of people 
now aspire and are also able to make the trans-Saharan journey, if they 
have access to only a few hundred Euros. Although various other costs along 
the journey may inflate this considerably, it remains well below the tens 
of thousands of Euros required for direct smuggling to Europe and makes 
these migrations attractive to those who wish to try to get work in North 
Africa and may have no ambition to move on to Europe. The development of 
increasingly rigid migration controls is therefore only one factor provoking 
the instigation of these migrations. Navigating the eastern borders instead 
mostly requires communication equipment; smugglers require informants, 
mobile phones and handheld radios to obtain information on the physical 
and technical obstacles so that these can be circumvented.
The f ifth theme highlighted by transit migrations is the new geopolitical 
signif icance of migration. The relationship between the European Union 
and neighbouring states has always been important, but, with very few 
exceptions (such as Russia), the relationship has always been much more 
important for the neighbouring states than for the EU. For example, in 2008 
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63 per cent of Morocco’s exports went to the EU but only 1 per cent of the 
EU’s exports went to Morocco (EC 2009). This imbalance creates a strongly 
asymmetric relationship as most neighbouring states are far more economi-
cally dependent on the EU than the EU is on them. The development of 
transit migrations through these countries to the EU, however, has provided 
many neighbouring states with valuable bargaining power in their relations 
with the EU. States such as Morocco and Algeria for instance, located on 
overland routes from West Africa to Europe, have so far resisted growing 
pressure from the EU to sign new readmission agreements.
These countries already accept the return of their own nationals found to 
be residing illegally in any EU member state, but they are now being asked 
to accept the return of individuals from other countries who are believed 
to have migrated through Morocco or Algeria. Such an agreement would 
manifestly not be in the interests of either Morocco or Algeria but blanket 
deportations to either country would be attractive for several EU member 
states, particularly for the Spanish and French governments. The European 
Commission, which is now responsible for negotiating such readmission 
agreements, is very keen to conclude negotiations, but although EU budgets 
for training of border control off icials and other migration management-
related technologies in Morocco, for example, have increased substantially, 
they have not yet been able to put together a sufficiently persuasive package. 
Libya has been even more successful at transforming its strategic loca-
tion into resources from Europe. The widely quoted claim of the Libyan 
government that there were two million sub-Saharan Africans in Libya 
‘waiting’ to come to Europe was widely seen as an exaggeration. There has 
always been a substantial immigrant population in Libya and this claim 
simply reclassif ied all of them into a ‘transit migration’ category. Yet, though 
the claim was largely f ictitious, the Italian government has nevertheless 
made very considerable investment in Libya, in terms of detention centre 
infrastructure, training and equipment.
With Ukraine, however, such a readmission came into force in 2010 and 
after a two-year transition period during which only Ukrainian nationals 
were returned. The concessions made to Ukraine are (a) to assist the country 
in introducing a migration management system including detention centres 
and (b) to liberalise the visa regime for Ukrainian citizens; so far, the latter 
has not materialised and numbers of non-national returnees are low. Hence, 
Ukraine has used this agreement to modernise its migration control system, 
which is in the interest of the country without accepting larger numbers 
of returnees from the EU. Turkey, situated on the main route from some 
troubled regions in the Middle East and East Africa, is also lobbied by the EU 
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and in particular by Greece to accept readmission of irregular immigrants 
of various nationalities who have entered the EU from Turkey. But by 2013 
still no such policy had been implemented and since Turkey’s membership 
application has been put on hold for so long, one might wonder why the 
government should comply with EU wishes.
These themes all combine into our sixth and f inal consideration, the 
conceptual signif icance of transit migrations. Migration has always been 
considered as a relatively simple transfer from a country of origin to a 
country of destination, though this has never been considered unproblem-
atic from the migrants’ perspective. To some extent this was a reasonably 
accurate portrayal of migrant experiences of the immediate post-Second 
World War generation, when travel was becoming quicker and less expen-
sive and their concerns were focused on what would happen when they 
arrived. Contemporary migration theory is rooted in this period, from ap-
proximately 1945 to 1975, though the migration experience of these decades 
is actually particularly unrepresentative of migration patterns before and 
after this time. When journeys were longer and more convoluted there was 
always the possibility that something could happen along the way to force 
a change of plans. For the loose range of experiences subsumed under the 
transit migration label, that experience of travel is again the case. Even those 
migrants who have a destination in mind when they leave may never get 
there and our own research suggests that this is probably not even a majority 
of migrants. In this sense, we see a linear logic is something that is imposed 
from the outside rather than something which reflects the experience of 
migrants themselves. The creation of ‘transit migration’ is a symptom of 
this trend, following the logic that since every migration has a pre-defined 
beginning and end, anything that falls in between is simply ‘transit’. The 
experiences of migrants on these journeys belie this simple characterisation 
and suggest that we should pay much greater attention to the journey itself, 
to the responses to their the experiences in the various countries in which 
people spent some time and the dynamic decision-making processes of 
people once they have left their country of origin. The papers collected in 
this book set out to do just that.
1.4 Papers in this collection
In the following chapter, Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Sert consider transit 
migration in Turkey. The chapter considers many years of relevant f ieldwork 
and access to unpublished border control statistics. These provide a detailed 
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picture of the evolving nature of migration to and through what is, from the 
perspective of the EU, one of the most strategically signif icant migration 
crossroads anywhere in the world. Following this detailed statistical pres-
entation İçduygu considers this migration from two important perspectives. 
First, they examine the migrants’ perspective, characterising Turkey as 
an ‘environment of uncertainty’ when faced with border control agents of 
various countries and traff ickers and smugglers. They then turn to consider 
migration from the perspective of the Turkish state, characterised as an 
‘environment of insecurity’, looking at the range of readmission agreements 
signed by Turkey as a way of using international relations to resolve these 
problems of insecurity. They conclude by arguing that both perspectives 
are necessary if we are to understand the nature of this highly politically 
charged migration.
In chapter 3, Mulki Al-Sharmani examines migration trends to and from 
Egypt by Sudanese, Somali, Iraqi and other refugees. Although constituting 
a large segment of long-term migrants in Egypt, many refugees are deprived 
of basic resources that would enable them to establish stable and settled 
communities. This chapter questions the assumption that most of these 
refugees are transit migrants on their way to the West and therefore only 
to be considered as temporary. Al-Sharmani argues that a considerable 
number of these refugees have lived in Egypt for a decade or more and that 
only few of them actually resettle in the West. The analysis exemplif ies the 
complexity of their multiple and subsequent movements which defy simple 
notions of them being ‘in transit’. Some Somali and Sudanese refugees f irst 
migrated to other countries in Africa and the Middle East before moving 
to Egypt. Many Somali émigrés in Egypt were refugees in the Middle East 
and Africa, and resettled in the West, where they often obtained citizen-
ship. Over the past decade, these North American and European Somalis 
have been increasingly relocating to Egypt, thus their movement to Egypt 
even turns out to be circular. Al-Sharmani argues that this highlights that 
the term ‘transit migrant’ fails to capture important aspects of migratory 
experiences of refugees in Egypt.
Mehdi Alioua, in chapter 4, provides a geographically influenced analysis 
of the situation in Morocco, since the generalisation of the visa regime 
across the Schengen area in the 1990s, followed by the restrictions on is-
suing visas, established a barrier for many Africans wishing to migrate 
directly to Europe. He identif ies staged transnational migration, which he 
refers to as ‘transmigration’, as one solution to avoid these new diff iculties. 
Staged migration involves opening or reopening new migratory routes 
from sub-Saharan Africa, through the Maghreb, to Europe. These new 
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stopovers in the Maghreb have continued to serve as migratory staging 
posts for newcomers and they have a social history which has gradually 
become a part of migratory trajectories. Alioua’s study of the sub-Saharan 
transmigrants’ transnational networks therefore asks how we should see 
the creation of unrestricted spatial conf igurations produced by these 
moving populations, but situates this within a geopolitical context where 
the borders are not as porous as the term ‘transnational’ would suggest. 
In response to this, the notion of a stopover, seen simultaneously as an 
observation location, a methodological framework and an analytical tool, 
seems much more relevant than the notion of ‘transit migration’, which 
is too restrictive from the space-time point of view. In his chapter, Alioua 
develops and illustrates this idea, working from the example of Moroccan 
stopovers in the transmigration of sub-Saharan Africans.
In chapter 5, Cetta Mainwaring examines migration and migration 
policy in Malta and its new role as an island in the middle of a transit zone 
of migration. Having joined the EU in 2004 and having seen an increase 
in ‘boat people’ arriving on the island since 2002, Malta has become an 
EU watch tower, a state that now has the power to act as a barrier to the 
mixed migration flows traversing the Mediterranean Sea. In this context, 
this chapter examines the changing policies and politics of migration in 
Malta, since joining the EU. It focuses on the relationship between Malta 
and the EU and how this has influenced policies on the island, as well as the 
relationship between Malta and Libya, another transit point for migrants 
in the Southern Mediterranean. We turn then to look at the implications of 
these changes for the mixed flows of irregular migrants arriving in Malta, 
especially the new strategies they must pursue in order to overcome the 
impediments to mobility created by EU and Maltese policies. The chapter 
concludes in looking at public and media discourses.
Irina Ivakhnyuk, in chapter 6, deals with migration patterns that have 
emerged after the collapse of the USSR. Notably Russia is found to play 
an important role in the journeys of migrants and refugees. The chapter 
also focuses on some major changes around the turn of the millennium. 
First and foremost, Russia is a major destination country that is an equally 
important destination country as the EU. But whilst some features attract 
and facilitate migration to the country, others facilitate on-migration. 
Ivakhnyuk demonstrates that what is understood as ‘transit migration’ is 
indeed intimately linked with other forms of migration, such as student 
mobility, as well as labour migration. Chinese migration is used as a case 
study. Second, the chapter analyses governance of migration in Russia and 
the wider Eurasian space and its consequences for migration processes. 
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Indeed, international migration in Eurasia is less regulated than the Central 
and Western European space and the boundaries between the two spaces. 
Indeed, the borders of Russia are characterised as ‘asymmetric’, referring 
to relatively liberal arrangements in terms of entry from the South and 
East but relatively strict regimes in terms of exit to the West. Therefore, as 
the chapter suggests, smuggling networks are important institutions that 
facilitate on-migration to the West.
In chapter 7, Irina Molodikova concentrates on one of the new member 
states of the EU, Hungary and its non-EU neighbours to the East and South, 
notably Ukraine and Serbia. When the socialist system collapsed Hungary 
introduced liberal entry policies; as a consequence it attracted immigrants 
from the former Soviet neighbourhood, but began to also play the role of a 
transit corridor from East to the West. Even though Hungary adapted to the 
legal norms of the EU and subsequently became member of the Schengen 
space of migration control, its special relations with countries that host 
Hungarian minorities seem to undermine these otherwise strict regimes 
and facilitate irregular (transit) migration from more distant countries to 
Hungary as well as other EU countries. This chapter analyses migrants’ 
journeys across the various borders of Hungary, life in refugee centres and 
migrants’ migration strategies. It uses statistical data and interviews with 
different actors in the migration field: smugglers, migrants, refugees, human 
rights experts, police and politicians, and thus highlight the peculiarities 
of transit migration.
In chapter 8, Valerii Mosneaga takes the perspective of a small and 
poor agricultural sending country and addresses the issues of migration 
of Moldovan citizens. Indeed, up to a third of its working-age population 
is working abroad, often in an irregular situation. The major destinations, 
however, are not their neighbouring but various more distant countries in 
the Russian Federation and the European Union. Due to travel, immigration 
and employment restrictions, these cannot always be easily and legally 
reached. Therefore, Moldovan citizens frequently travel through other 
countries in order to get to their f inal destination. Often, as this empirically 
rich article illustrates, migration is irregular and facilitated by agencies and 
more or less unlawful services. Occasionally, Moldova too is transited by 
refugees and migrants aiming to get to another country. This chapter will 
mostly concentrate on transit migration of Moldovan and other citizens 
on their way to the EU. It is based on various qualitative and quantitative 
research projects, which contribute to the better understanding of the 
phenomenon of irregular transitional migration in its institutional and 
human dimensions.
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Finally, in chapter 9, Franck Düvell summarises as well as contextualises 
the f indings presented in these case studies. He returns to some of the 
themes raised in this introduction. The chapter examines the implications 
of transit migration for both the control and the study of migration. It 
argues that transit migration increases the geopolitical signif icance of the 
EU’s relations with its immediate neighbours, that it poses new control and 
protection challenges and it questions established migration categories. 
Nevertheless, suggestions are made to preserve the category of transit 
migration but simultaneously f ine-tune and apply it more rigidly.
The papers collected in this book make an important contribution to 
disentangling the range of issues that are brought together by the term 
‘transit migration’. At the moment the relationship between, for example, 
the statistical claims made by states such as Libya about the number of 
migrants attempting to reach Europe and the geopolitical signif icance of 
undocumented migration in the Euro-Mediterranean region are extremely 
diff icult to separate. Similarly, the contribution of increasingly rigid migra-
tion controls at the European border and the greater ease of movement 
beyond those borders facilitated by access to cheaper technologies have not 
been clearly distinguished in previous treatments of these issues. In this 
introductory chapter, we have tried to show how these themes challenge 
preconceptions about migration in European space and how, in the absence 
of greater clarity, we f ind it useful to think in terms of ‘transit migrations’, 
at least for the moment. The overviews of each of the papers in this f inal 
section demonstrate how the new empirical research which they present 
may start to clarify the relationship between these various themes and 
work towards a more sophisticated theoretical basis for considering the 
many ‘transit migrations’ which are discussed.
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2 Migrants’ Uncertainties versus the 
State’s Insecurities
Transit Migration in Turkey
Ahmet İçduygu & Deniz Sert
2.1 Introduction
He’s in Turkey illegally, having already been deported back to his native 
Iran once before. An Iranian Kurd, he was in prison for his political beliefs, 
and – as he put it – for thinking un-Islamic thoughts. Twice now, he’s 
paid $500 to be smuggled by night across the steep mountain passes into 
Turkey (Morris 1998).
Since the early 1980s, Turkey has become an important route for so-called 
transit migration flows in the south-east of Europe. People from different 
parts of the South and East have begun to use the Turkish peninsula as a 
bridge to the West and the North, where they hope to f ind better living 
conditions. The number of such people is unknown as there are no f igures 
available for ‘irregular transit migration’ passing through Turkey, which 
is an expected result, given the murky nature of this phenomenon. The 
only existing data cover the number of irregular migrants who were ap-
prehended in Turkey between 1995 and 2009, with a total f igure of around 
800,000, as compiled by the Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at 
the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior.
The issue of irregular transit migration is receiving increasing attention 
from the media in Turkey – with a special focus on the misfortunes of 
those irregular migrants who try to cross the Aegean Sea between Turkey 
and Greece – as well as from policymakers and government off icials who 
are under constant pressure from the European Union to stop the tide of 
irregular migration and from non-governmental and international organisa-
tions that are concerned about the humanitarian and human rights aspects 
of the issue (Kirişci 2008).
In this chapter, the issue of transit border crossings in Turkey is presented 
from two different perspectives. Based on Anthony Giddens’ (1996) argu-
ment that ‘ontological uncertainty/insecurity’ has become an essential 
constituent of life in the post-Cold War era, as far as the transit migration 
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issues are concerned, we see Turkey as a platform for two parallel envi-
ronments. The f irst environment, which is inhabited by irregular transit 
migrants, is full of uncertainty, where the dynamics of migration entail an 
innovative normative view that does not treat migrants as a security threat 
in an a priori fashion (Appadurai 1996), but as humans living with ambiguity 
and facing an unclear future. The second environment, which is envisioned 
by the Turkish state, def ines migration in terms of insecurity – a view that 
Appadurai warns against.
The chapter is divided into four parts. The f irst section gives facts and 
figures regarding transit border crossings and presents a taxonomy delineat-
ing who is considered an ‘irregular transit migrant’ in Turkey. In the second 
section, the ‘environment of uncertainty’ faced by migrants is analysed with 
details on the experience and nature of irregular migration in Turkey. In the 
third section, the Turkish state’s ‘environment of insecurity’ is examined 
with a focus on the policies and actions created to manage irregular transit 
migration. Irregular transit migration as an issue within EU-Turkish rela-
tions is also considered in this section, which is followed by the conclusion.
The chapter is based on various sources. The facts and figures are derived 
from the data compiled by the Bureau for Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum 
at the Directorate of General Security of the Ministry of Interior, on the 
number of irregular migrants apprehended in Turkey since the mid-1990s, 
and on new data released by the Turkish General Staff on irregular border 
crossings since September 2006. The context of the transit migrants is 
analysed through a comparison of two studies commissioned by the 
International Organization for Migration: Transit Migration on Turkey 
(IOM 1995) and Irregular Migration in Turkey (İçduygu 2003). Although 
the methodology of these studies is not based on representative sampling, 
and their f indings cannot be generalised, they are pioneers within a limited 
scholarly literature on transit migration in Turkey. They provide insight into 
the personal attributes of transit migrants who face an uncertain environ-
ment in Turkey and convey information about irregular transit migration 
in the country, in general.
2.2 Transit border crossings in Turkey: Some facts
There are 117 off icial points of entry into Turkey: seven by rail, 41 by air, 20 
by land and 49 by sea. While Turkey’s sea border measures 8,333 km in total, 
the total length of the country’s land border is 2,949 km. Turkey shares 269 
km borders with Bulgaria, 203 km with Greece, 276 km with Georgia, 328 km 
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with Armenia, 18 km with Azerbaijan, 560 km with Iran, 384 km with Iraq, 
and 911 km with Syria. Turkey’s geographical position is the main reason 
why the country is susceptible to irregular transit border crossings, turning 
it into an almost natural bridge between its politically and economically 
unstable neighbour countries in the East and the South and its prosperous 
neighbours in the West and the North. Moreover, Turkey’s mountainous 
eastern borders and the length of its Aegean and Mediterranean shores 
make it an attractive travel route for irregular transit migrants. Transit 
migrants enter Turkey in many different ways: by using forged documents; 
by hiding in vehicles passing across land borders; by passing land borders 
on horses, donkeys, or on foot; by crossing sea borders on ferries, f ishing 
boats or small boats; or by entering the country legally but failing to leave 
when their visas expire (İçduygu & Toktaş 2002).
The task of acquiring adequate, reliable data on the volume and trends 
of transit migration is diff icult because of its irregular nature, but there 
are some rough estimates available. The data compiled by the Bureau for 
Foreigners, Borders, and Asylum at the Directorate of General Security of 
the Ministry of Interior, on the number of irregular migrants apprehended 
in Turkey since the mid-1990s, and new data released by the Turkish General 
Staff on irregular border crossings since September 2006, give us some 
f igures which implicitly reveal the nature of transit migration through 
Turkey. An evaluation of the f igures on persons apprehended by Turkish 
security authorities on charges of irregular migration shows that this type 
of migration has increased considerably from the mid-1990s to the early 
2000s. While almost 11,000 and 19,000 irregular migrants were apprehended 
in 1995 and 1996, respectively, the number increased to 47,000 in 1999 and 
94,000 in 2000 (table 2.1). Since 2001, the number of irregular migrants 
apprehended has shown a decreasing drift from nearly 83,000 in 2002 to less 
than 50,000 in the year 2005, with only a slight rise to nearly 52,000 in 2006. 
This recent rising trend continued in 2006 and 2007, when 64,000 and 66,000 
migrants were apprehended respectively (table 2.1). It is important to note 
that the f igures stand for only those irregular migrants who were actually 
apprehended and that the scale of irregular migration through Turkey is 
naturally much greater than these data suggest. Taking into considera-
tion the relevant literature on migration, it can be inferred that the actual 
number would be at least two or three times higher than the number of 
migrants apprehended (İçduygu 2007a).1 Consequently, the scale of such 
1 Various f ield studies conducted by Içduygu, mainly at the two borders of Turkey the ones 
between Iran and Turkey, and Greece and Turkey, since the early 1990s indicated that even 
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a f igure illustrates that the range of irregular migration within Turkey in 
recent years is analogous to that in many other countries of the world that 
are known to attract large-scale irregular immigration.
Of course, not all these apprehended migrants in Turkey were transit 
migrants. However, the estimates of transit migrants in the country are also 
based on assumptions inferred from the data on the number of migrants 
apprehended. Taking into consideration the countries of origin of the 
apprehended irregular migrants, it can be claimed that those migrants 
entering Turkey especially from the Eastern and Southern borders intend 
to use Turkey as a bridge to reach their destination countries in the West 
and North. From 1996 to 2008, almost 800,000 irregular migrants were 
apprehended in Turkey and nearly half of them seemed to be transit mi-
grants (table 2.1). Thus, it can be deduced from the above data that at the 
beginning of the 2000s, around 51,000 to 57,000 transit migrants a year 
had intentions to pass through Turkey annually. Currently, this number 
seems to have fallen to the level of 20,000 to 30,000. Most transit migrants 
had entered the country illegally through human smuggling, though the 
recent liberalisation of Turkey’s visa policy enables more people to arrive 
legally and on regular flights, though they then leave or attempt to leave 
with the help of smugglers. It appears that over the period of 1995-2008, the 
f ive primary source countries for irregular migrants, who were typically 
transit migrants, were Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Bangladesh 
(table 2.2). The recent in- and outflow of Syrian refugees is not yet reflected 
in these older f igures.
according to the border security off icers the actual number was at least two or three times 
higher than the number of migrants apprehended.
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As mentioned earlier, information published by the Turkish General Staff 
on irregular border crossings since September 2006 comprises recent 
data, which present certain f igures that expose characteristics of transit 
migration through Turkey. This new data on irregular border crossings is 
largely complementary to the information provided by the Security Forces 
detailed above. Based on this new data, there were about 102,000 foreign 
citizens apprehended in the period September 2006-June 2009 because they 
infringed the rules of border crossings in Turkey. Thus, on average, almost 
100 persons are detained on the borders of Turkey on a daily basis. Looking at 
the monthly pattern of these apprehensions, it is seen that irregular border 
crossings increase in the month of September and decrease in the winter 
months of January and February (f igure 2.1). It can be inferred from these 
f igures that climate conditions affect both the scale of migration and/or 
the success of the border guards in apprehending irregular border crossers.















































































Source: compiled by the authors based on the data provided by the turkish general Staff
Based on the same data, in the period between September 2006 and Febru-
ary 2008, while 21 per cent of those irregular border crossers were from 
the Palestinian Territories, 19 per cent were from Iraq, 11 per cent from 
Afghanistan, another 10 per cent from Mauritania, 10 per cent from Pakistan, 
and 8 per cent from Somalia. The data point out that nearly 35 per cent 
of these irregular border crossers were caught on the borders between 
Greece and Turkey while they were departing, and the majority of those 
remaining were apprehended on the eastern borders of Turkey (mostly on 
the Iraqi, Iranian and Syrian borders) while they were entering the country 
(f igure 2.2).
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Source: compiled by the authors based on the data provided by the turkish general Staff
Asylum seekers in Turkey are also a potential source of transit migration, 
partly because Turkey is a bridge between Asia, Europe, and Africa, and 
partly because of Turkey’s geographical limitation in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. Since the 1980s, Turkey has been one of the key arrival points 
for many asylum seekers from its eastern peripheries – which are beset 
by political irregularities, problems, and turmoil – a large majority being 
citizens of Iran and Iraq. In fact, this completely conflicts with the geo-
graphical limitation clause that Turkey recorded while signing the Geneva 
Convention of 1951. The clause states that Turkey would only consider 
asylum applications made by persons from European countries and would 
not accept any responsibility for asylum seekers from outside Europe.2 While 
the geographical limitation is in place, almost all persons seeking asylum 
2 This is partly related to the refugee problem in post-war Europe and is partly a ramif ication 
of the anti-communism policies that Turkey adopted during those years, meaning Turkey would 
grant asylum to persons who arrived from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the 
Cold War. With its absolute pledge for protection and placement of persons f leeing communist 
regimes, in particular, Turkey undertook to serve a very limited number of asylum seekers. In 
fact, during the Cold War years, migratory movements in Turkey involving asylum seekers from 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were scarce and limited, with their numbers being notably 
low. According to the UNHCR data, between 1945 and 1991, less than 8,000 asylum applications 
from the Soviet Union and Eastern European states were f iled with Turkish authorities as per 
Turkey’s position under the Geneva Convention of 1951. More than half of these applications 
were f iled between 1979 and 1991 (İçduygu 2003).
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in Turkey are non-European – mostly of Iranian and Iraqi origin. In reality, 
this limitation is not employed: non-European asylum seekers are granted 
temporary asylum and, once they are granted refugee status through a joint 
procedure of the UNHCR and the Ministry of Interior, they are resettled 
to a third country. This asylum process turns Turkey into a transit country 
for those people who have been granted refugee status and are waiting for 
resettlement, which reflects the definition of transit migrants as ‘refugees 
awaiting resettlement’ (IOM 2004: 53). In fact, from 1997 to 2008, more 
than 27,000 of the total of 56,000 asylum seekers (more than 48 per cent) 
were granted refugee status and re-settled in other countries, making them 
transit migrants in Turkey in the last ten years.3 Later, 14,000 asylum seekers 
were waiting for their status to be determined and more than 10,000 refugees 
were waiting for resettlement. These numbers further increased in 2013, 
when the number of refugees (excluding Syrian refugees) reached over 
33,000 and thus record levels. In the meantime, both groups have come to 
form a segment of overall transit migration in Turkey. Thus, the movement 
of asylum seekers and that of transit migrants often amalgamate and the 
distinctions between transit migration, irregular migration, and asylum 
seeking are often blurred.
2.3 Environment of uncertainty
I left Iran illegally with the help of an ‘agent’ – crossing the border with 
Turkey. I spent 10 days in a ‘safe house’ – a secret location where you 
cannot go out. I paid $8,000 to escape. It is a lot of money: but if it’s about 
your life – I think you will pay even more if you need to. I travelled in 
different cars all the time and at night-time. Like a James Bond f ilm. But 
James Bond always lives. You maybe die. Sometimes I was travelling with 
other people – sometimes not. The route is secret and you always travel 
at night so you don’t know where you are. I don’t know what countries I 
travelled through. I know I went through Turkey, but nowhere else. I was 
not fearful, just glad to escape. I have never done anything illegal in my 
life – but I had to leave (BBC 2008).
Not only is the line blurred between transit migration, irregular migration, 
and asylum seeking, but these groups all face an uncertain future. Transit 
3 For a detailed elaboration of these f igures, see the UNHCR Ankara Off ice webpage 
www.unhcr.org.tr.
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migrants often f ind themselves in an environment of uncertainty, which 
is a result of three main factors. First, most transit migrants are irregular 
border crossers and their ‘illegality’ makes them more vulnerable than other 
migrants. The irony is that while living in constant fear of apprehension 
by transit country security forces, transit migrants also lack the protection 
provided by those same forces. Moreover, their ‘illegality’ deprives them of 
employment and housing rights as well as health services and/or educa-
tion. The second factor adding to their environment of uncertainty is their 
‘temporary’ situation. Transit migrants, by the nature of their migration, 
are directed towards a third country, but the duration of their temporary 
transit situation is usually unknown. Third, transit migrants’ movements 
are usually facilitated by human smugglers or traff ickers, and thus they 
often have no control over their crossings, or sometimes even over their 
destination. Thus, the environment faced by transit migrants is defined here 
as uncertain because of the ‘illegal’, vulnerable, temporary, and restraining 
nature of transit migration.
Transit migrants’ environment of uncertainty in Turkey can be better 
understood through an analysis and comparison of two studies commis-
sioned by the International Organization for Migration: Transit Migration 
in Turkey (IOM 1995) and Irregular Migration in Turkey (İçduygu 2003). 
These studies, besides being pioneers within a limited scholarly literature 
on transit migration in Turkey, also provide insight into the personal at-
tributes of transit migrants who face an uncertain environment in Turkey 
and convey information about irregular transit migration in the country 
in general.
The 1995 IOM study, which was based on interviews with 159 irregular 
transit migrants in Istanbul and Ankara, exclusively focused on transit 
migrants, reflecting on f ive major groups of irregular transit migrants in 
Turkey: Iranians, Iraqis, Bosnians, Africans and others who were mostly 
Asians. Almost 75 per cent of the transit migrants in the sample were 
men, 60 per cent were below the age of 30, and more than 60 per cent were 
either single or divorced. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that most 
irregular migrants are from rural areas, unskilled and/or uneducated, most 
of them were born in urban areas, had obtained some education, and had 
been employed prior to migrating. A signif icant number of them came to 
Turkey without valid documents and without enough information about 
the country prior to their arrival. Almost one out of three respondents 
was preparing to employ traff ickers/smugglers in order to reach their 
f inal destination, mainly named as Denmark, Greece, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the USA.
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The second IOM study in 2003, which was based on interviews with 53 
irregular migrants in Istanbul and Van provinces, mainly concentrated on 
irregular migrants in general, and not only on transit migrants. Almost 
one-quarter of the sample were Iranians and Iraqis, another 14 per cent 
were Afghanis, and the remainder were from some of the former Eastern 
bloc and African countries. Still, the study highlighted those migrants who 
largely regarded Turkey as a transit area en route to the West. This group 
represented the irregular transit migrants who also wanted to leave illegally. 
Like the 1995 sample, the 2003 sample contradicted the stereotypical view of 
irregular transit migrants as young, unmarried, poor, uneducated and un-
skilled males from rural backgrounds. On the contrary, the sample showed 
that irregular transit migrants in Turkey were mainly young, married men 
and women, from diverse national and ethnic backgrounds and with a 
considerable degree of formal education and experience in urban areas. 
Like their 1995 counterparts, a majority of these individuals had already 
worked in their countries of origin before migrating.
While a large percentage of the irregular transit migrants interviewed in 
the 2003 IOM study had crossed the borders without valid travel documents, 
only 40 per cent of the respondents in the 1995 study indicated that they 
had entered Turkey without a valid document. The f inding indicates that 
there were more illegal entries in 2003 than in 1995, which is confirmed by 
the off icial statistics which show increases in the second half of the 1990s, 
mentioned above. Almost 55 per cent of the 2003 respondents reported that 
their approximate monthly income was either low or below average, while 
4 per cent had not received any income at all. They were usually illegally 
employed in precarious and low-paid jobs, the so-called 3D jobs (dirty, 
diff icult and dangerous), due to their illegal status. The 1995 respondents 
were in a relatively better situation as two-thirds considered their income 
to be average, indicating that later-comers had a worse economic status as 
compared with their forerunners from 1995.
The housing conditions for irregular transit migrants were generally 
stated as very poor in both studies. In the 2003 study, half of the respondents 
shared rented accommodation, 10 per cent lived alone, 8 per cent lived with 
friends, 4 per cent with relatives and 4 per cent lived at their workplace, 
while 6 per cent lived in hotels and 10 per cent in shelters. In a different 
study conducted in Istanbul, the migrants interviewed mentioned that 
while f inding housing was not very diff icult, without any legal status and 
regular employment many had to shelter together, sometimes up to ten 
people in a single room, gathering together in apartments that were badly 
equipped to house them (İçduygu & Biehl 2008).
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As stated earlier, by its very nature irregular transit migration tends to 
become entangled with asylum seeking processes in Turkey. While the 
number of asylum applications was lower in the 1995 study, 27 per cent of 
the irregular migrants interviewed for the 2003 study had applied for asylum 
and only 6 per cent had actually been granted refugee status. Many of these 
transit migrants have arrived in Turkey without valid travel documents, 
with the help of smugglers, making the wish to migrate a considerable eco-
nomic burden on the migrant and his or her family members. The bribes and 
payments to the smugglers make the whole process of migration expensive. 
Both studies revealed that smugglers and traff ickers are frequently used 
and transit migrants have no control over the travel arrangements made 
by such intermediaries. Some 59 per cent of the sample group in the 2003 
study and almost 71 per cent of the respondents in the 1995 study had already 
attempted to leave Turkey, mostly through paying such intermediaries fees 
ranging from $50 to $15,000.
Thus, as described earlier, the line between transit migrants and asylum 
seekers is blurred: the majority f ind themselves forced into practices of 
‘illegal’ border crossing, living in precarious situations and denied employ-
ment and housing rights. Because such migrants typically enter the country 
without valid documents, they are often stuck waiting for the right moment 
to be smuggled. The duration of the wait is usually unknown. It typically 
depends on various factors ranging from availability of funds to the fees 
demanded by the smugglers to climate conditions, and even to the policies 
of both the transit and destination countries. Some days are better for taking 
action than others, but agency usually lies in the hands of other intermediar-
ies, leaving the transit migrants with less control over their futures.
2.4 Environment of insecurity
Turkish security forces arrested a total of 44 illegal migrants in separate 
operations, off icials said on Saturday. A coast guard boat spotted a rub-
ber boat off Karaburun town of the Aegean province of Izmir with 25 
illegal migrants and a Turkish human traff icker on board. Somali and 
Bangladeshi illegal migrants, who were trying to reach Greek islands, and 
the Turkish human trafficker were arrested. In a separate operation in the 
north-western province of Edirne, gendarmerie and border patrol teams 
caught 19 illegal migrants of Iraqi, Palestinian and Burmese descent. All 
illegal migrants would be deported, police said (Sabah Newspaper 2009).
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The concept of security has broadened and migrants have been linked 
to certain risks (Ibrahim 2005: 164). Policymakers now tend to treat im-
migration as a security threat. The Turkish state apparatus is no exception. 
Turkish policymakers envision transit migration within an environment of 
insecurity where two different dynamics function at the same time. On the 
one hand, protection of the borders is a national security issue by its nature 
and illicit border crossers simply violate the law of the state. However, the 
phenomenon of transit border crossers is more complicated: the fact that 
they intend to move on to third countries also makes the transit country ac-
countable towards those third countries that are, most often, its neighbours. 
In the case of Turkey, the migrant-receiving neighbours are EU members who 
increasingly view immigration as a national security issue, and who have be-
come more and more concerned about transit migration in particular. While 
the issue of transit migration had been on the European agenda since the 
1990s, when many illegal immigrants appeared on the shores of Greece, Italy 
and Spain, the fact that the terrorists who attacked New York (11 September 
2001), Madrid (11 March 2004), and London (7 July 2005) were considered to 
have immigrant backgrounds strengthened the view that immigration is a 
source of insecurity and uncertainty that encircles the economic, social and 
political spheres of the region. An analysis of discourses on transit migration 
within the EU reveals how migration is securitised by building upon the 
idea that transit migration leads to a chaotic migratory system (İçduygu & 
Yükseker 2008). It is within this setting that Turkey, due to its geographical 
position as a transit country, has attracted a lot of policy attention from 
its European counterparts during the accession negotiations with the EU.
On the other hand, as the intermediaries of irregular border movements, 
smugglers and traff ickers are integral parts of transit migratory flows while 
also being important constituents of criminal networks. There are diverse 
reactions regarding human trafficking and smuggling. Some think that such 
actions are among the unavoidable outcomes of the globalised dynamics of 
contemporary human mobility (İçduygu & Keyman 2000: 383-384; İçduygu 
& Ünalan 2002: 3-6). Others regard such actions as major illegal activities 
led by organised criminal groups (IOM 2000: 8-11; SMOFA 2001), while still 
others argue that, as migrant-receiving countries tighten the means of 
legal immigration, the only way for many potential migrants to enter these 
countries is through irregular border crossings where smugglers and traf-
f ickers act as intermediaries (Graycar 2000; İçduygu 2000: 358; Salt 2000: 
32; İçduygu & Toktaş 2002).
Within this environment of insecurity, where both national security and 
criminal networks are at stake, Turkey has taken several legal measures and 
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pursued various international collaborations to counter irregular migration 
into the country. To illustrate, in August 2002, the government instituted 
new clauses to the Penal Code that criminalised human smuggling and 
traff icking, while establishing f irmer controls at the borders and ports. 
Article 79 of the new Turkish Penal Code Law No 5237, put into force in 
2005, classif ied migrant smuggling and established punishments of three 
to eight years of imprisonment and judicial f ines corresponding to 10,000 
days in jail. In the case that an act of human smuggling is proven to be an 
organised crime, the penalty is increased by half. Article 79 also provided for 
coercive measures (confiscation of assets, etc.) against legal entities involved 
in human smuggling. In the meantime, based on the Road Transportation 
Law (2003) and the Road Transportation Regulation (2004), if a person is 
sentenced for migrant smuggling, his/her transportation permit cannot 
be renewed for three years and the person’s vehicle is confiscated by the 
Turkish authorities. Furthermore, as another domestic measure in the f ight 
against illegal immigration, the Law on Work Permits for Aliens, which was 
enacted in 2003, authorised the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to 
issue all types of work permits for foreigners to make sure the process is 
better managed and controlled to avoid illegal employment of foreigners.
On a more international level, in March 2003, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly recognised the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and its Additional Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and introduced legal actions in accordance 
with the agreement. Furthermore, Turkey became a full member of the IOM 
in 2004, when it embarked on international collaboration to combat human 
traff icking and addressed several migration issues in general. Moreover, 
in January 2006, Turkey assumed the Presidency of the Budapest Process, 
which is an unoff icial forum for inter-governmental cooperation and 
dialogue, involving f ifty governments and ten international organisations. 
The forum aims to prevent irregular migration and establish sustainable 
mechanisms in the f ield of migration management.
In terms of further international cooperation, in order to slow down or 
even end illegal migration, Turkey has also signed readmission agreements 
with those countries of origin whose citizens are among the larger groups 
of irregular transit migrants. Such agreements have been signed with 
Syria, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Ukraine, and Greece, while negotiations with 
Pakistan are still continuing. In September 2000, the European Commission 
was also given the mandate to negotiate a readmission agreement with 
Turkey. The EC negotiators thought that as a candidate country with a 
possibility of accession, Turkey had an incentive to negotiate a readmission 
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agreement (Paalman interview 2005 in Long & Celebic 2006). However, 
afraid of becoming a border zone, the Turkish negotiating team argued 
that such an agreement would come into force automatically on Turkey’s 
entry into the EU and was therefore unnecessary, and tied its signature of 
the readmission agreement to completion of the accession process.
As the discussion above also reveals, irregular migration and other is-
sues related to it have become an integral part of Turkey’s EU membership 
debate. Within this context, an important agenda item in EU-Turkey rela-
tions is how Turkey’s state institutions and legal frameworks can manage 
incoming migration and asylum flows. Thus, as detailed elsewhere (see 
İçduygu 2007b), the strength and stability of Turkey’s integration into the 
EU is subject not only to the economic, social, and political makeovers in 
the country, but also explicit policy matters.
From the EU’s perspective, this was a result of the political discourse 
with which transit migration is associated, where some published materials 
presented the phenomenon as yet another threat to Europe (Düvell 2006: 
6), and where the concentration and assets dedicated to f ight against it 
already far exceeded its quantitative signif icance (Collyer 2006: 3). In one 
such publication, transit migration through Turkey was ‘viewed as one 
of the most common of all recently established mobility f lows between 
Africa and Asia and countries of Europe’ where ‘it has become clear that 
thousands of migrants from the developing world who enter Europe are 
using Turkey as a transit area on their way to their preferred destinations’ 
(IOM 1995: 4; also cited in Düvell 2006). Within this context, since Turkey’s 
candidature to Union membership in 1999, the EU has required Turkey to 
securitise migration within its borders and to conform fully to the norms of 
the international refugee regime. Ultimately, both requirements call upon 
Turkey to devote more resources and energy to managing migration and 
asylum flows across and within its borders.
From the Turkish side, as implied by the discussion of a possible readmis-
sion agreement between the EU and Turkey, there is a feeling that EU poli-
cies and practices for managing migration shift the burden of controlling 
migration to countries on the periphery, like Turkey, turning them into 
buffer zones between the immigrant-attracting European core and the 
emigrant-producing peripheral regions. Thus, Turkish policymakers regard 
the EU’s efforts as burden-shifting and try to promote policies that would 
lead to burden-sharing instead. Within this context, irregular migration 
and transit border crossings in particular go beyond national security, for 
they are also key features of an international environment of insecurity 
where EU-Turkey relations are also at stake.
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2.5 Conclusion
I paid $7,000 to human traff ickers so that they take me from Iraq to 
Greece. They took me through mountains and everywhere, it took me 10 
days to get there. But then Greece authorities they sent us back to Turkey. I 
am not a criminal, I am an engineer. I have done nothing against anybody 
I just want a safe place (Jones 2009).
In this chapter, we have tried to show that transit border crossings in Turkey 
can be perceived from two different standpoints. On the one hand, transit 
migration has been politicised by policymakers and government off icers. 
Under this policy discourse, the phenomenon has become a euphemism for 
‘illegality’, and therefore, a domain of insecurity both for Turkey and the EU 
– as transit migratory flows through Turkey are usually destined for Europe. 
On the other hand, transit migrants f ind themselves in an environment of 
uncertainty ‘with a temporary status of non-belonging that results in exclu-
sion from conventional protections regimes’ and which results in ‘various 
human rights concerns’ (Düvell 2006). Thus, transit border crossings into 
and out of Turkey are envisioned in a twofold environment of insecurity and 
uncertainty, which is perceived by the actors involved – transit migrants 
and state off icers – very differently. It seems that they are different in terms 
of the dissimilar position of these actors, but as far as the wider picture of 
irregular transit migratory f lows is concerned, they are complementary 
to each other.
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Egypt has a long history of receiving migrants of various ethnic back-
grounds, such as Armenians, Greeks, Croats, Palestinians and Sudanese. 
Recently, the country has witnessed large scale immigration of refugees 
fleeing armed conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. According to UNHCR 
(2008) there were 23,660 Sudanese, 10, 786 Iraqis and 5,383 Somalis residing 
in Egypt. There were also small numbers of refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia 
and other nations such as Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, the former Yugoslavia and Yemen. 
In addition, there were between 50,000 and 70,000 Palestinian refugees 
residing in the country. By 2014, numbers rose to 183,318 refugees, includ-
ing 120,000 Syrians. Many of the refugees in Egypt, though constituting 
the largest segment of long-term migrants, are deprived of the resources 
(legal, economic and social) that would enable them to establish settled 
communities in Egypt and pursue integration as a durable solution. For this 
and other reasons it is assumed that many of the refugees, notably Somalis 
and Sudanese, are transit migrants (Roman 2006). This chapter will f irst 
outline the migration history of the main refugee groups in Egypt, with a 
focus on Sudanese and Somali migrants. Second, it will analyse the policies 
of the Egyptian government as well as those of the UNHCR and how they 
have impacted on the daily lives and the future prospects of these refugees. 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion on the appropriateness of the 
term ‘transit migrants’ to classify these refugee groups. The analysis in this 
chapter draws on a review of existing literature and the f indings of a f ield 
study which the author conducted on the secondary movement of Somali 
refugees in Egypt in 2004 (Al-Sharmani 2005).1
1 This study was part of a multi-sited research project carried out by a research team that 
was commissioned by the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies. For the study in 
Egypt, a questionnaire was administered to 165 Somali refugees in order to investigate the scope, 
patterns, and causes of their movements since their f light from the homeland. Seventeen expert 
interviews were also conducted with key personnel at UNHCR off ice in Cairo, non-governmental 
organisations that provide services to refugees, the Refugee Department at the Ministry of 
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3.2 The history of refugee migration to Egypt
Somali refugees
The history of the movement of Somalis to Egypt can be traced to the late 
1960s and 1970s, when limited numbers of Somali students started coming to 
Egypt to pursue their education at Egyptian universities, as part of bilateral 
educational agreements. In the 1980s, when many Somali labourers sought 
employment opportunities in Gulf countries, Cairo became a popular place 
with Somali families who wanted to provide better educational opportuni-
ties for their children than were available in Somalia. Moving to Cairo was 
seen as advantageous because it would allow their children to receive a good 
education in a Muslim, but modern, country that was not too far either from 
Somalia or from the Gulf countries where the breadwinners of these families 
often worked. Until 1991, the largest numbers of Somalis living in Egypt were 
diplomats and their families, college students on government scholarships 
and some families and their children who were enrolled in Egyptian schools. 
With the collapse of the Somali government and the escalation of the civil 
war in 1991, Egypt saw a large influx of Somali refugees. While the majority 
of those early refugees came directly from Somalia, some others moved 
back from Gulf countries to join family members who either arrived from 
Somalia or were already in Cairo. The educational level of this earlier group 
was high and many held professional jobs; the majority had resettled in 
Western countries through the UNHCR.
The majority of the refugees who are currently residing in Egypt entered 
the country in or after 1999. Like the earlier group of refugees, this new 
Somali refugee group also varies in age, sex, clan aff iliation and migration 
trajectories. While some migrated directly from Somalia, others came from 
Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Libya, Saudi Arabia or Yemen, or a combination 
of these countries. According to UNHCR data, refugees with a history of 
secondary movement constituted a large sector of the total Somali refugee 
group in late 1990s, while the majority of the current Somali refugees are 
direct arrivals from the homeland (UNHCR 2005). While the majority en-
tered Egypt legally, with an entry visa that was purchased before departure 
with the help of family contacts in Egypt and elsewhere, a smaller number 
entered the country by sea, for instance those arriving from Saudi Arabia. 
The onward movement of refugees from f irst countries of asylum to Egypt 
was motivated by lack of legal protection and basic rights to livelihood 
Foreign Affairs, the Resident Affairs Unit at the Immigration Department, and the Department 
of Foreign Students at Ministry of Education.
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and education. The educational levels of many of the more recent refugees 
are low compared to early groups of Somali refugees as well as Sudanese 
refugees (Al-Sharmani 2005; Grabska 2005). Before coming to Egypt, most 
did manual labour, construction work, auto-repair work or driving, and 
were involved in petty sales or (for women in the Gulf) in domestic work 
(Al-Sharmani 2005). Most Somali refugees live in overcrowded apartments 
which they share with other Somalis and are mainly concentrated in the 
neighbourhoods of Ard il Liwa and Nasr City.
It can be argued that the recent high rate of recognition of Somali refu-
gees (78 per cent2) has been largely the result of the use of much broader 
criteria in the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) process, a new policy 
that UNHCR Geneva called on all country off ices to adopt (UNHCR 2003). 
According to this position paper, northern parts of the country such as 
Somaliland and Puntland are considered safe, while the southern sector 
beyond the town of Galkayo is considered unsafe. Consequently, it is as-
sumed that refugees who are originally from the north can return to their 
homeland, but those from the south cannot. Nonetheless, the position paper 
also pointed out that if asylum seekers who come from the north ‘have a 
well-founded fear of persecution in the meaning of Article 1 of the 1969 
OAU Convention governing the Specif ic Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa,’ their claims ‘should be assessed carefully on an individual basis to 
determine their needs for international protection.’ As a result of this policy, 
a great number of Somali asylum seekers became recognised refugees. In 
addition, the UNHCR adoption of the 1969 OAU Convention as a basis for 
assessing RSD claims in 2003 led to an increase in the overall recognition 
rate as well as that of Somali refugees.
Sudanese refugees
The movement of Sudanese migrants to Egypt can be dated to the nine-
teenth century when Sudan was part of Egypt and was under British colonial 
rule. Up until the late 1980s, most of the early Sudanese who moved to 
Egypt were northerners and were able to take advantage of bilateral treaties 
between the two countries, which gave Sudanese many of the same rights 
as Egyptian nationals (e.g., right of employment, residence, free access 
to health and education, and the right to own property).3 However, after 
the failed assassination of President Mubarak in 1995, which implicated 
Islamists allegedly backed by the Sudanese government, the Egyptian 
2 Estimate, own calculation based on UNHCR 2006.
3 The latest of these treaties was the 1976 Wadi El Nile Treaty.
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government revoked all treaties that gave special privileges to Sudanese 
in Egypt. Since then, Sudanese in Egypt have been subjected to the laws 
governing the status and rights of foreigners.
In the late 1980s, large numbers of Sudanese refugees fled to Egypt. The 
majority of these recent waves of refugees were from the southern parts of 
Sudan, with some also coming from the north. As the number of Sudanese 
asylum seekers in Egypt ballooned, the Egyptian government asked the 
UNHCR to undertake their RSD in March 1994. Recently, Sudanese from the 
western part of the country have also been moving to Egypt. The estimated 
figures for all Sudanese residing in Egypt vary, although figures often quoted 
by Egyptian authorities range between two and f ive million.4 More than 60 
per cent of these Sudanese are refugees who arrived since the late eighties.
In the period 1997-2004, 67,000 Sudanese approached the UNHCR Cairo 
off ice to apply for refugee status (Grabska 2005). Of these asylum seekers, 
28,700 were recognised while 7,300 cases were pending. Also, 14,300 of 
the recognised Sudanese refugees in this period were resettled through 
the UNHCR. In addition, 20,000 Sudanese asylum seekers were rejected 
with 15,000 of them classif ied as closed f iles (UNHCR 2004; Grabska 2005). 
Until 2003, the recognition rate among Sudanese refugees was quite low 
because of the adoption of the 1951 Geneva Convention as the basis for suc-
cessful refugee claims (Kagan 2002). Between 1999 and 2003, for instance, 
the recognition rate among the Sudanese was 33 per cent. But after the 
UNHCR’s adoption of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention as a basis for the 
determination of refugee claims, the recognition rate among the Sudanese 
rose to 63 per cent in 2004.
Many of the refugees, particularly those from the western and southern 
parts of Sudan, arrived directly from the homeland. However, some of the 
northern refugees had f irst moved to the Gulf or Libya, before coming 
to Egypt. The main factors motivating both groups to f lee include the 
deteriorating security situation, fear of forced conscription, religious 
persecution, political persecution due to political activism, pursuit of 
educational opportunities, as well as reunif ication with family members 
in the West through resettlement. The majority entered Egypt legally with 
visas purchased before departure or upon arrival, while refugees arriving 
before 1995 did not need a visa to enter the country. Most refugees entered 
Egypt either by land, taking a train to Wadi Halfa and then a steamer to 
Aswan, or by flying to Cairo.
4 These f igures are often quoted by the spokespeople of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.
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The majority of the Sudanese refugees live in cramped apartments which 
they share with other Sudanese (and in some cases Egyptians), and are con-
centrated in five neighbourhoods in Cairo (Ain Shams, Arba Wa Nus, Maadi, 
Nasr City, and 6th October). A small number of Sudanese refugees also lives 
in Alexandria. The education level of Sudanese refugees is relatively high, 
with many having a secondary school education and some being holders 
of university degrees as well. The education level of the northern refugees 
tends to be higher than that of the southerners, while men also tend to be 
more educated than the women.
Palestinians
Although the history of movements of Palestinian refugees to Egypt can 
be traced back to 1929, large-scale immigration of Palestinians took place 
during the 1948 and 1967 wars. Unlike other refugee groups, the status and 
affairs of Palestinian refugees are directly administered by the Egyptian 
government instead of UNHCR. The national policies regulating the status 
and affairs of the Palestinian refugees have changed over the past decades. 
For the most part, these policies restricted the rights of Palestinians, with 
the exception of the period of President Nasser’s rule during which Law 66 
was passed. This law gave Palestinians the right to work in the public sector 
and to be treated as nationals of the Republic (Al-Ebed 2003). However, in 
1972 this law was revoked and two administrative regulations were passed 
(Nos 47 and 48), which considered Palestinians in Egypt as holding the 
status of foreigners. This meant that they were not entitled to free education 
or health care and had to obtain a work permit before they could legally 
participate in the labour market.
Earlier waves of refugees who arrived in 1948 and after 1967 were is-
sued a one-year residence permit and a travel document by the Egyptian 
government. However, refugees who left Egypt with these travel documents 
could not return to the country without re-entry visas, which had to have 
been issued before departure. The fees for renewing residence permits 
vary according to the arrival date of the refugee. In recent decades, the 
granting of residence permits to Palestinian refugees has been determined 
on the basis of their reason for staying in Egypt. Reasons which are con-
sidered valid include pursuing education, legal employment, marriage to 
an Egyptian or co-owning a business with an Egyptian national (Zohry & 
Harrell-Bond 2003). Most of the current Palestinian refugees work in the 
informal sector and face great diff iculties in obtaining affordable educa-
tion. Moreover, young men who are not enrolled in school and who are not 
legally employed are particularly susceptible to detention and deportation. 
60 Mulki Al-ShArMAni 
Unlike the Sudanese and Somalis, Palestinian refugees do not live in specific 
neighbourhoods or cities, but are dispersed across the Egyptian nation.
Iraqis
In 2003 and with the war in Iraq and American occupation, a large influx 
of Iraqis sought refuge in Egypt. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates 
the number of Iraqis residing in Egypt to be 100,000-150,000.5 However, the 
number of Iraqi refugees registered with the UNHCR is 10,786. Before 2006, 
Iraqis arriving from Iraq were able to enter Egypt on a one-month tourist, 
student or investment visa. But since then, Iraqis who want to apply for an 
Egyptian visa are instructed by the Egyptian government to go to Syria 
and Jordan. Moreover, the granting of visas has become very scarce. Iraqi 
refugees who approach the UNHCR for refugee claims are recognised prima 
facia. Then, after screening, refugees who are identif ied as vulnerable are 
recommended for resettlement. In addition, there is screening for refugees 
who are eligible for resettlement through the Direct Access Program.6
Most of the Iraqi refugees live in Cairo, while a small number lives in 
Alexandria. Many of the refugees appear to come from Baghdad and are 
Sunni Muslims, Shi’a Muslims and Christians. Anecdotal evidence, as well 
as f indings from interviews with some Iraqi refugees conducted by a group 
of journalists and researchers for the Iraqi Voices in Cairo (2008) website, 
suggested that most of these refugees are highly educated professionals 
who are often married with children.
3.3 Egypt’s policies on refugees
Egypt was the only non-Western member of the drafting committee of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and its 
1967 Protocol).7 Egypt is also a State Party to the Organization of African 
Unity’s Convention Governing the Specif ic Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
5 In a telephone interview a staff member at the Refugee Affairs Unit at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs reported that the ministry reached this estimate on the basis of Iraqis pur-
chasing houses, cars and businesses in Egypt (personal communication, April 2008). A 2007 
Refugee International Report also estimates the number of Iraqi refugees in Egypt to be 70,000 
(Yoshikawa 2008).
6 This programme started in June 2007 as an initiative of the United States to provide protec-
tion through resettlement to Iraqis in Egypt and Jordan who were aff iliated with the US forces 
in Iraq. This programme is administrated by IOM.
7 The 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol were ratif ied by Egypt on 22 May 1981.
refugee MigrAtion to egypt: Set tleMent or trAnSit? 61
Africa,8 which expands the refugee definition contained in the 1951 Geneva 
Convention. Also, Article 53 of the Egyptian Constitution gives the right 
of asylum to political refugees. On the one hand, Egypt’s commitment to 
these international conventions translates into fairly generous admission 
rights for refugees, renewable temporary residence permits, and the right 
of non-refoulement. On the other hand, the government does not provide 
refugees with the rights and resources that would enable them to build 
an adequate life in Egypt. This is because after the ratif ication of the 1951 
Geneva Convention, Egypt placed reservations on Articles 12 (1) (Personal 
Status), 20 (Rationing), 22 (1) (Public Education), 23 (Public Relief) and 24 
(Labour Legislation and Social Security). In practice, these reservations 
imply that refugees are unable to access legal employment, free education 
or public health services.
For example, refugees are treated like foreigners in regulations pertaining 
to labour. Refugees, like all foreign nationals, are not allowed to work unless 
they have a work permit. To obtain a work permit, the potential employee 
applies to the Ministry of Manpower. Foreign applicants are not allowed to 
compete with the local workforce and are not allowed to work in particular 
sectors, such as tourism, oriental dancing, exports and customs-related jobs.9
The procedures and costs involved in obtaining work permits discourage 
refugees from seeking legal employment and Egyptian employers from 
hiring refugees, which explains why refugees tend to work in irregular jobs 
in the informal sector and why unemployment is high (Al-Sharmani 2003; 
Grabska 2005). This makes the economic conditions of most refugees very 
harsh. Most Sudanese and Somali refugees live in cramped apartment build-
ings in the poor neighbourhoods of the city. The apartments are generally 
shared with other co-ethnic refugee families. Moreover, because they are 
foreigners, Sudanese and Somali tenants pay much higher rents than poor 
Egyptians (Al-Sharmani 2003; Minnick & Nashaat 2009).
Refugee children are not entitled to free education in public schools, 
while private schools are generally too expensive for refugee populations. 
In 1992, the minister of education issued Decree No. 24, which gave the 
legal right to Sudanese, Jordanian and Libyan children to access primary 
education at state-owned schools. In 2000, this right was extended to other 
refugee children. Nevertheless, Decree No. 24 is not implemented on a large-
8 Egypt ratif ied the 1969 OAU Convention on 12 June 1981.
9 Foreign applicants from particular nationalities are exempted from paying the application 
fees, such as Sudanese working in the private sector; Palestinians and Italians who had been in 
the country for f ive years or more; and Greeks.
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scale basis as a consequence of ineffective coordination and communication 
within and between relevant ministries. For instance, in my interview with 
a senior specialist at the Department of Foreign Students at the Ministry 
of Education, he said that he was not aware of any ministerial decrees that 
allow children of refugees or asylum seekers to attend free public schools. 
In fact, according to him, there was no distinction between refugees and 
foreign nationals in the procedures and the regulations that both groups 
had to follow in order to enrol their children in Egyptian schools.10
Therefore, to enrol their children in schools, the parents of all foreign 
children (refugees and non-refugees) need to submit academic records 
and proof of residence in Egypt (e.g., a refugee card) to the school and 
Department of Foreign Students and have to pay tuition fees. Parents also 
need to f ill out security clearance forms which the Department of Foreign 
Students sends to the National Security Off ice for review and approval.
It seems that the challenges of implementing Decree No. 24 do not 
merely arise from lack of effective communication and coordination within 
government bodies. Another important factor is the unpopularity of public 
schools because of the low quality of the education they offer. Most of the 
public schools are crammed with students and lack adequate teaching staff 
and educational resources. There is also a perception among some of the 
refugees as well as NGOs and government bodies that refugees do not want 
to enrol in public schools because they do not think these schools prepare 
their children for life in the West, where the majority of the refugees want 
to resettle.11 In short, refugees’ access to public schools remains very limited. 
Very few refugee families manage to enrol their children in private schools. 
Many Sudanese and Somali refugees resort to other alternatives such as 
church-run and refugee-run schools. Some refugee families (mostly Somalis) 
also enrol their children in Al-Azhar-run schools.12
The ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior Affairs are the two main 
governmental entities with which the UNHCR Cairo off ice coordinates 
closely in order to ensure the protection of refugees and the management 
of their affairs. Both ministries deal mostly with issues related to refugees’ 
10 Interview with Senior Specialist at the Department of Foreign Students at the Ministry of 
Education, 12 March 2005.
11 This opinion was expressed to me repeatedly by staff members at different NGOs that work 
with refugees, such as Caritas, and Africa Middle East Refugee Assistance (AMERA), as well as 
by some of the Somali refugees (Al-Sharmani 2003, 2005; Grabska 2005).
12 These are primary through secondary schools that are run by the Al-Azhar academic institu-
tion. Such schools teach students both regular school subjects and more extensive religious 
education.
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residence permits and detention cases. For instance, any asylum seeker or 
refugee who wishes to apply for a residence permit goes to the Department 
of Refugee Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Department of 
Refugee Affairs, furthermore, acts as the main government body that the 
UNHCR, NGO, and refugee communities communicate with for advocacy 
work. Nonetheless, it is the UNHCR, rather than the Egyptian government, 
that predominately deals with refugees in the management of their affairs. 
Due to a lack of adequate capacities and institutional resources for the 
process of handling the asylum procedures, the Egyptian government has 
delegated this task to the UNHCR Cairo office. Thus, registration of refugees, 
refugee status determination interviews, durable solution interviews and 
all other asylum-related procedures are carried out by the UNHCR Cairo 
off ice. Also in cases where asylum seekers and refugees are detained, the 
UNHCR liaises with both departments so that they can be released.
In an interview, the Head of the Department of Refugee Affairs at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that the government was commit-
ted to protecting refugees because Egypt is a signatory to international 
conventions pertaining to Somali and Sudanese refugees. However, she 
also stressed that ‘real integration’ was not possible for the refugees and 
that their stay in Egypt was a ‘transitory phase’:
We have put reservations on the 1951 Geneva Convention, which is 
understandable. We do not have enough resources to offer education 
and other services to all nationals. So it is not possible for us to make 
that commitment to refugees. So refugees are not allowed to enrol in free 
public schools. But we [this off ice] try to help refugees who need educa-
tion on an individual case basis. We are also working on an agreement 
with European NGOs and the EU to build schools that will offer education 
to both Egyptian and refugee children. Refugees’ time in Egypt is a transi-
tory but an important phase … Refugees have to obtain a work permit 
before they can work. They have to go through the same procedures for 
obtaining a work permit that foreigners do. But many refugees manage 
to work in the tertiary sector like many Egyptians do (interview with 
Head of the Department of Refugee Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 17 February 2005).
This notion that the issue of refugees and their time in Egypt is temporary 
is reflected in the state’s lack of comprehensive national policy that regu-
lates all refugee affairs. Instead, on occasions the government resorts to 
fragmented and ineffective policy solutions, such as ministerial decrees, 
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to address some of the pressing needs of refugees. The vulnerable situation 
of refugees in Egypt is also reinforced by their ineligibility for Egyptian 
citizenship regardless of the length of their residency. This undermines 
the refugees’ opportunities for integration into Egyptian society. Because 
of their economic, social, and legal marginalisation, refugees lead harsh 
and precarious lives. This explains, to a large extent, why most refugees in 
Egypt seek resettlement as the durable solution for their situation. It also 
explains why refugees have a lot of expectations (often unrealistic) from 
the UNHCR off ice, the institution that handles their asylum procedures, 
including their resettlement.
3.4 UNHCR Cairo: Protection policies
Since the late 1990s, the UNHCR Cairo office has seen an enormous increase 
in the number of asylum seekers. For example, the number of asylum seekers 
doubled from 1998 to 1999. In 2001, the number of asylum seekers was 13,176, 
which was a 96 per cent increase from 1998 (UNHCR 2002; see also Kagan 
2002). In fact, the number of asylum seekers in 2002 was almost double 
the number of asylum seekers in the UNHCR Kenya off ice (UNHCR 2001; 
see also Kagan 2002). In particular, the number of Iraqis who are seeking 
asylum in Egypt continues to increase, currently constituting 25 per cent 
of the caseload at the UNHCR Cairo off ice (UNHCR 2008). By 2014, there 
were 18,307 asylum seekers. The increase in the number of asylum seekers 
coming to Egypt can be explained by a combination of factors. First, most 
of the asylum seekers come from countries with continuing armed conflicts 
and instability. Second, the UNHCR-assisted resettlement programme at-
tracts many refugees who feel that a safe and stable life is neither possible 
in their countries of origin nor in neighbouring host societies in Africa or 
the Middle East. A third factor, which has not been fully examined, is the 
transnational family network of which more and more refugees are becom-
ing part. That is, the efforts and desires of individual refugees to migrate 
and to ultimately resettle in the West are part and parcel of collective 
family-based strategies to ensure survival and a stable life for different 
family members (Al-Sharmani 2004).
Asylum seekers who wish to f ile a refugee claim go through the following 
procedures: they approach the UNHCR off ice and f ill out an application 
form. The applicant is given a registration date, which can be two to three 
months after the submission of the application. After the registration 
interview the applicant is given either a yellow card or an asylum seeker 
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letter with a refugee determination status (RSD) interview date. The RSD 
interview is often conducted within two to six months, depending on staff-
ing capacities. The waiting period for a decision is one to four months. The 
process is not the same for all refugees. For instance, asylum seekers who 
are recognised as prima facia, such as Iraqis, do not go through an RSD 
interview.
Asylum seekers with yellow cards are eligible for a six month residence 
permit. This temporary residence permit is renewable up to three times. 
After the RSD interview, asylum seekers who are recognised receive blue 
cards from the off ice and are eligible for a one year renewable residence 
permit. Residence permits issued to asylum seekers and recognised refugees 
are stamped on the yellow or blue card. Also the passport of the asylum 
seeker or refugee is voided by the Department of Residence and Immigration 
once the applicant receives the residence permit.
Individual refugee claims (apart from those recognised as prima facia) 
are recognised either on the basis of the 1951 Geneva Convention or on 
the basis of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention. Both kinds of refugees 
are entitled to annual residence permits and protection from detention 
and deportation. Also vulnerable individuals and families, regardless of 
their status as 1951 or 1969 OAU refugees, are entitled to limited forms 
of f inancial assistance, health care, and educational grants. The main 
distinction, however, between the two kinds of refugees is that those who 
are recognised on the basis of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention are not 
eligible for resettlement, since Western countries are not signatories to the 
convention. The exception to this has been vulnerable groups among the 
1969 OAU refugees, such as ‘women at risk’.
Asylum seekers who are recognised as 1951 Geneva Convention refugees 
go through a durable solution interview with an UNHCR off icial. The three 
options that are considered in such interviews, depending on the circum-
stances of each refugee claim, are local integration, voluntary repatriation, 
or resettlement. Understandably, voluntary repatriation has not been pos-
sible for the Sudanese and Somali refugees because of the armed conflicts 
in their countries of origin. This, however, may no longer be the case for 
Sudanese refugees, because of the recent peace agreement between the 
Sudanese government and the rebel groups in the south as well as the four 
freedom agreements between Egypt and Sudan.13
13 According to the UNHCR Fact Sheet-Egypt of February 2008, 184 Sudanese were voluntarily 
repatriated in the period January-February 2008.
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Resettlement is considered a durable solution for refugees who meet the 
resettlement criteria as outlined in the UNHCR Resettlement Handbook. 
The underlying premise of these criteria is that the refugee continues to be 
in a precarious and vulnerable condition in the f irst country of asylum for 
a variety of reasons and can only obtain protection and a durable solution 
through resettlement. The main resettlement criteria are 1) the refugee and/
or his or her family do not f ind legal and physical protection in the f irst 
country of asylum, 2) the refugee is a survivor of violence and torture and 
requires specif ic medical attention that is not available in the f irst country 
of asylum, 3) the refugee has certain medical needs or disabilities and lacks 
the mechanisms to lead a viable life in the f irst country of asylum, 4) the 
refugee is a ‘woman at risk’ who faced torture and violence in the country of 
origin and continues to be at risk in the f irst country of asylum for a variety 
of reasons that may be related to the situation in the country of origin as 
well as in the host country and 5) the refugee lives in a precarious security 
situation or harsh economic conditions in the f irst country of asylum. 
The resettlement programme in Egypt is one of the main attractions that 
motivate refugees to come to Cairo. Still, resettlement, unlike protection 
from refoulement and voluntary repatriation, is not a guaranteed right 
for the refugee. Moreover, as a durable solution, resettlement is a process 
that is determined to a large extent by the regulations and quotas set by 
receiving countries.
Asylum seekers who are rejected are eligible to appeal against the decision 
within one month and a committee at the UNHCR office reviews the appeal 
cases and makes decisions. If an appeal is rejected, the f ile of the asylum 
seeker is closed; hence the individual is no longer under the protection of 
the UNHCR and can be legally deported. This, however, rarely happens in 
reality. On the other hand, rejected asylum seekers face the drawbacks of 
staying in the country without the protection of the UNHCR, which include 
arbitrary detention and the inability to access the few services that are 
made available to the refugees by the UNHCR and refugee aid organisations.
The UNHCR ensures the protection of all kinds of refugees and asylum 
seekers from detention and deportation. While the detention of refugees 
and asylum seekers is not a regular and wide-scale problem in Egypt, it does 
take place. In such cases, the role of the UNHCR is to confirm the status of 
the detainee so that he or she can be released. However, the mechanism in 
place for this process is sometimes ineff icient (Helal 2004). When a refugee 
or asylum seeker is detained, the UNHCR is supposed to receive a letter 
from the Egyptian Immigration Department requesting confirmation of 
the status of the refugee. But in many cases, the UNHCR staff members are 
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informed of the detention of refugees through unoff icial means (i.e., the 
detainee’s family members or neighbours). The UNHCR sends a letter to the 
Immigration Department verifying the status of the detainee. When the 
Egyptian authorities are reassured that the refugee in detention is under the 
protection of the UNHCR, he or she is released. This process frequently lasts 
fourteen days, but can also take longer. Moreover, the physical conditions in 
detention centres are cruel. Detainees complain of harsh treatment and in 
some cases they are allegedly extorted for bribes by detention officers. Thus, 
on the one hand the legal protection that refugees and asylum seekers are 
granted is meaningful and beneficial because it allows them to reside in the 
country in relative safety. On the other hand, it has its limitations because 
of certain gaps in coordination and cooperation between the UNHCR and 
the relevant Egyptian institutions in this aspect.
To assist refugees with sustenance and access to some educational and 
health services, the UNHCR off ice offers recognised refugees and asylum 
seekers several forms of assistance through partnership with a number of 
NGOs. First, vulnerable refugees such as those with children, unaccompa-
nied minors, disabled and chronically ill refugees receive monthly f inancial 
assistance that ranges between EP 200 and EP 600.14 Financial assistance is 
dispensed through the Caritas Off ice in Cairo and eligible refugees collect 
the money from one of the branches of the Bank of Alexandria every two 
months. The UNHCR also gives educational grants that range from EP 
700 to 1,400 to 6-15 year old children of recognised refugees and asylum 
seekers. The grants are dispensed through the Catholic Relief Service Office 
and are paid in two instalments. Also other UNHCR partner organisations, 
such as the Joint Relief Ministry at All Saints Cathedral, offer counselling, 
support, and medical assistance for pregnant women, victims of torture, and 
refugees with tuberculosis. Recognised refugees can also access health care 
at a Caritas clinic which is run by two doctors. The UNHCR off ice (through 
Caritas) pays 50 per cent of the costs of the medication. Furthermore, the 
Refugee Programmes at Saint Andrews and All Saints Cathedral offer educa-
tion to children who are excluded from Egyptian schools. The UNHCR also 
supports the ‘Care with Love’ (CWL) NGO that offers on-the-job vocational 
training to refugees.
Nevertheless, the different forms of assistance that refugees receive from 
the UNHCR are insuff icient. This is because, while the number of refugees 
in Egypt has been increasing, the allocated budget to the UNHCR Cairo 
off ice has been dwindling (Sperl 2001). The sharp decrease in f inancial 
14 100 Egyptian pounds (EP) = US $18 in 2008 (or $16 in 2011).
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resources and the subsequent understaff ing resulted in a backlog of RSD 
cases. Also, single refugees and those without children complain that they 
do not receive f inancial assistance although they, like refugees with chil-
dren, are not employed. Some of those who receive f inancial assistance or 
educational grants complain of several problems that they encounter in the 
process of collecting the money. Sometimes, monthly f inancial assistance 
is delayed or suspended. Educational grants are not suff icient to cover 
school fees. Moreover, the grants are only dispensed to refugees after they 
submit receipts verifying that they had paid school fees. But parents point 
out that they often do not have the money to pay the fees in the f irst place 
and in some cases the delay of reimbursement has resulted in dismissal 
of children from schools (Al-Sharmani 2003). Moreover, many refugees 
also complain about inadequate health services at the Caritas clinic and 
lament that there are too few physicians overwhelmed with large numbers 
of patients and that quality of health care is low. In fact, the inadequate 
f inancial and staff ing resources of the off ice and the large number of 
asylum cases that it is handling have resulted in tensions between refugee 
groups and the off ice. On several occasions, Somali and Sudanese refugees 
have protested (separately) in front of the UNHCR off ice to voice their 
concerns and frustrations.
In response, UNHCR off icials have been negotiating with the Egyptian 
government to widen the legal rights and institutional support that are 
available for refugees. One outcome of this was the procedure of issuing 
yellow cards to asylum seekers and granting them six month residence 
permits. This procedure, which was f irst implemented in December 2002, 
was part of an effort to deal with the problem of detention of asylum seekers. 
Another achievement was the Ministerial Decree No. 24 that was issued 
by the Ministry of Education in 1992 and the Decision of the Minister in 
2000 to allow refugee children to have access to public schools. Also the 
UNHCR and the Catholic Service have been working on establishing a 
system which will relieve parents from the burden of paying school fees 
in advance by f inding ways in which the Catholic Relief Service can pay 
the schools directly. Furthermore, the UNHCR off ice has been involved in 
efforts to work with refugee associations and to support community-based 
efforts to address the needs of refugees. Despite these on-going efforts, the 
living conditions of most refugees remain very diff icult and UNHCR staff 
members as well as different NGOs working with refugees concur that the 
self-suff iciency of refugees and their integration into Egyptian society have 
been very challenging goals to achieve. The head of the Refugee Centre 
for Human Rights, an Egyptian NGO that offers legal aid to refugees and 
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helps them to access Egyptian court systems for documentation purposes, 
explained the limitations of the situation of the refugees in Egypt and the 
kind of protection they receive from the UNHCR as follows:
To determine whether the UNHCR is providing protection, we have to 
agree, f irst, on what protection means. If protection means giving refugees 
blue cards and protecting them from detention, then the answer is yes. 
The UNHCR is providing protection. If protection also means providing 
a humane life for refugees, then the UNHCR has failed (interview, Head 
of Refugee Centre for Human Rights, 15 March 2005).
For this Egyptian lawyer, overcoming the problems that refugees face in 
Egypt, and providing comprehensive and multi-layered protection, requires 
that the Egyptian government plays a central role in refugee affairs and that 
Western governments provide f inancial support to a much needed national 
integration programme. She said:
Refugees need to f ind an adequate life in host societies. The Egyptian 
government needs to help the refugee community access health and 
education services not on individual but on community bases. There 
needs to be a real policy for integration. But realistically in order for 
that to happen, Western countries must provide f inancial assistance to 
the Egyptian government because it lacks suff icient resources. There 
needs to be better coordination between top policymakers and junior 
government employees that implement these policies. For example, it is 
not enough for the government to decide that refugee children can now 
access public schools. There needs to be training of school staff so that 
they are ready and able to teach and handle classes that include refugee 
and Egyptian children and can encourage good interactions between 
refugee students and Egyptian ones.
When I asked the assistant representative of the UNHCR off ice in Cairo 
about the possibility of local integration for refugees in Egypt, he pointed 
out that it was diff icult to talk about integration in a developing country 
(interview, February 2005). He explained that perhaps it was more realistic 
to aim for self-suff iciency in this case. Yet, he admitted that even self-
suff iciency was diff icult to achieve. Refugees are concentrated in poor 
urban areas where accommodation is expensive and employment is very 
diff icult to f ind. Moreover, he agreed that the assistance that was provided 
to refugees by the UNHCR and partner organisations was limited.
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However, is the situation of refugees worse than that of poor Egyptians, 
who also have problems finding employment, who live in poor urban neigh-
bourhoods and slum areas where housing and living conditions are harsh, 
who may also suffer from human rights violations by law enforcement 
institutions, for example as a consequence of the Emergency Law introduced 
in 1981? The answer is complex. On the one hand, the living conditions of 
refugees are further worsened by their precarious legal status. Landlords 
charge them more rent. Their refugee cards sometimes do not ensure their 
protection from police off icers who still take them to detention centres and 
keep them in custody until the UNHCR intervenes. On the other hand, poor 
Egyptians, unlike refugees, lack a legal framework of international laws and 
conventions that advocate their protection, as the Head of the Department 
of Refugee Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues:
I think Somali and Sudanese refugees are doing much better [than poor 
Egyptians]. Refugees have the protection of the UNHCR. They have refu-
gee advocates, the UNHCR and our off ice is working for them and trying 
to protect them. Poor Egyptians have Allah. Refugees may be resettled, 
but what will Egyptians do if they cannot f ind the basic needs for life 
right here in their country? Also police off icers do not detain foreigners 
and refugees only. Egyptians are subject to that and it happens a lot that 
Egyptians also get detained if they are not carrying their personal IDs. 
Often when these off icers detain someone, they do it because they are 
trying to do their job. They are in some public place and they see someone 
they are not sure about and who happens not to have documents to prove 
his identity and residence status, so they detain them. It happens to 
Egyptians too. But we make sure that when refugees are detained they are 
released as soon as possible. And we offer this protection to recognised 
refugees as well as asylum seekers (interview, Head of Department of 
Refugee Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 February 2005).
Moreover, the depictions of refugees in the mass media convey contradic-
tory messages and images. Sometimes, refugees are portrayed as a national 
threat. Other times they are portrayed as people who need protection 
and Egypt’s duties as a host society are asserted. For instance, the title of 
one of the main featured articles in the weekly Rosa el Yusuf in 2003 was 
‘The Floods of Africans and Asians are Snatching Livelihood from Our 
Youth’ (Subhi & Abdel-Gawad 2003). The article mentioned the danger 
of the increasing number of African and Asian migrants who would be 
‘stealing’ employment opportunities from Egyptian youths by working as 
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street vendors. The article also depicted the migrants as sources of social 
problems such as drugs and prostitution that were, according to the article, 
becoming prevalent in Egypt. Needless to say, the language of the article was 
highly inflammatory and prejudiced. There was no mention in the article 
of the refugee status of the ‘African migrants’ nor or of Egypt’s obligations 
towards them as a signatory of international conventions on refugee rights. 
Moreover, in letters to the editor published in the daily Al-Ahram in the 
same year, Egyptian readers raised the issue of the threats that refugees 
pose to Egyptian society because of their alleged loose moral values, again 
related to alleged drug use and illicit sexual relations.
On the other hand, newspapers and TV programmes also feature refugee 
assistance efforts that are led by UNHCR Goodwill Ambassadors such as 
the famous Egyptian actor Adel Imam. Such media reports do not highlight 
the perceived problems posed by refugees but the generosity of Egyptian 
society for providing protection to them.
3.5 Refugees’ experiences
Getting by in Egypt
Family and community-based support systems are the main strategies 
that many refugees use to survive on a daily basis. Refugees depend on 
one another to share information about housing, UNHCR news, residence 
permits, detention problems, and other aspects related to their lives in 
Egypt. The refugees are all concentrated in Cairo, in neighbourhoods popu-
lated by other co-ethnic refugees. They share apartments with other family 
members or refugees whom they have befriended in Cairo or have known 
in previous host societies. Most live on a combination of limited sources 
of income. These sources are often: remittances from family members liv-
ing in the West or Gulf countries, f inancial assistance received from the 
UNHCR, or small and highly irregular income from intermittent work in the 
informal market. There are problems with all. First, while remittances are a 
main source of sustenance money, they are sometimes irregular, especially 
in cases when remitting family members lose their jobs, or discontinue 
remitting to attend to another family member who has more serious need, 
or where a family conflict has occurred. Second, only vulnerable refugees 
such as single parents with children, disabled individuals or unaccompa-
nied minors receive f inancial assistance from the UNHCR. As previously 
mentioned, this assistance is meagre. Moreover, there have been reports 
by numerous refugees who are eligible for such assistance that they often 
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encounter problems in collecting the money, such as delays in disbursing 
the money or sudden and unexplained suspension of monthly allowances.
Third, the kind of wage-paying work that refugees undertake is irregular, 
poorly paid, and with no legal benefits or labour protection. Sudanese male 
refugees are mostly employed as construction labourers, factory workers, 
off ice cleaners, and security guards (Grabska 2005). Compared to the men, 
Sudanese refugee women f ind more job opportunities, with higher wages, 
in the domestic work market. Some of the women also earn income from 
petty sales and crafts. The average salary earned by Sudanese refugees 
ranges from EP 250-350 for males to EP 400-600 for females (Grabska 2005).
Unlike Sudanese refugees, Somalis engage in income-generating ac-
tivities that are mostly conf ined to Somali communities. Women work 
as domestic workers for Somali émigrés who have relocated from various 
Western countries. Some women also work for Egyptian families. Somali 
domestic workers make between EP 400 and EP 600 when they work for 
Egyptian families and $100-$150 when they work for Somali émigrés. Some 
of the women also generate income by selling home-made Somali food 
to Somali émigrés on special occasions such as weddings and religious 
gatherings. Such female vendors make the equivalent of EP 200 to EP 300 a 
month. Also, some male refugees teach Quran, Arabic and Somali to Somali 
refugee children as well as the children of the émigré families and earn 
between EP 120 and EP 400. The scope and prevalence of these different 
kinds of income-generating activities are fairly small because potential 
employers (i.e., émigré families) are still not that numerous when compared 
to the size of the Somali refugee population.15
In recent years, however, a number of Egyptian telecommunication 
businesses (internet cafes and telephone off ices) which cater for mostly 
Sudanese and Somali refugees have been hiring individuals from these 
refugee groups (Al-Sharmani 2003; Grabska 2005). The number of refugees 
hired by such businesses is very small and thus far all employees have 
been male. But it remains to be seen (and studied) to what extent this 
phenomenon will become prevalent and what its impact will be on the 
livelihood of the refugees. In addition, other spaces for societal member-
15 There are no off icial f igures on the number of Somali émigrés who relocate to Egypt from 
the West. During my doctorate research in the period 2001-2003, I calculated that there were 
about 200 Somali émigré families in Egypt. But my research and informal observations that I 
have carried out since then suggest that increasingly more émigrés are relocating from North 
America and Europe to Egypt in order to purchase homes, educate their children in Egyptian 
private schools, pursue religious education, and engage in trading activities. However, these 
émigré families maintain a transnational life, going back and forth. 
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ship are slowly being opened for refugees as a result of intensive advocacy/
research work that has been carried out by local research institutions, the 
UNHCR, its implementing partners and other activists. This is reflected in 
the recent participation of Egyptian opposition movements (such as Kifaya) 
in advocacy work on the behalf of refugees.16 Also a number of Egyptian 
NGOs (e.g., the Coptic Evangelical Society), which in the past were solely 
concerned with Egyptian communities, are now taking part in development 
programmes that target refugees.
Despite these new spaces of cooperation, and positive interactions 
between some sectors of Egyptian society and refugees, the lives of most 
refugees continue to be characterised by a high degree of economic vulner-
ability, difficult living conditions exemplified by poor and cramped housing, 
limited educational opportunities and precarious legal protection which 
does not lead to long-term security and stability. Under such conditions, 
resettlement in the West becomes highly desirable to the refugees as it is 
seen as a way to access legal employment, adequate health care, educational 
services and Western citizenship (which is perceived as a form of capital).
Resettlement and protection: Are they related?
Most refugees seek resettlement through the UNHCR. But while the number 
of recognised refugees has recently increased, the same has not been true 
of those who are resettled. Thus, UNHCR-assisted resettlement can only 
be offered to a small number of refugees. Accordingly, some of the refugees 
who are found not eligible for resettlement or have despaired of waiting have 
resorted to other means to achieve this goal. Sudanese refugees, for instance, 
actively pursue resettlement by applying to the Australian sponsorship 
programme. Some of these refugees are able to meet the requirements of 
this programme with the assistance of family relatives in Australia, while 
others obtain assistance from churches in Egypt in order to complete the 
requirements of the application process. In addition, between 2002 and 2003 
several hundred Somali refugees attempted to travel to Europe through 
Libya, like Syrians are now doing. Many of the refugees travelled to Niger 
by air and then entered Libya by land, and from there took small boats that 
were overloaded with refugees. Some lost their lives on these harrowing 
journeys, yet some made it to Italian shores, keeping similar hopes alive 
for those left behind in Egypt.
16 For example, Kifaya members participated in the protests that were organised by the 
Sudanese refugees in 2005 and were very critical of the violent break up of the protest by Egyptian 
security forces. 
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The importance (perhaps even the necessity) of resettlement is ever more 
real for Somali refugees who moved and settled in different host societies such 
as Kenya, Libya and Saudi Arabia, where they encountered inadequate protec-
tion and deprivation from basic rights and resources to secure livelihood and 
education. Many of these refugees repeatedly talk about the inseparability of 
protection and the possibility of having a life with long-term legal stability, 
employment possibilities and a sense of a future (Al-Sharmani 2005).
This search for safety and stability through onward movements often 
forms part of the collective needs, wishes and struggles in which several 
family members participate, in different ways. That is, refugees move to 
seek safety and stability not only for themselves but also for a transnational 
circle of inter-linked family members (Horst 2006). For instance, a Somali 
man who fled his homeland in the civil war ended up in Saudi Arabia. He 
is working irregularly but manages to remit money to his extended family 
in the homeland. The family used the money to send his niece to Egypt 
so that she can be safe from the danger of rape and sexual violence that 
women have been confronting since the start of the civil war. Meanwhile 
the niece has found a job as a domestic worker and is supporting a widowed 
aunt and her children who are also living in Egypt. The aunt and children 
await resettlement so that they can secure more adequate protection and 
resources that will in turn enable them to participate in the transnational 
familial efforts to secure the safety and well-being of other family members.
Yet, the struggle and the pains of resettlement are not only related to the 
question of how to secure it and the price that people sometimes pay in the 
process. There are also the psychological and physical pains that refugees 
associate with the yearning for resettlement, which Somali refugees call 
Buufis (Horst 2006).
In short, the protection of refugees cannot be divorced from opportuni-
ties for their economic self-sustenance and social development. Similarly, 
the availability of economic opportunities for refugees without legal rights 
is an inadequate mechanism for pursuing protection and wellbeing. That 
is, adequate refugee protection is multi-layered. It starts with well-def ined 
legal rights but it is also contingent on an environment in which refugees 
are enabled (institutionally, economically and socially) to sustain them-
selves, secure their well-being and become full members of the host society. 
Thus, the initial movements of Sudanese and Somali refugees from their 
homeland, the onward movement of some of them from other countries to 
Egypt, their yearning for and/or the pursuit of movement from Egypt to the 
West need to be understood as an intrinsic part of a complex and dynamic 
process of seeking adequate protection and well-being.
refugee MigrAtion to egypt: Set tleMent or trAnSit? 75
3.6 Conclusion: Settlement or transit?
In a 2006 report on transit migration in Egypt, Roman (2006) categorises 
the Somali and Sudanese refugees as transit migrants. The author bases her 
classif ication primarily on the basis of the refugees’ wish for and (in some 
cases) pursuit of resettlement in the West. In an article that re-examines 
the political genealogy and academic use of the term ‘transit migration’ 
Düvell (2006) takes Roman and other authors to task by arguing that their 
uncritical use of the term ‘transit migrant’ creates a lot of confusion. For 
instance, Roman classif ies Sudanese and Somali refugees as transit mi-
grants although a considerable number of these refugees have lived in the 
country for a decade or more; few of them actually resettle in the West and 
we do not know (at least from Roman’s study) about the further movements 
and outcomes of Sudanese and Somali refugees who resettled in the West.
Düvell traces the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term ‘transit 
migration’ to political discourses in which the term was f irst used in the 
nineties. He points out that in the discourses of the IOM, UN and EU, the 
term is used in multiple and inconsistent ways, all of which reflect a tone 
of perceived threat that is associated with this kind of migration. In these 
discourses, transit migrants are more or less conceived of as those who are 
passing through or staying in a country for a temporary period of time while 
planning to move to another destination. In addition, transit migration is 
often coupled with issues of irregular movements and traff icking.
This highlights two important issues that are perhaps not well-examined 
in studies of transit migration. For one thing, the people often referred to 
as transit migrants engage in complex and dynamic processes of decision-
making and strategising, regarding the trajectories of their movements 
and their purposes. This process is shaped by multiple and often changing 
factors. In the case of refugees, such factors include the kind and quality 
of protection that they need and are able to access in different asylum 
countries; their family-based needs and strategies for securing protection 
and well-being; refugee policies of asylum countries from which refugees 
have moved or where they or their families are currently staying; and the 
availability of resources that enable movement to particular countries. 
These resources include legal and social capital, economic means, migratory 
experiences and facilitating networks, etc. Thus, the multiple movements 
of some Somali and Sudanese refugees to other countries in Africa and 
the Middle East and then to Egypt, and their pursuit of resettlement in 
the West, exemplify the above-mentioned process of decision-making and 
strategising.
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Second, the existing conceptualisations of transit migration conceal 
the connections between this kind and other types of movement. The 
Somali émigrés in Egypt are a case in point: many were refugees in the 
Middle East and Africa, resettled in the West and obtained citizenship. 
But in the past seven years, it has been observed that some of these North 
American and European Somalis have also been relocating to Egypt, thus 
their movement to Egypt turns out to be circular. Their motivations are 
multiple and tend to consist of the desire to escape cultural and socio-
economic marginalisation in Western societies, to invest in interdependent 
relationships of maintenance and care with family members who are in 
the homeland or in neighbouring countries, and to use the newly acquired 
capital of Western citizenship and educational skills to pursue an empower-
ing, albeit transnational, life (Al-Sharmani 2004). There are links between 
Somali refugees’ pursuit of resettlement in the West and the relocation of 
Somalis with Western citizenship to Egypt. Both groups of Somalis are often 
part of transnational families whose members are collectively engaged in 
interdependent relations of care and support. In addition, the movements 
of both groups seem to be different parts of a similar endeavour, which is 
seeking a life of adequate protection and empowerment.
In brief, the term ‘transit migrant’ fails to capture important aspects of 
migratory experiences of refugees in Egypt. However, host societies’ policies 
towards refugees are an important factor shaping the (both political and 
academic) discourses on transit migration and do have a certain impact 
on refugees’ experiences. In the case of Egypt, the government’s policies 
and national discourses have generally treated and portrayed the presence 
of refugees as transitory. These policies and discourses have influenced 
refugees’ sense of the temporary nature of their dwelling in the country, 
even if they have been staying for more than a decade. Thus, in our efforts 
to improve our understanding of transit migration, we also need to be 
aware of how the issue is framed differently by those who move and by the 
societies that receive them.
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The Case of Sub-Saharan Transmigrants Stopping Over in 
Morocco
Mehdi Alioua
Life is a caravanserai
It has two doors
I entered through one
I left through the other
(Sufi proverb)
Since the generalisation of the visa regime across the Schengen area in the 
1990s, followed by the restrictions on issuing visas which now stand in the 
way of the majority of Africans wishing to migrate to Europe, staged trans-
national migration has become one solution for African migrants, opening 
or reopening new migratory routes from sub-Saharan Africa, through the 
Maghreb, to Europe. In this chapter, this phenomenon is referred to as 
‘transmigration’, as explained and justif ied below. So, thousands of sub-
Saharan transmigrants enter and relocate themselves collectively every 
year in the Maghreb, setting up stopovers which, since their establishment 
in the 1990s, have continued to serve as migratory staging posts for new-
comers: these stopovers have a social history which has gradually become a 
part of migratory trajectories. This study of the sub-Saharan transmigrants’ 
transnational networks therefore asks how we should see the creation of the 
unrestricted spatial configurations produced by these moving populations, 
within a geopolitical context where the borders are not as porous as the 
term ‘transnational’ would suggest. In response to this, the notion of a 
stopover, seen simultaneously as an observation location, a methodological 
framework and an analytical tool, seems much more relevant than the 
notion of ‘transit’, which is too restrictive from a space-time point of view. 
This chapter develops and illustrates this idea, working from the example 
of Moroccan stopovers in the transmigration of sub-Saharan Africans.
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4.1 The stage: The best place to observe and understand 
‘transit migrations’
Since the 1980s, a number of social scientists have identif ied new concepts 
associated with changing aspects of the international migration experience, 
including ‘circulatory territory’,1 ‘migratory circulation’2 or ‘transnational-
ism’, with the resulting notions of ‘transnational migration’ and ‘transmi-
grants’ (Glick-Schiller, Bash & Szanton Blanc 1995). All these terms have 
been developed to give a better description of the processes through which 
migrants create social spaces which extend across geographical, national 
and political borders. Migrants, whatever status is assigned to them or 
identity they claim for themselves, are implicated in establishing relation-
ships between different places: they connect territories, construct multiple 
networks, encourage the circulation of goods and services (Tarrius 2002), 
ideas and images (Appadurai 2005) and carry with them a whole world of 
relationships and social networks that support them. When borders are 
closed to them, the nature of the flows changes: new forms of displacement 
appear and change the migratory space, simultaneously enlarging it. At 
the same time, former emigration countries become immigration spaces, 
and vice versa. In the face of this constant f lux, the traditional distinc-
tions between emigration countries and immigration countries, between 
work migration and multiple displacements, between lasting migration 
and temporary migration, are no longer adequate to describe the changes 
taking place.
This research, focusing on the distinct, often individual, migration 
projects of sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco, draws its inspira-
tion from the suggestions and concepts mentioned above, particularly 
‘circulatory territory’. New empirical data emphasise the diff iculties these 
populations have in crossing certain frontiers or getting used to the feeling 
of de-territorialisation, a geographical concept of central importance in 
this study. The transnational social networks of these migrants are not 
borderless configurations: they cross clearly delineated territories, though 
they have no contact with the territory; they are not implicated in the 
social, political, cultural or economic life of the territory which they cross. 
1 The notion of circulatory territory proposed by Alain Tarrius (1989) in Anthropologie du 
mouvement. The paradigm, ref ined in 2000 (Tarrius 2000) described a certain socialisation of 
those spaces which support displacement. Individuals acknowledge one another within the 
spaces which they enter or cross during a shared history of mobility, which triggers an original 
social bond.
2 Notion embraced by the Migrinter research team.
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However, this is not a permanent state. Since it is not permanent, migrants’ 
de-territorialisation is therefore considered as relative, rather than absolute, 
in that it only lasts a period of time.
Such temporary de-territorialisation can therefore only be understood in 
relation to the re-establishment of links between migrants and the social rela-
tions present in the territory where they are resident: the re-territorialisation. 
Staged transnational migration is in fact a movement where the time and 
space of migration are punctuated by de-territorialisation, re-territorialisa-
tion and re-de-territorialisation as migrants are connected, disconnected and 
reconnected with the overlapping social spaces of their points of origin. In 
the case of sub-Saharan migrants, who often have no visas, the transnational 
migratory space they have established is not defined, and can extend over 
several years, straddling several countries which have not planned for their 
arrival or settlement. Hence, the space-time dimension must necessarily be 
reintroduced to this context, where migratory trajectories are punctuated 
into stages during which migrants reorganise themselves until the time 
arrives to cross the next border confronting them (Tarrius 1989).
Frontier effects do indeed persist, and it is the migrants’ ability to 
overcome (or failure to overcome) those which confront them which helps 
most in understanding what these transnational dynamics mean. This 
involves a consideration of their circulatory know-how or ‘savoir-circuler’ 
(Tarrius 2001, 2007) – the way in which they organise themselves socially 
in time and space to achieve this – along with the way in which they take 
their own frontiers with them, transferring them to where they settle. For 
the sociologist, this most clearly manifests itself at the stopovers, where 
migrants settle by choice or necessity, for as long as it takes to get their 
bearings, reorganise themselves and sometimes to redefine their migratory 
project.3 It is these stopovers – whose organisation and regulation has been 
the focus of my own research for the past eight years– that enable them 
to organise their mobility and their stay. This chapter does not focus on 
the origin or destination societies, or on the so-called ‘transit’ societies, 
but rather on the connections forged by the migrants between these three 
that result in processes of de-territorialisation, re-territorialisation and 
re-de-territorialisation.
My research has considered this form of migration over the past eight 
years, using a qualitative, ethnographic approach involving the sub-Saharan 
African populations who shape it. I have tried to identify how the movement 
3 As I have already shown, some decide to settle in the Maghreb countries for a longer period, 
without in any way abandoning their dream of reaching Europe (Alioua 2005). 
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of these migrant populations expresses itself in social space and transna-
tional territories, perpetuating the tensions caused by their mobility and 
their rootedness in the countries of the Maghreb and the Western Mediter-
ranean in general and in Morocco in particular. This has involved more 
than 300 migrants – men, women, young people, refugees or ‘adventurers’ 
(as they describe themselves) – with whom I have established relationships, 
ranging from short- to long-term depending on the situation, and whom I 
have followed in their everyday lives. Where considered necessary, I have 
conducted biographical interviews, not restricting the analysis simply to 
local contexts and social organisations. In this way I have considered the op-
portunities offered by international migration. The researcher may become 
involved with these relational networks and, without becoming a member of 
the collective, have some contact with the everyday activities of the survey 
populations, exchanging small services. This technique is a variation of 
participant observation, what Alain Tarrius, Lamia Missaoui and I (amongst 
others) refer to as ‘accompanying observation’. Unlike formal sociological 
surveys – statistics or monographs, which give the clearest picture of the 
morphology of populations and their organisation – it enables direct interac-
tion and the establishment of relationships at the centre of the process we 
are concerned with. In fact, once confidence has been established, thanks 
in particular to certain meetings and relationships which may result from 
exchanging gifts, the researcher becomes part of the network.
In order to reconstruct the uncertain development of the transnational 
migratory experience I consider the links that sub-Saharan transmigrants 
create over the course of their journey and their impacts on the places in 
which they reside. The study raises the issue of the creation of unrestricted 
spatial configurations produced by these moving populations, within a geo-
political context where borders are not as porous as the term ‘transnational’ 
would suggest. The notion of the ‘migration stage’ or stopover becomes an 
observation location but also a methodological framework – providing a 
context for accompanying observation – and an analytical tool. The aim is to 
give an account of the social autonomy of these migrants and their capacity 
to get through borders and to renegotiate some of the basic assumptions 
about ‘sedentary’ peoples. Their border crossing ‘savoir faire’ contributes to 
the construction of transnational spaces in which they manage to circulate 
with varying degrees of success. The chapter also aims to identify the dif-
f iculties they have in getting through these ‘trials’4 or ‘barriers’ which are 
4 For a sociological view of the trial, particularly in the individuation process, see Martuccelli 
(2006).
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not only located at the geographical conf ines of nation states, but also 
within them, most often at the margins, such as in some of the peripheral 
districts of the larger towns and cities.
To circulate, there is a need for staging posts in which these popula-
tions can get their bearings and f ind all the information, connections and 
resources (economic, social and symbolic) needed, initially for survival 
and subsequently for the next part of the journey they wish to make. In 
the case of sub-Saharan Africans in Morocco who want to go to Europe but 
feel ‘stuck’, the main focus for sociological analysis should be the original 
migratory projects, at least those declared by the individuals. There could 
also be the temptation to reduce this type of migration to simple ‘transit’ 
and to talk of Morocco as a ‘transit country’, of this movement as a ‘transit 
migration’ and of these people as ‘transit migrants’. But I would distance 
myself from these terminologies which I f ind not only unsatisfactory in 
terms of our sociological understanding, but also suff iciently ambiguous, 
politically, to mislead the researcher.
The term ‘transit’ has a particularly restrictive def inition in space-time 
terms and is really not good enough for migration sociology. I understand 
‘transit’ as the time one spends wandering about, for example in the 
terminal building at some international airport waiting for one’s next 
f light. Furthermore, this term assumes subjective realities which vary 
depending on whether one is a migrant, a journalist, a politician, a lawyer, 
or even according to the country in which one f inds oneself. This restrictive 
understanding of transit matches the place it occupies today within our 
societies, whether as a subject for discussion by ‘experts’ or as an issue 
in public debate (Morice n.d.). In Europe, for example, the term ‘transit 
country’ is curiously dedicated in its common meaning to the countries 
on the fringes of the EU, accentuating further the presumption of the 
exteriority of these countries and the idea that a ‘natural’ border separates 
the EU from the rest of the world. However, it should be remembered that 
countries such as Spain and Italy were considered transit countries in the 
1990s before becoming important immigration countries. Furthermore, 
countries formerly known as ‘transit’ countries, such as Cyprus or Malta, 
have changed status simply because of their entry into the union, becoming 
‘countries of f irst entry into the EU’, whereas we are well aware that the 
majority of migrants do not wish to settle in these countries but to try and 
get into the Schengen area!
The notion of stopover conveys the complexity of migratory routes much 
better, replacing the space-time dimension, and does not become reduced 
during the waiting process into a ‘non-place’, like an airport, with a mini-
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mum of interaction before moving on to another. The stopover is a much 
longer and much more complex period during which social interactions 
and immersion are signif icant enough to transform, or at least to influence, 
those carrying out migratory activities, as much as those who see them pass-
ing by and settling. Stopovers bring actors together who did not previously 
know one another, who have developed their migratory project individually 
and independently within their own social environment, but who must 
now negotiate with each other and organise themselves collectively. They 
bring together actors who can be distinguished from one another by their 
origins and their aims.
Migratory trajectories are not smooth and often run into obstacles: in the 
case which concerns us here, they are governed by transnational networks 
that are affected by the border control policies introduced by nation states, 
and particularly the EU. Migrants must therefore reorganise themselves, 
working out strategies during their stay at the stopovers which stand a 
chance of overcoming the dissuasive policies. These strategies often reveal 
the density of their social networks. During their stopovers, sub-Saharan 
migrants, who are almost nomadic and always strangers in the societies they 
pass through, must of necessity acquire know-how and social skills during 
their process of de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation, of engagement 
in and disengagement from new social relationships. This encourages a 
certain distancing from so-called ‘ethnic’ belonging, which is all too often 
seen by researchers as irrevocable and insurmountable.
4.2 The establishment of collectives in Maghrebian stopovers
Since the generalisation of the visa regime across the Schengen area in 
the 1990s, the majority of Africans wishing to migrate to Europe now face 
restrictions on the issuance of visas. International migration in stages, 
dodging the state rules imposed to control entry to, residency in and exit 
from a national territory, has become one frequent scenario for African 
migrants, opening or reopening (Bredeloup & Pliez 2005) new migratory 
routes from sub-Saharan Africa, through the Maghreb, to Europe. I refer to 
this as ‘staged transnational migration’ or ‘transmigration’. While the need 
for immigrant labour remains high in Europe, depending on the sector, 
these increasingly restrictive migratory policies are paradoxical and have 
helped, to some extent, to encourage a number of Africans to embark on the 
route to what they call ‘the adventure’, and what the media and politicians 
call ‘illegal immigration’ or ‘transit migration’. While this is not the only 
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determining factor,5 a great many of these sub-Saharan migrants would 
have f lown directly to Europe if they had been able to do so. However, 
the EU is neither a fortress nor a sieve. The numbers of people, male and 
female, who manage, either legally or illegally, to get across the frontiers 
and the numbers of those remain stuck en route, in countries where they 
had not planned to settle, give us an idea of the complexity of this form of 
migration, in which the dimensions of people’s migratory projects must be 
taken into account.
In fact, while this migratory movement begins in many different ways, 
in terms of places, reasons and situations, once these actors have left home 
with their personal migratory project, they reorganise themselves col-
lectively during the stopovers which punctuate their journey (Alioua 2003). 
To anchor themselves in these spaces, these migrants must collectively 
make up for an absence of territory by channelling their individual desire 
for mobility (Alioua 2005, 2010). So, having wandered the roads and crossed 
Africa from south to north, thousands of sub-Saharan transmigrants enter 
and relocate themselves collectively every year in the Maghreb, setting up 
stopovers which, since their establishment in the 1990s, have continued to 
serve as migratory staging posts for newcomers. These staging posts have a 
social history which has gradually built up along the migratory trajectories. 
This is the fruit of the experiences built up by the f irst transmigrants, who 
organised themselves into collectives, which has been passed on and shared 
throughout the whole of the migratory networks. All of this has therefore 
required pre-existing social skills and the ability to learn new ones.
Since migrants are constantly moving from one place to another, they 
are confronted by things which are alien, new and unstable: this is clearly 
the opposite of the norm, of the ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu 1980) linked to a social 
order with a particular territory, a socially organised space to which this 
order applies. Feeling lost and alien to the societies in which they anchor 
themselves for a period of time, they gain their bearings as best they can, 
thanks in particular to their project which allows a certain social closeness 
with the other transmigrants, but also with the local people who share 
some of the same characteristics. Here it is not just the way in which these 
dynamics modify the material lives of these populations which concerns 
5 South-South migrations are important as the classic South-North forms. It should also be 
remembered that the majority of African migrants reside in an African country, not in Europe. 
Furthermore, the stopovers which are being occupied today by Sub-Saharan migrants in order 
to complete their journey to Europe were often established by previous migratory movements 
in the Maghreb or West Africa (Alioua 2007).
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us, but also the way in which they tend to give an unprecedented role to the 
imagination. The imagination is not confined to certain specif ic domains, 
nor is it the preserve of certain social categories – like the myth of ‘national 
identity’ put about by the institutions and the elites for example (Anderson 
1996) – but it plays a role in everyday practices, particularly in situations of 
poverty or marginality, like those resulting from transnational migration. 
These are situations where actors are obliged to reinvent themselves in 
their feeling of abandonment, in their wandering or their exile, a world of 
their own, using, for example, all the images that globalisation (Appadurai 
2005) puts about and taking ownership of them.
To illustrate these dynamics in more practical terms, I echo words used by 
Mustapha Belbah to talk of young Moroccans who migrate ‘clandestinely’: 
all the sub-Saharan migrants surveyed see ‘elsewhere as the universe of the 
possible’ (Belbah 2002). We have shown that by over-valuing ‘resourceful-
ness’ and ‘adventure’ in this way, they reveal the dimension of individuality 
which lies within their staged transnational migration. In other words, by 
reclaiming the image of the entrepreneur in the sense of the ‘self-made 
man’, they turn the image of the ‘victim’ (not to mention the ‘good savage’) 
on its head, trying to show, if given the chance to express themselves, how 
far they themselves are the decision-makers in their lives. The interviews I 
conducted with dozens of these sub-Saharan migrants from all backgrounds 
over the past seven years led us to reach the same conclusion as Mustapha 
Belbah: the borders that these transmigrants want to ‘burn’6 are f irstly those 
which occupy a place in their thought world as a separation between the 
impossibility of personal achievement, of freeing oneself from family and 
social constraints, and transmigration which allows them to become the 
authors of their own future. As some young Malians said, ‘We know what 
awaits us along the road. But we’re already dead here! So physical death for 
a cause doesn’t frighten us any more … It’s the only chance we have … and 
we must take it!’ By crossing the physical borders of nation states they hope 
also to cross those which, in their perception, separate the world of waiting 
and inactivity from the world of action and innovation.
In order to get through all these frontiers, particularly those symbolic 
frontiers which represent the move from childhood to autonomy as an 
6 Moroccans, who make up the majority currently travelling these routes ‘clandestinely’ into 
Europe, use the term hrag – literally ‘burn’ – to express the action of crossing a border without 
off icial authorisation: they are very often called hragga, the ‘burners’. But the important thing 
to remember here is that sub-Saharan migrants stopping over on the same journey as these 
Moroccan people now use the same words and have taken up this image for their own use.
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adult,7 migrants must develop mutual bonds of solidarity, despite the wish 
for individual emancipation. It is necessary to ensure the cooperation of 
the members of migratory networks, of those who want the same thing: 
to realise one’s full potential, or, as they put it, ‘to f ind your life’.8 So it is 
on the basis of thinking and planning for the future, rather than identity, 
that collectives are formed to cope with adversity, organising themselves to 
work together because of the complementarity of their migratory projects. 
The notion of a project then becomes of interest because it highlights the 
link between social practices and appearances, and between imaginations 
and social action. One of the main characteristics of social action is that it 
contains a representation of the future which is sought, and it orders itself 
according to this representation. Projects give meaning to actions through 
this representation of desired aims.
Staged transnational migration is the result of a project, in the sense 
of the image of a situation which one hopes to attain – that is, everything 
by which people tend either collectively or individually to change the 
world which surrounds them, or to change themselves and their position 
within this environment. These migrants have an idea of elsewhere, like 
an idealised Europe, and want to get there: this is a project which f inds 
meaning in migration itself, and is projected onto the spaces and borders 
which migration leads one to travel and to cross. The project is seen as an 
objective which ranks higher than all other goals. It seems then that they 
fulfil their potential as drivers of their own lives, equipping themselves with 
a migratory project which takes the place of a life plan or social mobility, and 
they gain recognition among themselves. They build an ‘elsewhere’ where 
everything becomes possible, an imaginary space of social fulfilment, and to 
get there they elaborate a plan in an imaginary elsewhere where they hope 
to f ind the means to achieve their ambitions. ‘The most important thing is 
to leave. You have to leave! You have to leave the country, then afterwards, 
everything is possible!’ a young Ghanaian reported. Over the course of 
migration they collectively negotiate this journey, crossing together all 
the frontiers that they encounter (Alioua 2006), whether national, natural, 
social or cultural; their migratory project is realised f irst and foremost in 
the journey.
7 However, it should be remembered that the majority of these sub-Saharan migrants stopping 
over are young: of the 300 people we met, 257 were aged between 16 and 32 (Alioua 2010).
8 Sub-Saharan migrants stopping over often use the phrase ‘I’m going to f ind my life’ to 
explain and legitimise their migration.
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Following this, it is thanks to the network that this transnational 
migration is possible; it is the relational structure which allows the mi-
gratory project to be directed. The trajectories deriving from it, weaving 
de-territorialised relationships on the basis of a shared imagination and 
project. Migrants passing from one regulated area to another show those 
who follow how to succeed in this step on the basis of their own experiences. 
But this suggests that the signs marking out the routes are recognisable to 
all, in other words that a collective thought world brings all these individu-
als together, allowing actors to interpret the codes they have worked out. 
During the constant succession of such steps, migratory routes are also 
‘traced’ in social terms; migrants leave little markers behind so that others 
can recognise and benefit from them. Distributing such information in this 
manner about the path to follow helps with the acquisition of one dimen-
sion of nomadic know-how: to set up a circulation by marking out routes 
or drawing up new ones to be able to travel them again or to help those 
following to travel them. This is why these ‘venturers’9 are modern nomads. 
Let us look at how Adama, a young man from Cameroon, describes it.
MA: And when you got to Algiers, how did you manage to f ind houses … 
How did you know where to go?
Adama: In fact there’s … when you arrive somewhere you look f irst for 
where you can f ind the … black brothers. You’re never alone. So with your 
friends you look for where the black brothers can be found. Everyone has 
information and you work together to f ind out how to see these brothers 
who will help us live here. There’s a district where you f ind black brothers 
waiting by the side of the road for work. So there’s a lot of them waiting. 
They hitch-hike to f ind a job. There’s people turning up in cars to fetch 
them, to take them home, to do housework, or cleaning … or to take you to 
a building site to do building work, or clean up the site, things like that …
MA: And how did you know there was a district like that where the …
Adama: Actually, when you’re in Tamanrasset, you’re already in contact 
with the people down there … they’ve got phones and they tell us how it 
works down there. So once you’re in Algiers you know where to go … In 
9 The ‘adventure’ is the way they like to describe their migration, def ining themselves as 
‘venturers’. The fact that they describe themselves in this way reinforces the collective nature 
of such migration and also makes it possible to value it.
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fact it’s the ones who go ahead of us, if someone goes ahead before me, 
we’ve got a phone box where we can call them, but most of the time we 
work by e-mail. We communicate with each other. An e-mail address is 
very important for us, it enables us to locate our brothers who have gone 
ahead … then they try to tell us about the little diff iculties on the way.
MA: And when you arrive, do you do the same thing for the people you’ve 
left behind?
Adama: Of course! For example, if I open my e-mails and a friend writes 
to me, I tell him for example, ‘well, it’s like this, it’s hard, but if you want 
to make it, now you know the ropes, well this is what you have to do …’ 
That’s how it is … So, erm, ‘that’s it down there’, ‘we’ve found some jobs!’ 
… I’ve worked on building sites, really very, very hard work. I tried to save 
some money. Once I’ve saved up, I head off for Morocco … that’s how it 
is. Once I’m at Maghnia, the border between Morocco and Algeria, it’s 
the same thing all over again. Maybe there are Algerians who provide 
papers, and that way you try to cross the border at night, or maybe there 
are brothers who act as guides … well, there are brothers who left before 
us, and they’re the ones who opened up the route! … And all of that doesn’t 
belong just to you! You also have to help the brothers following behind. 
Of course you can’t do much … you’ve already spent all your cash, for 
the guides and everything … and that’s for your own journey! But that’s 
what you do. You communicate … you exchange stuff and that’s really 
important: you have to leave the route open!
So migrant populations from a variety of origins move through, circulate 
and settle in the stopovers from sub-Saharan Africa to the Maghreb, adding 
their own mobility, their own projects and their own migratory strategies. 
Hence the feeling that migratory paths have a tendency to mingle can 
produce an identity-forming process; coming from the same place, going 
through the same trials, circulating within the same areas with the same 
practices to get to the same places, in short having the same project and 
the same method of migration, this means belonging to the same historic 
movement, especially when one suffers the same setbacks (Clochard & 
MIGREUROP 2009). These individuals gain recognition among themselves 
and cooperate because, little by little, they are creating a shared history, an 
‘adventure’. Their migratory project and methods of migration are similar 
and unite them (Alioua 2005). These migrants manage either individually 
or collectively to weave and activate social bonds without pre-established 
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personal relationships of trust. During the stopovers where collectives are 
formed, trust is initially founded not on the intimate knowledge of the 
other, but on the fact of sharing the same project. This shows that trust is 
possible between people who do not know one another. These networked 
social forms connected through bonds which spread over time and space 
thus generate social bonds which take the place of communities where 
integration is by origin. This is particularly evident in the nature of the 
social bonds which are woven during the stopovers in which these migrants, 
on their ‘circulatory territory’, meet, cross paths, avoid one another, cooper-
ate or come into conflict.
These stopovers are the locations where the bond is activated. Collective 
reorganisation, despite precarious situations, the diversity of origins and 
competition between migrants become indispensable strategies in this new 
form of migration. If these sub-Saharan migrants, whatever the status im-
posed on them and the origins they claim, see these stopovers as migratory 
staging posts, then it is because they think that here they will f ind social 
staging posts that will allow them to f it in and f ind the means for survival. 
More generally, if new sub-Saharan migrants are constantly arriving and 
circulating around the Maghreb, then it is because they f ind people at 
these stopovers who can show them how to f it in, in order to survive until 
their next departure. Relational density certainly implies a demographic 
density. Indeed, it is a matter of gaining a suff iciently embedded presence 
in the areas in which they f ind themselves that it will be possible for those 
following them to circulate there. Some of these migrants, particularly those 
who have a clear overview of their staged transnational migration, like the 
‘chairmen’ for example,10 call this ‘leaving the travelling route open’. This 
is to say that these stopovers have been migratory staging posts in which 
transmigrants can be sure of f inding other transmigrants like themselves, 
able to help them, for example enabling the new arrivals to identify a district 
where they can f ind accommodation without diff iculty and without the 
10 The ‘chairman’ is a kind of manager for one or more collectives. He (for it is always a ‘he’) 
owes his position to his ‘savoir-circuler’, his experience of transmigration and particularly 
his knowledge of the social environment in which he f inds himself, particularly his networks 
and relationships with ‘important’ people: smugglers, the police, lenders, potential employers, 
doctors, lawyers or activists defending the migrants’ cause etc. He also generally surrounds 
himself with a ‘policy committee’ in which each person’s role is def ined, such as ‘treasurer’ for 
example. The chairman is a migrant-smuggler: he is part of the transmigrants’ world, he has 
been introduced into the space he frequents, he has inherited experiences and relationship 
networks from those who were there before him, and in turn he ‘resocialises’ new arrivals. He 
has a capacity to work across several areas, far from the negative image of ‘traff icker in human 
beings’ that the media have constructed to describe him (Alioua 2003).
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risk of provoking rejection by the natives, to assimilate the way of moving 
from one place in the town to another and how to behave in these places 
by avoiding social control.
These services and information are sometimes subject to a f inancial 
transaction. Even when this is the case, it is only a way of surviving that is 
constantly subject to negotiation. This is an economic means which is fully 
‘embedded’ (Granovetter 1985) in the social realm, to such an extent that 
there is not necessarily any actual f inancial payment. Furthermore, the 
transaction may take place later, during the course of f inancial services or 
help, for one person in particular or for the collective which takes care of 
the new arrival. This debt amassed by new arrivals enables exchange and 
solidarity, along the lines of ‘give and take’. In collectives which are based on 
self-management, whose members claim to be free, in the sense that each 
individual has his own project but ‘must be responsible regarding the other 
brothers’, the new arrivals are assimilated through their active participation 
in the structure. The fact of becoming involved and participating actively 
in a collective enables the exchange and drives solidarity. Transmigrants’ 
collectives which organise themselves in order to achieve their personal 
project can inform us about their degree of autonomy and the capacity of 
their actors to weave relationships with people they do not know, changing 
from weak link to strong link depending on the situation.
4.3 The impact of transmigration on local populations
But to live – or should we say to survive? – at these stopovers, migrants 
must also be accepted by the local population and cooperate with some 
of their neighbours, organising their diversity around common points and 
social values. That is to say that they must avoid social control by adapting 
their lifestyles; they must have the capacity to make what is distant closer. 
Migrants are typically able to continue to live there due to assistance from 
‘sponsors’11 who send them postal orders and who either live in Europe, 
at the other end of the network, or who are in the country of origin and 
make an investment in spatial dispersion by supporting a relative who is 
migrating. They also manage thanks to the solidarity of the collective in 
which they f ind themselves, and sometimes the solidarity of an NGO or 
Moroccan peoples. Due to state controls and repression, this transmigration 
can only be achieved by f inding ‘ways in’ among the local populations. 
11 This is the way they describe friends and relatives who send them funds.
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Transmigrants know how to slide into the gaps left undisturbed by the 
state and the margins which the native populations have found ways of 
negotiating locally.
MA: And when you got here, how did you f ind a house and everything?
Male Migrant: Well Morocco’s a country … it’s a bit easier, there’s no work, 
but the people are more open, more sociable … so the brothers who are 
there, they help us to live … they give us some money and we rent houses 
… I rented a little house with some brothers … for the moment it’s ok, but 
the problem is there’s no work here, so it’s diff icult to make a living, so 
every now and then I try to call my uncle who’s in Europe, and he sends 
me a bit of money to get by on. Now, he doesn’t send me stuff very often, 
but the other brothers also have brothers in Europe who also send them a 
lot of money, and they support me too, and that’s how it is … They support 
me from time to time, we live together, we’re solid. Not like them at the 
embassy! They call us ‘the risk-takers’ … they can’t understand. And the 
Moroccan police hunt us down, they’re really tough! But sometimes they 
help us or set us free because they know they’re like us and that their 
brothers too want to migrate to Europe. Often the Moroccans warn us 
when the police are going to turn up … That’s how it is! Once, right, there 
was this old woman who was saying to me ‘comrade, come here comrade!’ 
I didn’t understand why, and then the children started laughing all round 
me, they made fun of me. But the fact was that there was a GUS (Urban 
Security Group) at the bottom of the street, and she wanted to hide me 
in her house. Well, afterwards, she asked me to pay her for her help … 
That’s what Morocco’s like! … But I know a lot of brothers who have been 
helped by the Moroccans, who give them food … Myself, I’ve also met 
nice, kind Moroccans … who, who … especially around Nador, well I had 
a family, where I came out of the forest [self-managed ad-hoc camps on 
the outskirts of the town], I went there to eat, they let me take showers, 
have a good bath, and they made up little parcels for me, little olives, 
oranges and bread, and then I’d go back to the forest for the night … and 
the next day, if I still need food, I leave the forest and go into town and I 
try to see them, they give me advice and encouragement, then I go home 
… well, they had a son too who had left without any papers and who had 
managed to get to Italy … so people like them have really impressed me, 
you see … they’re people with a lot of love to show me … so I don’t know 
how I’d manage to meet them one day … give back what’s theirs … but I 
simply say ‘God is great,’ you never know.
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Little by little, some Moroccan towns have become, despite appearances, 
favoured stopovers for these sub-Saharan transmigrants, who f ind every-
thing they need there to survive and to realise their migratory project. The 
stopovers where the sub-Saharan migrants live are working-class districts 
characterised by widespread mobility (Alioua 2007). So it is no coincidence 
that they shelter non-Moroccan migrants today having welcomed so many 
Moroccan nationals undertaking internal migration. These districts have 
always sheltered persons judged undesirable by the ruling classes of the 
time. During the years of ‘apartheid’ imposed by the French colonial system, 
country dwellers who wanted to settle in town were frequently rounded 
up in these districts and then expelled from the town. At the time of inde-
pendence, the Moroccan authorities would sometimes end up reproducing 
the same violence: the socio-political history of these districts is strongly 
characterised by resistance against the authorities, by a fear of the state 
and a lack of trust in its agents.
In addition, a proportion of the inhabitants of these working-class 
districts has ended up emigrating to Europe (Hambouch 2000), and a huge 
population of young Moroccan men and women who live there wish to do 
the same. Today they harbour foreign ‘illegals’, as they did with the national 
‘illegals’ who arrived during the rural exodus and piled into shanty towns in 
the hope of improving daily life. With a mixture of rejection and fascination, 
Moroccans living in very cramped conditions in these working-class districts 
where the transmigrants settle are impressed by the path these new arrivals 
have taken. Some young Moroccans learn from these transmigrants and 
open up a little more to the outside world. Sometimes plans are even worked 
out between Moroccans and Africans of two or three different nationalities, 
working together to f ind the best way of getting into Europe. They exchange 
advice and information on what they have been able to learn themselves 
from someone they know who has already attempted the journey, or who 
simply lives in Europe and gives them advice on the best way of moving 
around without getting caught. Each has their own basic idea about the 
issue, but by pooling these ideas they increase their chances of success.
There are also mixed couples which form, between Moroccans and 
sub-Saharan Africans, and their plan is often to get into Europe together. 
Leaving aside the more or less hidden or assumed affectionate relation-
ships (short-lived affairs) between Moroccan women and sub-Saharan 
African men, there are ‘regular’ mixed couples which form in this district 
of Morocco. They are certainly few in number, but not marginally so. In 
these places they are common knowledge and they can be found in all 
working-class districts. In the city of Rabat alone I met 27 mixed couples, 
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f ive of whom had one or more children. The majority of these couples marry, 
even if the men are not in a regular situation as far as the authorities are 
concerned. This is possible because, rather like under rural practices, it is 
suff icient for a certain number of witnesses (men) to endorse the marriage 
for it to be legitimate, at least in the eyes of family and neighbours. Thus 
they do not need to apply to the Cadi or Adoul. The husbands are just as 
frequently Christians as they are Muslims. But in order to marry, Christians 
have to convert to Islam; most of the time, all they have to do is to recite the 
Fatiha in public and choose a Muslim f irst name. The feast which follows, 
by virtue of its public nature and the publicity it generates, legitimises 
the marriage. However, I have only met one mixed couple comprising a 
Moroccan man and an Ivorian woman (Christian). Although at least one 
third of sub-Saharan transmigrants are women, one does not f ind the same 
proportion among mixed couples. It must be said that Moroccans often 
consider these women to be prostitutes whom they can use as best suits 
them. In the minds of many men, be they Moroccans or migrants, these 
routes are not the place for single women; and therefore, in their minds, 
they imagine those who are there without the (supposed) protection of a 
man to be amoral.
All these social relationships are evidence of the emergence of new forms 
of cosmopolitanism, which extend beyond the national frameworks and 
institutions for socialisation and identity creation within Maghrebian 
society: complementarity merges into both a kind of rejection of the nation 
state,12 and the formulation of a project to move to another place where 
everything becomes possible. These values are also those of youth, which 
tries to be the author of its own destiny.
The sub-Saharan migrants and their Moroccan neighbours also meet in 
queues at the Western Union, where they come to pick up their money order 
sent by a relative living in Europe. In fact, like the sub-Saharan migrants, 
many of the people who live in these districts survive thanks to money 
orders sent by a relative who has emigrated abroad, and many small houses 
have been built thanks to these transfers. In the urban setting, the number 
of owners and co-owners overtook the number of those renting at the end of 
the 1980s. The influence of unoff icial building companies has encouraged 
this trend, and it is in these districts that self-f inance represents 80 per 
12 For these social groups, the nation state is that which imposes, assigns, controls and prevents 
the crossing of borders, which represses but offers no solution.
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cent of homes produced,13 at its height. Generally, these new owners build 
one f loor at a time, and they repay the loan by renting out rooms. They 
then rent out a room, or the ground floor perhaps, whilst they themselves 
live at the top of the building. Most of those renting are migrants from the 
interior: workers who have come to work in the city, who have left their 
family behind and send back the majority of their wages. Sub-Saharan 
migrants on a stopover also make up a proportion of the people who rent, 
the number of whom has been underestimated, but which enables some 
of the Moroccans in these districts to achieve ownership, or to share the 
rent in the case of sub-letting. This suggests the degree of interdependence, 
as can be seen with the naked eye: the floors of these small houses in the 
working-class districts are getting more and more crowded.
Sub-Saharan migrants play a role in the local economy, which is mostly 
an informal economy, and are transforming the urban scene. Thus they have 
fully integrated themselves into the urban fabric of these towns, particularly 
the areas on the margins of the so-called legitimate town, transforming 
them by their presence. Moroccans have made room for them in spite 
of themselves. Admittedly, it is often a secondary position, tainted with 
contempt and domination, but at other times real cooperation develops, 
or at least relationships based on interdependence.
Over time the diff iculty of getting into Europe and the repression exer-
cised by the Moroccan authorities have encouraged sub-Saharan migrants 
to change their strategy. Up until 2005, migrant collectives paid very little 
attention to advocacy. After 2005 and the tragic events of Sebta and Melilla 
(MIGREUROP 2006), the collectives of sub-Saharan migrants, who were 
rather discreet (for example, they would often refuse to be interviewed by 
the media, and when they did accept would only in exceptional cases speak 
out about the demands made of them), took on a special dimension, chang-
ing from the simple function of mutual assistance to political militancy 
(Alioua 2009). In Morocco, at least nine political associations (not all of 
which are off icially recognised) have thus been set up and their members, 
in increasing numbers, not only f ight for respect for their rights in Morocco, 
even if they do not wish to settle there permanently, but are also engaged 
in advocacy at an international level for the right of asylum and claim their 
right to be allowed to circulate freely.
In Morocco, with the help and assistance of a considerable part of the 
civil society, human rights activists and foreigners working with interna-
13 Source: CERED (Centre for Demographic Study and Research) and HCP (High Commission 
for Planning), 2005, Rabat, Morocco.
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tional NGOs, these new transnational actors have appeared not only on 
the Moroccan public scene, but internationally too.14 The loss of some of 
their fundamental rights – through the simple fact that they have crossed 
a border without permission or have extended their stay unoff icially – has 
therefore not translated directly into disappearance from the public arena 
or increased invisibility. This ability to make their voice heard is the sign 
of their capacity to negotiate, albeit a relative and fragile one. This also 
tells us something about the degree of democratisation of the region. It is 
a signif icant characteristic of democracy that it allows the existence of a 
space which is opened up for marginalised populations to f ight for their 
rights; even when their de facto exclusion cannot entirely be overcome and 
there is irresolvable inequality, the relative equality encouraged by political 
struggle can at least allow it to be limited (Péralva 2007).
Thus, while the moving frontiers of the EU slide into the interior of the 
Maghreb, alienating a number of migrants from the right to have rights,15 the 
same movement opens up the possibility of resistance to the militants who 
profit from this fluctuation on the borders, using the democratic arguments 
of this same Europe, then paradoxically including new rights which are still 
in an embryonic state. For, as international law has evolved, for the f irst 
time nation states are subject to supranational authorities (Sassen 2005), 
which leaves the f ield open to organisations which attempt to use the law 
to impose their own demands, even when they run contrary to national 
interests.
The example of ‘transnational resistance’ (Urry 2000) in the face of the 
so-called European policy of ‘externalisation’ (Rodier 2006) of the control 
of migratory flows in the neighbouring countries, in which sub-Saharan 
transmigrants play an important role (Alioua 2009), is a remarkable example 
of the transition from the image of a world divided by state borders, which 
is gradually being supplanted by a multidimensional image revealing a 
density of relationships. But to be able to observe these fluid, liquid (Bau-
man 2000) phenomena in practical terms, we need interstices in which 
they materialise, solidify, in an instant in time. We therefore feel that the 
notion of a stopover is precious to our understanding, not only of current 
14 They organise sit-ins, have occupied a church in Rabat, are well-represented on circulation 
lists and Internet discussion forums, take part in conferences etc. For more information, see 
Alioua (2009). 
15 As for the situation facing transmigrants and asylum-seekers waiting for their status to be 
granted, more and more researchers have adopted Hannah Arendt’s well-known formulation. 
In the case of Black Africans in the Maghreb, see the report from one Moroccan NGO (GADEM 
2007).
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transnational migrations but also of the socio-political dynamics linked to 
globalisation (Sassen 2007).
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5 Trying to Transit
Irregular Immigration in Malta
Cetta Mainwaring
5.1 Introduction
The Mediterranean Sea has always been a passage for human movement, 
carrying flows of people and goods on its currents, be it tourists on yachts 
and cruise liners, soldiers on naval vessels, sailors on container ships, or 
migrants on dinghies. More recently, at the turn of the twenty-f irst century, 
the central Mediterranean experienced an increase in irregular transit 
migration, as migrants and refugees search for new routes into Europe 
and attempt the dangerous voyage from the poorer southern shores to the 
richer northern ones.
At the heart of the Mediterranean, Malta simultaneously bridges and 
divides North and South. Its geographic, political, and economic position 
places it at a crossroad, where tension is palpable: it lies just inside an arbi-
trary border, a fact that designates it as part of the wealthy club that is the 
European Union (EU), while mere miles across the sea lie the disqualif ied 
countries of Africa. As one of the 2004 accession countries, Malta’s borders 
have been redefined as external borders on the southern periphery of the 
ever-evolving Union. Influenced by its EU membership, the island is now 
faced with new challenges in terms of the nature of migration to the island 
and the subsequent policy responses.
Although part of the EU, Malta is a minor political player with little 
power to influence policies. Thus it continues to bear what the government 
views as a disproportionate amount of the migration ‘burden’ facing the EU, 
especially in light of stipulations under the Dublin II Regulation.1 Moreover, 
despite Malta seeing itself and often being viewed by migrants as a transit 
point en route to mainland Europe, it has now become more of an outpost. 
Policies simultaneously attempt to deter arrivals, as well as restricting 
migrants’ ability to transit to other countries. The multiple national and 
supranational interests at play result in contradictory logics within the 
restrictive policies. This has implications both for the Maltese population 
that faces new realities of immigration to the island and for the migrants 
1 In 2003, the Dublin II Regulation succeeded the Dublin Convention (1990).
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and refugees, who must often resort to irregular and sometimes dangerous 
methods in an attempt to leave the island.
An island state, located a stone’s throw from the North African coast, 
Malta’s geographic and political parameters influence both the type of im-
migration experienced and the policies enacted to manage these migration 
flows. Within the context of the emphasis in the EU on externalising asylum 
and migration policies, this chapter examines the new role that Malta is 
undertaking as an external border state and how this role affects the pat-
terns of transit migration and the migrant experience in the Mediterranean. 
The chapter looks, f irstly, at the development of EU migration policy and 
how it has shaped Maltese policies, before turning to the experiences of and 
strategies employed by migrants and refugees on the island. In concluding, 
it turns to the concept of transit migration and assesses its relevance in 
describing irregular immigration patterns in Malta.
5.2 EU migration policy
Over the past twenty years, as the EU relaxed its internal borders, member 
states have introduced restrictive measures aimed at fortifying the external 
borders and targeting non-EU nationals. Designed to deter unauthorised 
migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, from turning up on their 
doorstep, these include: extended visa requirements, carrier sanctions, 
increased patrols of land and coastal borders, expedited asylum applica-
tions, the principles of safe country of origin and safe third country for 
asylum seekers, expulsion of undocumented migrants, restrictions on 
freedom of movement, limitations on the right to work, and the exchange of 
information with other Schengen countries about immigrants perceived as 
undesirable (Baldwin-Edwards 2004; Crisp 2003: 8). Although these policies 
are fundamentally pertinent to the national context in encompassing ques-
tions of citizenship and security, the EU has created new opportunities for 
control and more restrictive measures by, for example, increasing security 
cooperation above that possible at the domestic level.
There is also an evident desire to externalise immigration controls 
toward and beyond the EU’s external borders, an aspiration established in 
2003 in the UK’s unsuccessful proposal to create Regional Protection Zones 
and Transit Processing Centres that would restrict the number of people 
entering and applying for asylum within the EU. It was envisaged that these 
Zones would be established on the outskirts of the EU, and most asylum 
applications would be considered there rather than within EU borders (Noll 
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2003; House of Lords 2004). The proposal raised many concerns, such as the 
lack of incentives and resources for countries outside the EU to guarantee 
minimum human rights standards. Although the proposal failed, the con-
cepts and ideas behind it have nevertheless gained prominence over more 
progressive proposals, such as development assistance, debt reduction, and 
the promotion of human rights and good governance in migrants’ countries 
of origin (Schuster 2005; Andrijasevic 2006).
Indeed, the same logic is evident in bilateral agreements that address 
the readmission of irregular migrants and the co-operation of law enforce-
ment between EU member and non-member states. Due to the slow process 
of harmonisation of asylum policies at the supranational level, there has 
been a proliferation of such agreements made with non-member countries 
that border the EU, often in order to negotiate readmission agreements. 
For example, since 2003, Morocco, in exchange for development aid, has 
collaborated with Spain on joint patrols and the readmission of migrants, 
including non-nationals who may have transited Morocco (Cuttitta 2007; 
Lutterbeck 2006; Geddes 2005). More recently, Italy and Libya have signed 
a Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation (2008), which calls for 
joint operations between the two countries to patrol Libya’s maritime border. 
In return for Libya’s cooperation in curtailing irregular immigration, Italy 
pledged f ive billion dollars in colonial reparations over the next 25 years.
Understandably, human rights organisations have responded with f ierce 
criticism to these diplomatic developments with countries that have, at 
best, dubious human rights records (e.g., Human Rights Watch 2006). For 
example, the Libyan judicial system has no asylum procedure in place and 
is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention that provides the legal 
framework for refugee protection. In light of these factors, the agreements 
are seen as attempts to deny access to the asylum system within Europe 
and to externalise immigration controls.
Such bilateral agreements, as well as the portrayal of migration as a secu-
rity challenge (European Council 2008), have also fostered a militarisation 
of the southern European border, where governments increasingly deploy 
military and semi-military forces and hardware in attempts to prevent mi-
gration by sea. This security framework has become even more prevalent in 
the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent 
attacks in Madrid and London (Lutterbeck 2006; Andrijasevic 2006).
Mediterranean crossroads
The Mediterranean Sea f inds itself literally in the middle of the debates over 
migration and has been characterised as the ‘soft, vulnerable underbelly of 
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Fortress Europe.’2 As dead bodies wash up on its beaches and many more 
drown without leaving a trace, ‘boat people’ continue to make the perilous 
voyage across the sea in hopes of reaching the privileged shores of Greece, 
Italy, and Spain. The Mediterranean has thus truly become a crossroads, 
an area of transit migration. The new members of the EU, whose borders 
are more porous due to long coastlines and large expanses of territorial 
waters and search and rescue areas, are now in a new and diff icult posi-
tion of acting as Europe’s gatekeepers. In this context, the changes in EU 
policy discussed above have impelled these countries to adopt increasingly 
restrictive migration policies (Baldwin-Edwards 2004).
Moreover, the transformation from countries of emigration to those of 
immigration has produced social, economic, and legal issues, for which 
administrations have not been prepared. Unfortunately, host populations 
have seen an increase in hostility towards non-EU nationals, who are 
perceived as a threat to the national culture and economy (Triandafyl-
lidou 2001: 90). The restrictive response in policy, coupled with the media 
exploitation of the issue, has led to the marginalisation of migrants as 
‘desperate’, ‘illegal’, and ‘unwanted’, and an associated eruption of racism 
and xenophobia in many countries (Katrougalos & Lazaridis 2003: 180-181). 
As Martin Baldwin-Edwards (2004) notes, one of the biggest failures has 
been the inability of governments in Southern Europe to accept the chang-
ing patterns of global migration and to move beyond treating immigration 
as an emergency situation.
Accordingly, much attention is given to easily sensationalised phenom-
ena, such as migrants risking and losing their lives in attempts to cross the 
Mediterranean on unseaworthy vessels. These events are certainly a human 
tragedy, but are also exploited by states to justify restrictive migration 
policies, as was evident in the asylum panic of the 1990s and the more 
recent focus on the ‘hordes’ of people waiting at Sangatte or in Libya wishing 
to migrate into the EU. Many headlines added to the scaremongering by 
reporting that in Libya, for instance, ‘[u]p to a million await calmer spring 
seas before risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean’ (Townsend 2008). 
Academics and NGOs dispute these f igures based on evidence that suggests 
that very few of the migrants in Libya attempt to cross the Mediterranean.3 
2 This label originated in World War II, and was used by Winston Churchill during the invasion 
of Sicily to note where the Axis forces were most vulnerable. It has now been adopted within 
the EU’s discourse on migration (Katrougalos & Lazaridis 2003: 169; Haynes 1999: 19).
3  This is of course diff icult to establish as migrants’ plans may change as new opportunities 
or limitations arise. Nevertheless, research has shown that most migrants in these countries 
do not continue on to Europe (De Haas 2007; Cuttitta 2007).
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One indication of this is the small numbers apprehended on islands such as 
Lampedusa or Malta, and on the Mediterranean borders of countries such 
as Italy and Spain.4 Apart from the evidence of apprehensions and deaths, 
the number making the journey across the Mediterranean is diff icult to as-
certain as it includes migrants who succeed in making the journey without 
detection, those who lose their lives at sea and whose bodies have not been 
recovered, and others who are thwarted in their attempts to leave North 
Africa before ever reaching EU waters. Despite the diff iculties involved in 
gathering such data, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR 2009a) estimates that 67,000 people crossed the Mediterranean 
Sea to reach Europe in 2008.
In the middle of the Mediterranean, Malta f inds itself on the geographic 
and political fringes of the EU. Although the small island has increased its 
political power by joining the EU, it is still a minor player and has been 
expected to increase migration controls and fortify its borders in order to 
fulf il the role of a gatekeeper. As a border state and an island, it is acutely 
aware of the consequences of this logic. The Dublin II Regulation, which all 
member states must adhere to as part of the Community acquis, stipulates 
that asylum seekers must apply for asylum in the f irst EU country they 
reach, ostensibly to reduce the risk of ‘asylum shopping.’ The Maltese gov-
ernment views the Regulation as the reason for a disproportionate number 
of migrant arrivals on the island, due to articles concerning Search and 
Rescue (SAR) missions.
Malta’s SAR region spans over 250,000 square kilometres of the Mediter-
ranean (roughly equivalent to the size of the United Kingdom) and effec-
tively means that every boat leaving Libya passes though the region.5 Before 
joining the EU, Malta’s informal policy was to help boats in distress before 
sending them on their way to mainland Europe, generally their intended 
destination. However, due to the Dublin II Regulation, the government is 
currently required to process the asylum claims of migrants who the Armed 
Forces intercept within the SAR region. Although the Armed Forces are 
expected to come to the aid of boats in distress in the region, they allow 
others to pass through without intervening. The boats asking for assistance 
4  In 2005, Maltese authorities apprehended 1,822 irregular migrants at sea (National Statistics 
Off ice 2006). In Greece, the number was around 5,000 during 2005 (Triandafyllidou 2008). The 
same year, Spanish authorities apprehended 11,781 irregular immigrants at their southern sea 
border (including the Canaries, Andalusia, and the Balearic Islands), while Italian authorities 
apprehended 22,824 on their southern sea borders (including Sicily and other minor Sicilian 
islands) (Cuttitta 2007: 2-3). 
5 For an exact map see www.sarmalta.gov.mt/sar_in_Malta.htm.
104 Cet ta Mainwaring 
are brought into Maltese ports and the migrants aboard are transported 
to one of the detention centres on the island (interviews, Senior Off icials, 
Ministry for Justice and Home Affairs [MJHA]; Maltese Member of the 
European Parliament [MEP]; Refugee Commissioner, July 2006).
This change in policy, along with an increase in the number of arrivals, 
has prompted the government to maintain that it carries a dispropor-
tionate amount of the migration ‘burden’ in Europe, an argument made 
vociferously at EU fora. The answers, it claims, lie in ‘solidarity amongst 
member states’ (interviews, government off icials, 2008-2009), by which 
it signals relocation schemes that would see those asylum seekers given 
protection in Malta resettled to other EU member states,6 and in rene-
gotiating the Dublin II Regulation in order to add a proviso that would 
exempt countries facing particular pressures. After some years, Malta 
succeeded in garnering a limited amount of support for its demands for 
more ‘solidarity’ and ‘burden-sharing’ in the EU: member states have 
agreed to resettle a small number of refugees from Malta (European 
Parliament 2010: 16, 46) and the issue of countries facing particular pres-
sures appears in the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008). 
However, these agreements remain voluntary and ad hoc, with little 
political will apparent amongst other member states to implement a 
permanent intra-EU resettlement scheme.
The relationship between the EU and Malta is thus a complex one. On 
the one hand, the EU has had obvious effects on Maltese migration policy. 
By joining the Union, Malta automatically became party to the Dublin 
II Regulation, legislation it had no part in drafting, and has had to align 
its policies with EU directives. More indirectly, as a border country, it 
has come under pressure to act as a gatekeeper to the EU by introducing 
restrictive migration policies both in terms of deterring arrivals as well as 
restricting onward movement to continental Europe. However, it would 
be wrong to suggest a purely hierarchal relationship between the EU and 
Malta. The Maltese government has also used EU directives to publicly 
justify controversial policies, as well as exploited its image of a small, 
vulnerable state in crisis in order to garner more supranational support. 
For example, the government justif ies its immigration detention policy 
in part as a means to hinder onward migrant mobility from Malta in line 
6 The relocation of asylum seekers, whose claims have not yet been decided and who may 
not ultimately qualify for protection, is a longer-term goal for the Maltese government. This, 
however, is even less popular with other member states (interviews, government off icials 
2008-2009, Quadro Group 2009).
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with the conditions of the Dublin II Regulation (interview, Jesuit Refugee 
Services [JRS], June 2006).
Nevertheless, government off icials also point to contradictory messages 
coming from EU member states. Countries criticise Malta for its deten-
tion policy, while simultaneously advising the government to be cautious 
regarding security and migration, not to allow migrants much freedom, 
and to share intelligence about them with other countries’ security services 
(interviews, Permanent Secretary, MJHA, July 2006; Maltese MEP, March 
2009). The tension appears to lie between national and supranational priori-
ties and interests, resulting in simultaneous attempts to deter migrants and 
refugees from arriving in Malta (a national priority) and to hinder their 
onward mobility (a European Union directive).
What is clear is that the Dublin II Regulation and EU membership have 
redefined Malta’s borders, and thus required their fortif ication through the 
incorporation of more restrictive migration controls facilitated by new tech-
nologies and expertise. These implications are conditioned by the fact that 
Malta is a state with blue borders. This has had two crucial consequences: 
f irst and perhaps foremost, the reality of blue borders results in a high 
degree of immobility for migrants and refugees on the island, especially 
in light of the Regulation’s authorisation of surveillance measures used to 
return asylum seekers to the first country of arrival within the EU. Secondly, 
these blue borders are much more diff icult to control than land borders 
as they cannot be demarcated in the same fashion, by building a wall or 
establishing guard towers. Sea borders are also multiple, involving layers 
of different types of inclusion and exclusion. Territorial waters, contiguous 
zones, exclusive economic zones and search and rescue regions encompass 
progressively more of the Mediterranean, causing the Maltese SAR region 
(250,000 km2) to be much larger than the island’s territorial waters (3,800 
km2). Furthermore, even when boats are intercepted within these waters, 
it is impossible to return migrants without the cooperation of bordering 
countries, such as Libya.
Dividing the Mediterranean: Malta, Italy, and Libya
The evolution of Maltese migration policies in light of EU accession has had 
repercussions on Malta’s relationship with Libya. Historically, Malta and 
Libya have enjoyed good relations, which were formalised in the 1984 Treaty 
of Friendship and Co-operation. Among other things, the Treaty allowed 
Maltese and Libyans to travel between the two countries without a visa, a 
practice that was upheld until 2004, when Malta joined the EU. The influx 
of migrants from Libya into Malta after 2001 further strained relations 
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between the two countries; although Maltese off icials maintain that they 
continue play an important role as a mediator between the EU and Libya.7
Nevertheless, the irregular migration flows from Libya to Malta between 
2002 and 2009 produced frustration among Maltese authorities and the 
wider public who believed that Muammar al-Gaddafi was not doing enough 
to stop migrants from leaving Libya’s ports and attempting to make the 
voyage across the Mediterranean to Europe – Malta’s own informal policy 
before joining the EU (interviews, Maltese MEPs, July 2006).
Without Libyan cooperation, interstate disputes between Italy, Libya 
and Malta frequently occurred over responsibility for irregular migrants 
at sea, often leaving the migrants stranded during the negotiations. Most 
notably, in 2007, 27 irregular immigrants clung to a Maltese tuna pen in 
Libyan waters for over 24 hours after the owner refused to accept them 
onboard. After much political wrangling between Libya, Malta and Italy, 
the migrants were eventually transferred to an Italian navy vessel that 
took them to Italy (Bilefsky 2007). Malta’s large SAR region exacerbated 
the conflict over responsibility as it includes the island of Lampedusa and 
thus boats in need of rescue are sometimes inside Malta’s SAR region, but 
closer in proximity to Lampedusa.8 The initiation of FRONTEX9 operations 
in the central Mediterranean in 2007 was in part an attempt to remedy this 
growing political tension, although the Maltese government was forthcom-
ing in discussing complementary goals that might be attained through 
the joint patrols. The Permanent Secretary at the Ministry for Justice and 
Home Affairs (interview, July 2006) said, ‘The scope is more as a deterrent’.
Other politicians and NGOs questioned the effectiveness and legitimacy 
of the patrols. One Maltese member of the European Parliament (interview, 
July 2006) underlined the fact that these types of measures ‘turn people 
away indiscriminately, whatever their story … creating a barrier to people, 
not hearing their story, just turning them back to whatever their fate is 
back at home.’ Moreover, without Libya’s cooperation, FRONTEX was un-
7 For example, they organised a meeting in July 2005 on the issue of saving the lives of migrants 
in the Sahara Desert and in the Mediterranean Sea, which was only attended by Libya because 
it took place in Malta (interviews, Permanent Secretary, MJHA, July 2006; Maltese Ambassador 
to Libya, July 2008).
8 In cases like this, Malta claims that the irregular migrants are Italy’s responsibility because 
they must be taken into the nearest safe port, while Italy claims they are Malta’s responsibility 
due to being within Malta’s SAR regions. See for instance the statement released by the Maltese 
prime minister after the Pinar incident in 2009 (‘Ministerial Statement regarding the immigrants 
who were rescued by the M/V Pinar-E off Lampedusa’, 21 April 2009).
9 FRONTEX is the EU’s external border security agency.
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able to return migrants and thus acted as a rescue team, helping boats in 
distress and taking those on board to the nearest safe port, often Malta 
or Lampedusa, rather than stemming the flow of migrants trying to enter 
Europe, its professed aim.10 FRONTEX’s executive director admitted that 
the agency’s ‘increased level of operational activities … might be serving 
as a pull factor for traff ickers’ (Camilleri 2008).
Respite from this interstate conflict came in the form of the Italian-
Libyan Treaty on Friendship in 2008 that paved the way for Italy to return 
irregular immigrants found at sea to Libya. Malta embraced this new devel-
opment without reservation, not least because it has tried unsuccessfully 
to negotiate a similar agreement with Libya in the past and hopes that 
this precedent will allow it to reopen these negotiations with new political 
weight (interviews, senior off icials, MJHA and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
[MFA], July 2006, April 2009). The government also correctly assumed that 
the agreement would limit irregular migration to the island; in 2010, arrivals 
had dropped to 47 (ECRE 2011).
Many NGOs have responded critically to this development, voicing their 
concern over protecting the right to asylum in Europe (Human Rights Watch 
2009a, 2009b; UNHCR 2009a). Indeed, such an agreement is questionable 
when considering that most of the migrants coming from Libya are not 
Libyan, but are from sub-Saharan Africa. It could therefore effectively 
result in refugees being returned to their country of origin, contravening 
the principle of non-refoulement. Moreover, Libya is not party to the 1951 
Geneva Convention that upholds the rights of refugees and asylum seekers; 
thus their commitment to human rights cannot be assumed (interviews, 
MP, UNHCR Malta Representative, July 2006). NGOs in Malta have echoed 
these sentiments, accusing the government of trying to f ind an easy and 
convenient solution to the problem of repatriating irregular immigrants 
by sending them to Libya, while ignoring the human rights issues involved 
(interview, JRS, June 2006).
Passing the buck and shirking responsibility for immigration is a continu-
ing trend among most countries, not just Malta. A few years before Malta 
joined the EU, Italy unsuccessfully proposed that the EU set up large deten-
tion centres in Malta and Cyprus, where all irregular migrants and refugees 
of the Mediterranean region would be kept. Italy has also attempted to hold 
Malta responsible for stopping every boat of migrants coming through its 
10 Italy initially also refused to cooperate, claiming the Nautilus II was futile without Libyan 
support. One can see from the FRONTEX reports (2009) that Spain, on the other hand, has been 
able to turn back migrants due to their agreement with Senegal and Mauritania.
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SAR region, not just those in distress. This would effectively mean that no 
boats would arrive in Lampedusa or in Sicily, as nearly all pass through the 
Maltese SAR region (interview, Permanent Secretary, MJHA, July 2006). 
For obvious reasons, Malta has refused to enter into such agreements, but 
nevertheless continues to try to procure similar agreements with Libya.
5.3 Malta
Malta is the smallest (both in terms of area and population) and most 
densely populated country in the EU, as well as its southernmost member. 
The country comprises of 316 square kilometres and the population of the 
island is 405,165. The result is a population density of 1,282 persons per 
square kilometre, the highest in Europe and the third highest in the world. 
The island is also situated 90 kilometres south of Sicily, 290 kilometres from 
the northern coast of Tunisia and 360 kilometres from Libya.
The history of refugee law in Malta reflects the history of a country of 
emigration rather than immigration. Until the 2001 Refugees Act,11 no such 
legislation existed in Malta and the UNHCR off ice in Rome processed the 
limited number of asylum claims made on the island. The off ice was also 
responsible for providing financial assistance to recognised refugees, as well 
as overseeing resettlement schemes. In passing the Refugees Act of 2001, 
in order to align itself with other EU member states, Malta created its own 
structures to manage the arrival of mixed flows of irregular migrants. In 
2002, the government opened the Hal Far detention facility to accommodate 
the arriving migrants. The facility had a capacity to hold 80 persons, the 
assumption being that Malta would continue to receive a few hundred 
migrants each year. However, 1,686 migrants arrived that year and sparked 
the current immigration ‘crisis’ (interviews, UNHCR Malta Representative; 
Maltese MEP, July 2006).
In the years since 2002, the small island continued to see an increase 
in the number of migrants arriving en route from Africa: from 57 in 2001 
to 1,686 in 2002 and peaking at 2,775 in 2008.12 From 2002 to 2012 a total 
of 16,614 individuals had arrived by boat and 15,832 asylum applications 
11 In November 2005, the government amended Article 10 of the Act to allow for the deportation 
of asylum seekers while their appeal against the rejection of their asylum applications was still 
pending (Amnesty International 2006).
12 See appendix to this chapter, table 5.1; the number of arrivals began to drop after 2008 due 
to the Italian-Libyan Treaty on Friendship.
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were f iled; all were detained (UNHCR 2013a). At any one point, over 2,000 
migrants and refugees are detained and another 2,000 held in open centres. 
For instance, in February 2009, there were 2,194 migrants and refugees were 
being housed in open centres, 766 had secured private accommodation, 
and 2,309 were incarcerated in detention centres.13 Although the number 
of arrivals is not large in absolute terms and makes up around 1 per cent 
of the Maltese population, the government maintains that they are more 
signif icant if one compares them to other countries taking into account 
population size and density. This argument is often employed in advocating 
an EU burden-sharing scheme and in trying to renegotiate how the Dublin 
II Regulation applies to the island.14
The emphasis on the number of migrants and refugees arriving in 
Malta reinforces the government’s continual assessment and portrayal 
of the situation as a crisis. The argument is also questionable in light of 
the number of tourists who visit Malta, numbering well over one million 
every year,15 and other forms of migration to the island largely ignored by 
the government. Thus the more signif icant concern appears to be one of 
race and class, rather than the volume of arrivals. Nevertheless, the focus 
in Maltese debates and legislation has been on deterring irregular migrants 
and refugees from arriving in Malta by implementing restrictive policies, 
such as the island’s lengthy 18-month detention policy. This approach is 
fuelled and simultaneously justif ied by the fact that many of the migrants 
claim they never intended to come to Malta, nor to stay there, but were 
either picked up by the Armed Forces on their way to mainland Europe 
because they were in distress while at sea or landed on the island believing 
they had arrived in Sicily or Italy.
It is important to make three interrelated observations here: f irst, that 
it is politically convenient for Malta to maintain that most migrants do not 
want to remain on the island, a logic which helps the government to portray 
13  These f igures were reported in a parliamentary question (Maltese Parliamentary Question 
2009b). The numbers are diff icult to ascertain as residents move in and out of the centres quite 
f luidly and accounts therefore vary. The f luctuating number of arrivals to the island also has a 
large impact on these numbers. The director of the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers, 
the government agency responsible for running the open centres, reported that 2,700 migrants 
and refugees were accommodated in January 2009 (interview, January 2009). Moreover, it is 
generally accepted by staff members at the open centres that more migrants live in the centres 
than are off icially registered (various interviews, 2006-2009). 
14 The arguments made are as follows: the 2,610 asylum applications that were lodged in Malta 
in 2008 are equivalent to almost 400,000 in France and the United Kingdom if calculated per 
capita. The actual asylum claims made in these countries were less than 20,000 (UNHCR 2008).
15 In 2008, an estimated 1,290,856 (National Statistics Off ice 2009). 
110 Cet ta Mainwaring 
Malta as a victim of migration patterns and EU legislation; second, this focus 
disregards the effects of Maltese policies on migrants’ desires to remain 
on the island; and f inally, this allows the government to operate in crisis 
mode, ignoring global patterns which point to the likelihood that Malta 
and the Mediterranean will continue to be an area of transit migration in 
the coming years. There is also some preliminary evidence suggesting that 
Malta is in fact a f inal destination for some migrants, as was noted by the 
authorities in 2006 with regard to a small number of arrivals (interviews, 
migrants, NGOs and government off icials, 2006-2009; JRS 2006: 23).
5.4 Trying to transit: Migrant accounts and strategies
Most of the migrants and refugees arriving in Malta come from sub-Saharan 
Africa, the largest percentages of asylum applicants being Somali and Eri-
trean over the past f ive years (UNHCR 2006, 2007, 2008; Luhmann, Bouhénia 
& Giraux 2007). These migrants and refugees usually travel northward 
through Africa until they reach Libya, often stopping in countries along the 
way to work or apply for asylum before deciding to make the voyage across 
the Mediterranean. Travelling from place to place, they make use of kinship 
and friendship networks in order to facilitate their journeys, for example 
by receiving money from family members in order to pay smugglers for 
onward passage. These journeys often involve multiple stops where factors 
such as employment prospects, levels of racism and violence, perceptions 
of opportunities in other countries, and the possibility for future mobility 
influence migrants’ strategies and decisions (interviews, migrants in deten-
tion and open centres, 2006-2009).
Those who arrive in Malta generally depart from Libya in order to make 
the voyage across the Mediterranean. In Libya, migrants and refugees spend 
various amounts of time ranging from days to years. Some work in order 
to make enough money to pay for the journey, which usually costs around 
$1,000. Contrary to the assumption made by Maltese politicians and the 
media, migrants and refugees sometimes spend long periods of time in Libya 
with no desire or forethought plan to move on until push factors prompt 
such a decision. Many who arrived in Malta note that friends had suggested 
the trip, often portraying Europe as an ‘el Dorado,’ or that the levels of 
violence and racism they experienced in Libya forced them to continue on 
in search of personal security (interviews, migrants in detention and open 
centres, 2006-2009).
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Most of the trips from Libya to Malta are undertaken on the same type of 
small motorboat, dark in colour and approximately four metres in length.16 
The boats carry between 20 and 30 people and the trips last up to seven 
days, during which the passengers endure extremely cramped conditions 
and have access to very little water and food. One person is usually elected 
the captain based on his ability to read a compass, which is provided before 
departure by the smuggler (interviews, migrants in detention and open 
centres, 2006-2009).
Although the migrants’ destination is usually Lampedusa or Italy, adverse 
weather conditions or a shortage of petrol can cause migrants to be detected 
by the Maltese Armed Forces either by (1) patrol boats, (2) aircraft, (3) com-
mercial vessels, (4) f ishermen, or (5) phone calls from the migrants and 
refugees themselves who have sometimes been provided a list of contacts by 
the smugglers. Malta’s extensive SAR region, which encompasses the Italian 
island of Lampedusa, and the unwillingness of states to take responsibility 
for migrants and refugees at sea often result in wrangling occurring tak-
ing place between countries while lives are in danger. This usually occurs 
between Libya, Malta, and Italy, although occasionally a fourth party is 
engaged when, for example, a commercial vessel is the f irst to encounter 
migrant boats in distress (e.g., MFA 2009). One refugee (interview, April 
2009) in Malta recounted his experience at sea:
It was rough weather … and we keep on asking for help. We were just two 
days on the sea. At the end, we managed to contact … the Malta AFM. So 
there was a Russian vessel which was passing over there and they came 
to help us, to rescue us. When we come to speak to them, they don’t want 
to take us from the sea as they were waiting for a reply from Malta. And 
then in that situation, the weather was very rough and we sink down to 
the sea. And we were just scattered because it was rough weather and 
they didn’t want to help us. So, three of us they died in that moment and 
after two hours, we managed to be rescued by that Russian boat … and 
then at the end we came to Malta.
Detention
Most boats are picked up before they ever reach Maltese shores, those 
aboard being subsequently transported to one of the detention centres 
on the island. Having gone through long and often traumatic journeys, 
16 Conversely, migrants arrive less frequently, but on larger boats, in winter due to adverse 
weather conditions (interview, Commander of the AFM Maritime Squadron, July 2008).
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migrants f ind themselves incarcerated in a detention centre for up to 18 
months or until their asylum application has been processed.17 In continuing 
with the much-criticised detention policy, the Maltese government system-
atically detains irregular migrants, be they refugees, economic migrants, 
or vulnerable cases such as minors. They thus deprive those who have 
committed no criminal offence18 of their freedom, portraying them as 
criminals and adding to the racism and xenophobia on the island. The 
policy is an expensive choice – one that in 2008 cost €8.2 million19 – but one 
that also has profoundly negative consequences for the migrants’ mental 
and physical wellbeing.
The two biggest centres on the islands are the Saf i Military Barracks 
and the Hal Far Lyster Barracks, which in 2008 housed 950 men and 730 
people (125 of whom were women) respectively (interview, Head of Deten-
tion Services, July 2008). The number of detainees fluctuates with arrivals, 
having increased dramatically after 2006 (106 in Hal Far and 300 in Safi), and 
then fallen due to the decrease in arrivals after 2009. NGOs have deplored 
the conditions of detention, as detainees must endure an overcrowded and 
unhygienic environment within the centres. The lack of private space is 
palpable in some of the centres where hundreds are sometimes housed in 
big open rooms, some with just a mattress on the floor. The use of solitary 
confinement as a form of punishment and the lack of adequate outdoor 
access have also raised concern (e.g., ECRE 2006). A 49-year-old Iraqi man 
who had lived in a room with f ive others for 15 months described the op-
pressing boredom and the inhumanity of not being allowed to go outside. 
‘I am dead. I am f inished,’ he said (interview, July 2006).
The only running water available is in the bathrooms, which are 
communal and emit a continuous stench. Cleanliness and the spread of 
communicable diseases are thus of immediate concern in such confined 
conditions. Indeed, while the government denied requests to have the 
ill separated, the lack of proper facilities caused tuberculosis and other 
diseases to spread amongst the detainees (MSF 2009). Even a Maltese MEP 
17 The time spent in detention was previously indefinite (Maltese Immigration Act of 1970). The 
government only established an 18-month limit after local NGO pressure resulted in a delegation 
being sent by the Council of Europe to investigate the matter. The Council subsequently insisted 
that Malta alter its indef inite detention policy. Today, asylum seekers may be released after 12 
months if their claim is still pending, while rejected asylum seekers are held in detention for 18 
months. 
18 In 2002, Malta decriminalised the entrance without leave of its territory, but kept in place 
the automatic detainment of all irregular migrants upon arrival (Gil-Robles 2004: 4).
19 Up from €6.8 million in 2005 (Maltese Parliamentary Question 2009a).
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(interview, July 2006) noted, ‘I myself have visited the detention centres in 
my own country and I am appalled at the conditions in which these people 
are kept … I thought one particular centre was f it for animals and not for 
human beings.’
The prolonged detainment in such unacceptable conditions has severe 
psychological effects on the detainees. Upon entering the detention centre 
in the middle of the afternoon, one can f ind most men asleep and wide-
spread depression is evident. Detainees report feeling as though their lives 
are wasted as they are reduced to total idleness with no form of physical 
or mental stimulation (interviews, July 2006). The Council of Europe also 
highlighted the lack of attention to detainees’ mental health, reporting the 
need for on-the-spot psychiatric care, especially considering the trauma 
often experienced by migrants and refugees (CPT 2005).
One asylum seeker (interview, January 2009) from Darfur described the 
time he spent in a Maltese detention centre:
They took us somewhere and took our f ingerprints and gave us a number 
and put us in detention. I had never been in detention before. I was very 
confused and didn’t have a phone to call my family. It made me crazy. It is 
like a jail. I applied for asylum but heard nothing for three or four months. 
I kept having nightmares and knew that I couldn’t stay in detention.
In August 2008, Médecins Sans Frontièrs (MSF) started providing much-
needed health care for irregular migrants and asylum seekers inside 
detention centres. Finding appalling living conditions and insurmount-
able structural barriers to providing adequate health care, MSF repeatedly 
requested that the Maltese authorities improve the conditions in detention 
centres. The government’s inertia produced no structural changes and 
as a result MSF suspended their activities in February 2009, publishing a 
scathing report detailing the unacceptable conditions (MSF 2009).
Access to the detention centres has also been very limited. Friends and 
family members do not have visitation rights. Furthermore, only a few 
NGOs have been given access and even the press did not previously have 
a right to enter, except for the occasional pre-arranged ‘tour’ given by the 
government. The government maintained that this was in order to protect 
potential refugees and ‘to protect the families and friends of detainees who 
are still in their homeland from retribution by the regime against which 
protection claims are being made’ (MJHA 2005: 14). The policy was revised 
in 2008, allowing journalists to f ile requests to enter detention centres. 
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Nevertheless, the effects of this policy change are ambiguous at best, as 
obtaining access continues to involve bureaucratic hurdles.
Despite the acknowledgement of the detainees’ frustrations by most 
government off icials, justif ication for the continuation of the detention 
policy is quick to follow. Many point to the fact that the policy attracts 
bipartisan support (interviews, Permanent Secretary, MJHA; Policy Advisor, 
Ministry for Family and Social Solidarity [MFSS], July 2006). Security con-
cerns are also employed as a justif ication, as many highlight that thousands 
of migrants arrive every year and the government could not allow ‘a huge 
number of persons to roam our streets undocumented without knowing 
their identity’ (interview, Permanent Secretary, MJHA, 10 July 2006). The 
Minister for Justice and Home Affairs (2005: 6) maintains, ‘It is therefore 
in the national interest, and more specif ically, for the reasons concerning 
employment, accommodation and maintenance of public order, that a 
detention policy be adopted.’ Nevertheless, the decrease in arrivals in 2010 
has not resulted in a termination of the policy. Indeed, the Ministry of 
Justice and Home Affairs released a statement in December 2010 reiterating 
that, ‘The government sees no need to depart from its current detention 
policy, a policy which is also practiced by other EU member states’ (‘No 
need to change detention policy’, 2010).
NGOs are thus highly sceptical of these justif ications; detention is the 
major point of disagreement between the government and NGO representa-
tives. The UNHCR and Amnesty International have repeatedly called on 
Maltese off icials to scrap the detention system all together and set up an 
alternative system of open centres (interview, UNHCR representative, July 
2006; Amnesty International 2008, 2006; c.f. Gil-Robles 2004: 5). Other 
NGO representatives emphasised the fact that detention is being used as a 
deterrent measure and is not in fact an administrative necessity. Indeed, 
the government has acknowledged that it believes the detention policy 
is a ‘powerful deterrent’20 and has been reminded by the Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture (2005: 8) that international standards explicitly 
state that asylum seekers should not be detained in order to deter future 
asylum seekers, a practice which is contrary to the norms of international 
refugee law.
The use of detention as a deterrent hinges on several false assumptions: 
f irstly, that migrants and refugees intend to travel to Malta when they leave 
Libya and view Malta as a destination country. The vast majority of migrants 
and refugees, although not all, report being forced to come to Malta due to 
20 Similar views were also expressed in interviews with Maltese politicians, 2006-2009.
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circumstances outside of their control, such as the weather or the quality of 
the boat in which they were travelling (interviews, migrants and refugees, 
2006-2009). Moreover, evidence from interviews with migrants and refugees 
in Malta suggests that despite this large political apparatus deployed to 
prevent mobility, a complex multitude of push factors in their countries of 
origin and countries of transit, as well as the perception of living standards 
in destination countries, are of greater consequence.21 One asylum seeker 
(interview, April 2009) in Malta noted:
The EU, the one thing they have to know is that it’s not that Malta extend-
ing of detention length will stop people coming, no. They are people who 
have a problem of maybe lack of shelter, hunger, starvation, those are 
humanitarian issues … For those that cannot go back, they have to give 
them protection … Even if detention is ten years, people will still come.
Due to the EU pressures to reduce onward mobility and the ineffectiveness 
of policies aimed at deterring arrivals, the Maltese government imple-
mented an ‘assisted voluntary repatriation’ (AVR) scheme in 2007. AVR 
is complementary to the both EU and national objectives of reducing the 
number of irregular immigrants in Malta, as well as removing the need to 
control for onward mobility to other member states. The AVR scheme began 
as a pilot project run from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which offered 
migrants €5,000 and repatriated just over 100 migrants (interviews, Head 
of Off ice, International Organization for Migration; Project Coordinator, 
MFA, January 2009). The project has now evolved into a more permanent 
scheme under the auspices of the Intentional Organization for Migration. 
The scheme initially targeted people both in and outside of detention, but 
subsequently focused solely on those still inside detention. An off icial 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interview, January 2009) explained 
the rationale behind this emphasis:
If they are in detention they’re not enjoying it for sure. In detention they 
can’t dream, but once they are in open centres they can dream of escaping 
Malta … I think detention is tough on the individual and conditions 
21 I employ the terms of transit and destination countries in a f luid rather than f ixed sense 
as travel plans change en route for many migrants and refugees as conditions change and new 
opportunities arise. ‘Transit’ countries in North Africa are often settled in for months or even 
years before onward travel is feasible or desirable (interviews with migrants and refugees in 
Malta, 2006-2009; De Haas 2007: 18-27).
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could be improved, but for us it’s a blessing that people get disgusted 
and want to leave.
Immobile in Malta: Structural and political barriers
Having spent months in detention, irregular migrants, as well as success-
ful and unsuccessful asylum seekers, are transferred to one of the open 
centres in Malta, which in 2009 housed 2,194 people (Maltese Parliamentary 
Question 2009a), a number that has risen signif icantly from 1,340 people 
in 2006 (interview, Policy Advisor, MFSS, July 2006). The majority of these 
detention and open centres are located on the southern end of the island, far 
from the waterfront boulevards lined with hotels that attract over a million 
tourists to Malta every year. The increased ghettoisation of the immigrant 
population hinders mobility and integration in Malta, while simultaneously 
encouraging hopes of onward mobility to other European countries.
The government’s Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers22 oversees 
the operation of open centres, which have also been plagued with over-
crowding, causing conditions to quickly deteriorate. One of the biggest 
centres, which houses over six hundred people, is called ‘tent city’ because 
of the canvas tents that were erected to house migrants and refugees instead 
of permanent buildings. The dilapidated tents clearly provide little relief 
from the summer’s soaring temperatures or the winter’s rain and wind.
Indeed, the open centres are facing the enormous problem of overcrowd-
ing partially because the residents remain for years, without an opportunity 
to move on or integrate into Maltese society. The government stresses the 
need for open centres to be a bridge between detention and resettlement, 
integration or repatriation, and to this end put in place a policy to limit 
residence to one year (interviews, coordinators at several open centres, 
April 2009). This policy is short sighted, however, as it does not take into 
consideration the consequences of evicting migrants and refugees. As a care 
worker (interview, April 2009) in an open centre said, ‘they have to go out … 
from the perspective of this organisation, they have to go out of these doors.’ 
A coordinator at another centre (interview, April 2009) commented, ‘After 
he leaves here, it’s not my concern anymore; it’s somebody else’s concern.’
In these instances, the limited and largely seasonal employment op-
portunities mean that people must resort to the generosity of their friends 
and often fall into a precarious existence when they are refused further 
accommodation in the open centres. Single mothers and other vulnerable 
22 The Agency changed its name from the Organisation for the Integration and Welfare of 
Asylum Seekers in 2009, conspicuously dropping any reference to integration.
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people suffer disproportionately from the policy. Although the policy has 
only recently been enforced, the ultimate consequences of not providing 
for the genuine integration of migrants and refugees in Malta are evident 
(interviews, residents and coordinators at various open centres, April 
2009). Indeed, the UNHCR is critical of the Maltese government for not 
emphasising long-term integration strategies for migrants and refugees 
and depending on ad hoc measures, which primarily focus on resettlement 
or repatriation as a solution. For instance, Malta has yet to implement a 
citizenship application process for refugees, and families remain in legal 
limbo even after years of living on the island (interview, UNHCR Malta 
Representative, July 2006).
The pervasive granting of temporary forms of protection rather than 
full refugee status also strengthens the interpretation of the situation as a 
temporary crisis and is detrimental to the integration process. Subsidiary 
protection does not allow for family reunif ication and also may be revoked 
if the government deems that a country of origin is safe for return. Although 
the government claims it has one of the highest protection rates in Europe 
(MJHA 2005: 5) and has indeed given some form of protection to between 
40 and 60 per cent of asylum applicants between 2004 and 2008, temporary 
forms of protection are granted to the vast majority. The refugee recognition 
rate, which is in any case minimal, has declined steadily over four years, 
from 4.9 per cent of applicants in 2004 to less than in 1 per cent of applicants 
in 2007 and 2008.23
Consequently, integration proves more diff icult and many attempt to 
leave Malta permanently, travelling to other member states within the 
European Union on tourist visas (interviews, migrants and refugees in 
Malta, 2008-2009). However, the Dublin II Regulation and the Eurodac, 
an EU database that holds the f ingerprints of all irregular immigrants 
and asylum seekers, extends Maltese border controls throughout the EU 
and thus cause further immobility for migrants and asylum seekers. Once 
in another member state, the stipulations under the Regulation compel 
these migrants and refugees into an irregular existence, as entering off icial 
bureaucratic channels such as asylum processes can result in apprehension 
23 See appendix to this chapter, table 5.1; calculations are based on the number of people 
who have had their asylum claim processed during one year, either receiving some form of 
protection or being rejected. The number is not necessarily equal to the number of applicants 
who lodge their claims during one year as the Refugee Commissioner’s Off ice has experienced 
severe delays in processing these claims since its creation in January 2002 (interview, Refugee 
Commissioner, July 2006; statistics provided to the author by the Refugee Commissioner, April 
2009).
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and repatriation to Malta.24 Many, having been returned from as far away as 
Norway or the UK, despair that they will remain on the island indefinitely, 
unable to continue their journey or be reunited with their family because, 
as they explain, ‘Malta has my f inger.’25
A young man from Darfur (interview, January 2009) with subsidiary 
protection recounted his attempts to leave the island and make a life for 
himself elsewhere:
I escaped from Malta to Italy and again the situation was very bad and I 
didn’t know anybody there. I was caught by the police and f ingerprinted 
and sent back to Malta. The police there told me it was because of EU 
regulations … I made some money and booked a ticket to Switzerland, 
but wanted to go to England. So, I crossed into France and spoke to some 
people there who told me I should go to Calais. I went to Calais and 
was told to get into a lorry, but we didn’t know if the lorries would go 
to England or not. But me and another guy got into a lorry with lots of 
boxes in it and spent f ive hours inside while the lorry got on a ship and 
then went to England. I was caught in England and f ingerprinted. I spent 
three days in a police station and then they sent me to a hostel where I 
spent two months. Then one day I got a letter from the Home Off ice and 
went to Croydon. They told me I had to go back to Malta because of EU 
regulations. I told them I didn’t want to go back, that there was nothing 
for me in Malta. If you go somewhere how can you survive if they have 
your f ingerprints?
5.5 Conclusion: Transit migration?
In concluding, it is f itting to revisit the concept of transit migration and 
to assess, in light of these migrant experiences in Malta, whether one can 
classify the immigration phenomenon that occurred on the island between 
2002 and 2013 as such. From a general, macro perspective, one might do so. 
After all, the time period saw migration flows increase across the central 
Mediterranean, in part a response to the increased fortif ications along more 
24 Although the number of Dublin II returns to Malta are low in absolute terms (127 in 2006, 
37 in 2007, 131 in 2008 and 470 in 2009), the limited data available suggest an increase over 
these three years (2006 f igures: Commission of the European Communities, 2008; other f igures 
provided by the MJHA to the author, January 2010).
25 A statement repeated by many migrants in Malta with subsidiary protection (interviews, 
April 2009).
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western routes to Europe through Morocco, Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary 
Islands. Indeed, in Malta, many migrants continue to express their desire 
to move northward towards Italy and even further into Europe.
However, as one homes in on the individual’s perspective, the concept 
appears less helpful, unless we take a very broad, and thus less meaningful, 
definition of transit migration. Migrants certainly transit various countries 
during their journey. However, these transitions are often not pre-meditated, 
as migrants must adapt to the barriers and opportunities they encounter en 
route. This thus raises questions of a temporal nature. If a migrant remains 
in Malta for many years, f inding employment and integrating into Maltese 
society relatively well, before being resettled to another country, is this 
transit migration? And if so, is it useful to include such an experience in a 
category that also includes those who pass through the island, remaining 
only for a matter of days or months before moving on to Italy?
What is made clear by this Maltese case study is that migrant agency 
must be considered within the context of structural barriers and oppor-
tunities to mobility. Indeed, despite the large political apparatus deployed 
by the government to both deter arrivals in Malta and limit integration 
opportunities, migrants and refugees did arrive and many have remained. 
The government’s rhetoric and policies are partially successful in condition-
ing the interests of migrants and refugees by limiting the expectations 
they have in terms of integration and access to rights on the island. This 
indirectly encourages many to migrate irregularly to other EU member 
states. However, other migrants and refugees have carved out small spaces 
for themselves within Maltese society, embarking upon the integration 
process through their own efforts.
Moreover, whilst in 2010 the Libyan-Italian Treaty on Friendship briefly 
interrupted the immigration flows to Malta, these were resurrected again 
after the fall of the Gadaff i regime in 2011 and in the f irst six months of 
2013 600 individuals had landed on Malta (UNHCR 2013b). The increased 
migration through Turkey and Greece also suggests that these flows have 
been rerouted rather than prevented. The arrivals in Sicily and Lampedusa 
in early 2011 on the heels of the political upheavals in North Africa also 
indicate that migration across the Mediterranean remains feasible, albeit 
more dangerous. These developments highlight the adaptability of migra-
tion flows and their persistence.
The Maltese case study also reveals how a government may employ the 
notion of being a transit migration country to its political benef it. The 
government maintains that migrants and refugees are trapped in Malta, 
and that its hands are tied by EU legislation on the matter. Although there 
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is some truth to these claims, as is made clear in the section above, the 
government has exploited this rhetoric in order to justify inhumane policies 
and to appeal to the EU for more support. The emphasis has thus been on 
the short term, on restrictive policies such as deterrence and repatriation, 
rather than long-term integration.
EU membership has facilitated this emphasis on exclusion and influ-
enced the repressive elements of policy,26 especially through the redefinition 
of Maltese borders as external borders. As Malta continues to stress the 
need for burden-sharing initiatives, the government continues to treat 
migration to the island as a crisis and seems unwilling to accept its new 
role as a country of immigration. Indeed, this portrayal is often exploited 
in order to attract more EU support. This mentality results in the adoption 
of ad hoc policies in a reactive, rather than proactive approach, with little 
long-term strategy. The short-term focus on deterrent policies disregards 
the reality of continued migration between Africa and Europe and fuels 
the xenophobic attitudes so prevalent in Malta already. Moreover, although 
deterrent policies implemented in other countries have had limited success 
(Boswell 2003:27), more progressive and creative approaches to migration 
are not being discussed.
What is apparent is that new strategies need to be employed to respond 
to the new migration patterns that Malta is facing, especially in its new 
capacity as an EU member on an external border. As a signatory to the 
1951 Geneva Convention, the island has a responsibility towards those 
seeking asylum on its shores. Moreover, the human dignity and human 
rights of all migrants should be upheld and should be at the forefront of 
the political dialogue on immigration. Migrants and refugees ought to 
be empowered and given the opportunity to contribute positively to the 
Maltese economy and culture, rather than being locked up like criminals. 
In attaining these goals, the EU should obviously move towards policies 
that do not discriminate against member states on the periphery and that 
allow for a focus on legal migration and asylum provisions rather than 
draconian restrictions. For Malta, the most fundamental step is to move 
beyond treating immigration to the island as a crisis and to accept the new 
reality with more positive rhetoric and policies.
26 For a broader discussion of how Southern European migration policies have been influenced 
by the EU, see Geddes 2003: 157-172.
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Part 2
The Central and Eastern European Quadrants

6 The East-to-West Circuit
Transit Migration through Russia
Irina Ivakhnyuk
6.1 Introduction
For over a decade, from 1990 to 2000, Russia went through a period of eco-
nomic downturn and contraction. This was related to the disintegration of 
the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). Transformations such as 
these, combined with new transportation facilities, impacted, changed and 
re-directed international migration routes. Correspondingly, new migration 
routes emerged which resulted in particular countries being transited by 
migrants. In the early 1990s these new routes were rapidly established and 
the vast territory of the formerly closed USSR was increasingly used by 
transit migrants and smugglers of migrants. Since then, numerous transit 
routes have run through the territory of Russia and the country has pro-
vided a convenient and cheap land route for Asian and African migrants 
on their way to the West. From 2000 to 2008, Russia benefited from rising 
oil prices, windfall prof its and an increase of investment in many sectors. 
This generated a period of economic growth which in turn resulted in a 
considerable demand for migrant labour. Consequently, Russia also became 
attractive as a destination country for immigrants. The economic crisis in 
2008-2009 then slowed down the demand for immigrant labour, although 
this is likely to increase again with economic recovery. Nevertheless, as 
this contribution will show, transit migration continues and sometimes 
overlaps with immigration.
The case of Russia is a good example of the complex profile of a country 
that is both an attractive destination and a popular transit zone for mi-
grants. Indeed, Russia exemplif ies the full spectrum of this phenomenon. 
Therefore, this case study illustrates a variety of effects and contradictions 
of contemporary transit migration.
First, the geopolitical position of Russia situated between Europe and 
Asia makes it a convenient transit corridor for migrants moving from east 
to west . Second, transit migration in Russia takes place primarily in an ir-
regular form with all the corresponding negative effects for the country and 
the migrants themselves. Third, migrants who are supposed to be in transit 
often become long-term or even permanent immigrants to Russia. Fourth, 
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an informal ‘migration infrastructure’ (ethnic social networks, criminal 
smugglers’ networks) has emerged and facilitates many types of migration. 
Fifth, authorities often remain passive, corruption is widespread, and the 
law is not enforced, which results in favourable conditions for irregular 
transit migration. Sixth, transit migrants’ rights are often violated under 
the existing legislation. And seventh, transit migration in Russia can be 
explained through social capital theory and in particular with those aspects 
that refer to migrants’ networks, for example, the ‘sets of interpersonal ties 
that connect migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and 
destination areas through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community 
origin’ (Massey et al. 1993: 448).
Russia is at the centre of the Eurasian international migration system 
and, consequently, its policies have to address transit migration and protect 
migrants in transit. This chapter focuses on migrants transiting Russia with 
the aim to move west, but not migrants transiting other countries, heading 
for Russia. Due to a lack of more recent data, it focuses on and compares 
the 1990s with the 2000s, though it is suggested that most f indings hold 
true to date.
Data and methods
This chapter presents the results of several surveys of international migra-
tion that were recently carried out in Russia and that provide data for an 
analysis of migrants in transit (Ivakhnyuk 2005a, b; Krasinets 2006; Kozina, 
Karelina & Metalina 2005; IOM 2004). In particular, two surveys are utilised 
for the purpose of this chapter. The f irst survey of transit migration was 
conducted in 1994 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM 
1995) focusing on Moscow and Saint Petersburg (233 interviews). A second 
survey on migration flows from Asian countries to Russia was conducted 
in 2001 by the Centre for Political Information (2002) focusing on Moscow 
(203 interviews). No more recent survey is available. Both used similar 
methods: survey interviews on the streets, at metro stations, the Central 
Telegraph Office, the UNHCR Moscow Office, hostels, in the transit zone of 
the Moscow Sheremetyevo International Airport, the UNHCR temporary 
accommodation centre for transit migrants, as well as in-depth interviews 
in focus-groups (students, Afghans, Chinese, Somalis, and Kurds). Therefore, 
their results are more or less comparable. They demonstrate a shift in transit 
migration characteristics in Russia at the beginning of the 2000s when 
compared to the beginning of the 1990s. Other surveys conducted in some 
neighbouring countries provide further information on patterns of transit 
migration in the region (IOM 2006; Pribytkova 2007; Gromovs 2007). In 
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addition, information is provided by studies of Chinese migration, notably 
the results of the Moscow Chinese ethnic community survey conducted in 
1998 (428 interviews) and Gelbras (2001). Academic and government experts 
in international migration in Russia were also interviewed and informal 
discussions with Afghan and Vietnamese community representatives in 
Moscow were held. Finally, migration data from off icial publications was 
consulted, such as the National Statistics Committee of the Russian Federa-
tion (ROSSTAT), the Ministry of Interior, the Border Service, and the Federal 
Migration Service (FMS).
Problems of defining transit migration: The Russian experience
The conventional understanding of transit migration is that it is a short-term 
temporary stay of a migrant on his/her way from a country of origin to a 
country of destination. However, this has been challenged by evidence 
from countries of transit. Typically, it was assumed that transit migrants 
aimed to keep their stay in a transit country as short as possible, as they are 
eager to move on to a destination country as quickly as they can. However, 
in reality entry to major destination countries is complicated by strict 
migration regulations, visa limitations, and f inancial requirements. For 
many would-be migrants, direct air f lights to a European capital city turn 
out to be impossible or bear high risks of being refused entry and immediate 
removal. For these reasons, people on the move often choose strategies 
which are more complex in terms of distance and time, and more uncertain 
in terms of security and routes through other countries. Usually these 
choices involve irregular practices. For instance, migrants often resort to 
the assistance of professional smugglers who propose transit routes based 
on geographical considerations, gaps in the migration and border control 
system, and availability of transport facilities.
As a consequence, a stay in a country en route is not necessarily ‘short-
term’; indeed, with respect to irregular transit migration, in most cases it 
is not short-term. Instead, migrants aiming only to transit a country may 
change their intentions under certain circumstances or after a certain 
period of stay in a country of transit: they may decide to stay for a longer 
period in order to earn money or to work out a better strategy for their 
migration project.
Migrants’ strategies to reach the desired EU country or other developed 
country are very diverse. They use various legal and semi-legal methods, 
often conceal their real intentions, develop multi-stage migration strategies, 
and respond flexibly to opportunities so as to succeed in their intention. 
In accordance with these strategies, a long-term stay in a transit country 
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becomes a common occurrence. Thus, the conventional definition of transit 
migration turns out to be inappropriate, as its duration varies depending on 
migrants’ tactical purposes. For example, can a Chinese student be regarded 
a transit migrant when he or she migrates to Moscow to obtain a university 
degree, with the aim to move on to an EU country? Such a f ive-to-six-year 
stay in Russia hardly corresponds with the conventional understanding of 
transit migration. However, the student sees him/herself as a temporary 
migrant, considers the stay in Russia as a transitory affair and the education 
and skills obtained as an advantage in moving on to the desired country. 
Some foreign students are even more strategically oriented: their declared 
intent is to come to Russia for the purpose of attending university, but in 
fact they only use their student visa and student card to stay legally in Russia 
in order to prepare their onward migration to the EU.
Often, transit migration in Russia is considered on a par with irregular 
migration. This is because foreign nationals may regularly enter the country 
of transit but then over-stay their visa. For instance, the purpose of arrival 
declared by migrants when they apply for a visa or at the border crossing 
points is often suspected not to correspond to their real intentions. In 2009, 
282,368 persons entered Russia declaring ‘transit’ to be their purpose; of 
these, 59,093 persons entered from the territory of Kazakhstan (see annex 
to this chapter, tables 6.2 and 6.3). This is 0.3 per cent of the total number of 
arrivals of over 20 million. Simultaneously, over 60 per cent of arrivals were 
classif ied as ‘private visits’. However, the Deputy-Director of the Federal 
Migration Service of Russia, Vyacheslav Postavnin, believes that what is 
declared by non-CIS citizens entering the Russian Federation as a ‘private 
visit’ is often a stay in Russia with the intention to prepare onward migration 
to Europe (interview with Postavnin, 18 December 2007). Certain tourism 
bureaus and other mediators are specialised in providing false invitations 
and other supporting documents (Ivakhnyuk 2005b; IOM 2004). Hence, 
in political terms, the main challenge of transit migration arises not from 
those travellers who declare ‘transit’ as the purpose of their entry, and 
who submit supporting documents, but from those who conceal their real 
intentions, enter the territory of Russia, abscond from immigration control 
and arrange irregular onward journeys.
From the data on transit migration for 2006-2009 (annex to this chapter, 
table 6.1), two trends become apparent: (1) the numbers of entries of transit 
migrants permanently exceed the numbers of their departures; (2) the 
steady decline in the scale of transit migration through Russia. Surveys 
of irregular migration in Russia suggest that the majority of the migrants 
from non-CIS countries are transit migrants whose aim is to reach the EU. 
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Often, however, they stay in Russia for months and even years, usually 
with an irregular status, in order to earn their living and accumulate some 
money for the next step in their migration. In this context, the shadow 
economy in Russia, according to Radaev (1999: 10), represents a quarter 
of the GDP and 15-30 per cent of the total labour force, offering plenty of 
earning opportunities. It is assumed that many transit migrants wittingly 
choose land routes via Russia and stay in the country for some period of 
time as this offers them the advantage of possible earnings in order to 
f inance their onward migration.
In order to overcome the usually restrictive immigration policies of 
destination countries, people who intend to move to another country are 
often compelled to resort to the help of professional mediators or smugglers. 
Some sources suggest that up to 75 per cent of illegal entries to developed 
countries are presently realised with some assistance from human smug-
glers and traff ickers (IOM 2003, 2006). The human smuggling business 
often goes beyond the simple crossing of state borders and includes briefing 
migrants on how to answer off icials’ questions, how to dress, and how to 
avoid raising the attention of the authorities.
Summarising all the peculiarities of a migrant’s transit journeys and 
taking into account their human, economic, social and security dimensions, 
one can say that international transit migration is migration of persons 
from a country of origin/departure to a country of destination/settlement 
through an intermediate/transit country, often in uncertain or insecure 
conditions. Under certain conditions (voluntarily or involuntarily) the 
country of transit can either be a staging post before irregular entry to 
another, often more prosperous, country, or the place of an irregular and 
relatively long-term stay and irregular employment, or even a country of 
permanent residence when further migration appears impossible and a 
return to the country of origin is considered too high a risk.
6.2 The emergence of Russia as a transit zone
Since the early 1990s, the territory of the formerly closed Soviet Union has 
increasingly been used by transit migrants and the smugglers of migrants. 
It appeared to be a relatively comfortable and cheap land route for migrants 
from Asia and Africa on their journey to more developed states of the 
European Union. Therefore, Interpol considered the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine to be important transit zones for migrants smuggled to the EU 
(Interpol 2010). The question is why Russia is used by migrants from Asia 
132 IrIna Ivakhnyuk 
and even Africa on their way to the European Union? Russia’s geographical 
position and common land border with European countries is the most 
obvious but still insuff icient explanation.
As early as in the f irst half of the 1990s, soon after disintegration of the 
USSR, several features that facilitate transit migration began to take shape 
and transformed Russia into a transit corridor:
– Poorly managed and relatively porous new international borders in what 
was once coherent Soviet territory facilitated the emergence of various 
east-to-west transit routes and guaranteed flexibility in the choice of 
itineraries depending on individual situations.
– Relatively liberal regulations of travel between the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and the former socialist countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) coincided with relaxation of travel between 
CEE and EU countries and resulted in new easy paths to West European 
countries.
– A lack of proper legal controls on the stay of foreign citizens in the Russian 
Federation enabled migrants to abscond and stay irregularly throughout 
their transit period, regardless of its duration.
– Russia lacked the institutional capacities to manage migration; this 
was reinforced by a high level of corruption in the sphere of migration 
management (Mukomel 2005).
– Huge informal labour markets provide employment and earning op-
portunities for migrants, whatever their intention.
– Numerous ethnic networks exist of migrants from developing countries 
who in earlier periods arrived and settled in the USSR, for instance as 
refugees from political persecution or war, or being graduates from Rus-
sian universities and other higher education institutions.
– Finally, the ratif ication of the UN 1951 Convention on Refugees by Russia 
in 1993 attracted thousands of asylum seekers from developing countries 
who – even when they had no intention of gaining refugee status in 
Russia – used the refugee law to obtain temporary legal status in this 
transit country.
Over the course of time, the majority of West European states tightened 
their entry regulations. However, there is no evidence for a decrease in 
the number of transit migrants from China, Afghanistan, Vietnam, or 
Ethiopia in the region. This means that they seem to have adapted to the 
new situation of a more ‘complicated transit’. Due to these conditions, 
transit migration is mostly irregular in character, more extended in time, 
and more expensive because of increased bribes and fees for forged papers, 
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and the rising costs associated with multi-step journeys of migrants, 
westward.
Refugees from distant and war-stricken countries like Ethiopia, Somalia 
and Iraq, who believe they have grounds to apply for asylum in an EU 
country, often choose lengthy land routes via Russia on their way to Europe. 
They prefer not to apply for refugee status in Russia but in developed states 
where living standards are higher, social assistance is guaranteed and 
human rights’ protection is an issue of priority. Members of the Afghan 
diaspora in Moscow explain that preferred destinations include Sweden 
and Denmark (IOM 1995; Centre for Political Information 2002). This is for 
two reasons: f irst, because rules for asylum seekers are perceived to be most 
liberal in these countries; and second, once a legal status is obtained they 
believe that refugees can apply for reunif ication with their other family 
members. Consequently, funds for travelling to Europe are often collected 
from relatives who later intend to follow the ‘pioneer migrant’ (IOM 1995: 
46, 48).
Migration to Russia is mainly controlled by two agencies, the Federal 
Migration Service (FMS) and the Border Service under the Federal Security 
Service (FSB). The FMS mandate is to implement the state migration policy 
and to issue residence permits, work permits to foreign citizens, as well as 
travel documents to Russian citizens, and to conduct immigration control. 
One aspect of the latter mandate is to set up control posts at international 
airports, railway stations and other border crossing points, and randomly to 
check foreigners. The task of the Border Service is to control entry/departure 
at the border, checking documents and their validity.
A signif icant difference is noted in the quality of border control at the 
eastern and western border frontiers of the Russian Federation. Control 
on the eastern borders is far less eff icient than in the west; this phenom-
enon is conceptualised as ‘asymmetric borders’ (Krasinets, Kubishin & 
Tiuriukanova 2000; Krasinets 2006; Vitkovskaya 2002). The consequence 
is that it is much easier for a migrant to enter Russian territory from the 
east and south than to depart to the west. If a migrant who aims to transit 
the country loses his regular status while staying in Russia, s/he has to use 
irregular ways to cross Russia’s western frontier, notably with either forged 
or invalid travel documents, without any documents or by corruption. 
However, Russian border guards frequently prevent attempts at illegal exits 
(interview with the Deputy Head of the Russian Border Service Vladimir 
Troufanov, 27 May 2006). In this case irregular transit migrants are forced 
to stay in Russian territory; as a consequence the country has become a 
sort of ‘reservoir’ for irregular migrants.
134 IrIna Ivakhnyuk 
Initially, during the mid-1990s, migrants from non-former-Soviet Union 
states consisted primarily of three equally large groups:
1 immigrants who arrived for economic reasons and did not fall under 
refugee status (Bangladeshis, Chinese and Vietnamese);
2 immigrants who continued to stay in Russia either after graduating from 
Russian universities and other further education institutions or after the 
expiry of their work contracts;
3 refugees who were granted asylum in Russia before the collapse of the 
USSR (Somalis and those Afghans who were supporting the socialist 
government and were forced to leave their country once the Soviet troops 
were withdrawn).
A few years later, a fourth group was noted: migrants who explained that 
they chose Russia as a transit country on their way westward. According 
to a study conducted by the Centre for Political Information (2002), around 
25 per cent of the respondents, notably a third of the migrants from Africa 
and Middle East, fell into this group.
However, it is not only for migrants from distant countries that Russia has 
become a transit corridor and gateway to Europe. Irregular migrants from 
former Soviet Union states who aim to migrate to EU countries also often 
use Russia as a transit area. Experts from Central Asian states argue that 
the true purpose of 10-20 per cent of migrants from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan to Russia is to reach an EU country and to open up a path 
for their family (e.g., Olimov 2009). They believe that in contrast to their 
own countries, they have a chance to earn the money they need in Russia 
for their move to the West. Additionally, they hope to gain experience 
in managing an irregular migration status while still living in relatively 
familiar conditions characterised by a common language, similar labour 
traditions and other conditions. However, it is diff icult to distinguish them 
from the irregular labour migrants from post-Soviet Union states in Russia 
and identify those who aim to move west.
Stocks and flows of transit migrants
It is a complex task to estimate numbers of irregular transit migrants. This 
is for a number of reasons. First, transit migration is often clandestine and 
irregular in nature. Second, the distinction between transit and non-transit 
migrants within the stock of irregular immigrants is unclear. Third, data on 
the detention of irregular migrants on Russian territory are compiled by the 
Ministry of Interior, whilst data on the numbers of persons apprehended 
for crossing the borders are compiled by the Border Service. These data are, 
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however, not published; data from the Border Service, which is a part of the 
Federal Security Service, are not normally publicly available, therefore no 
reference can be given. In 2005, according to the Border Service, over 8,000 
persons were apprehended as trespassers at the Russian Federation borders 
while 65,000 persons were not allowed to enter Russia at the border crossing 
points due to invalid documents. Data of the Ministry of Interior show 
that in the same year, over 200,000 foreign citizens and persons without 
citizenship were penalised for expired visas. About 1,400 persons were 
apprehended while attempting to depart from Russia with false documents, 
among them 184 persons from Bangladesh, 154 from Turkey, 151 from Sri 
Lanka, 141 from India, 51 from China and 49 from Pakistan.
Between 1999 and 2005, over 500 organised groups of human smugglers 
were detained; additionally 16,200 tourist agencies were penalised for 
human smuggling in 1998, 6,300 in 1999, 7,100 in 2000 and 8,900 in 2001 
(Ministry of Interior, unpublished source). In 2004, the Federal Migration 
Service control posts at the border crossing points randomly checked 4.9 
million foreigners entering Russia, about 20 per cent of all foreign entries. 
As a result, over 15,000 persons were prohibited from entering; of these 
2,500 persons had invalid documents, but the majority was refused because 
the declared purpose for their entry did not match the real purpose. In the 
same year, 12,200 persons who were already on the territory were deported 
(Ministry of Interior, unpublished annual report).
The Russian Federation Ministry of Interior suggests there are at least half 
a million transit migrants from Afghanistan, China, Angola, Pakistan, India, 
Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ethiopia and other countries who are ‘stuck’ in Russia 
(Centre for Political Information 2002). In contrast, the Federal Border 
Service argues that there are around 1.5 million illegal transit migrants 
from Southern and Central Asia and Africa on Russian territory (ICMPD 
2006). This number includes persons who have entered Russia legally, with 
a visa and declared transit as the purpose of their entrance to the country 
but whose departure was not recorded. Besides, there could be a signif icant 
flow of migrants who irregularly penetrate Russian borders trying to reach 
EU countries, going unnoticed and not covered in any reports.
Data from the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation on entries 
and departures of foreign citizens demonstrate the scale of international 
movements and their structure, by declared purpose of travelling (annex 
to this chapter, tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). These imply that in 2009, citizens 
of Ukraine and Kazakhstan used the territory of Russia for transit most 
actively. South Korea and China stood out among non-former Soviet states. 
However, as was noted earlier, it should be taken into consideration that 
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‘transit’ being declared as a purpose of entry is not the only channel for 
transit migrants. Certain migrants who indicated their arrival was ‘for 
private purposes’ or ‘tourism’ may have in fact had hidden or uncertain 
intentions, such as those of moving further to the West.
Factors, channels and routes
Previous surveys of migrants in Russia in 1994 showed certain forms of 
stress – wars, pogroms, fear for children’s welfare, ethnic tension and dis-
crimination or political persecution – were the most common push factors 
(IOM 1995). Over half of all migrants indicated escaping stress factors as a 
key motivation for their migration. Another important factor was education 
(15 per cent), often in combination with stress factors. As regards migration 
from Afghanistan and former Soviet republics, stress factors were the only 
determinants for migration. But with respect to migration from Africa, the 
Middle East and South-East Asia, stress factors were partially complemented 
by the aim to study. Economic push factors were dominant only for Chinese, 
Vietnamese and migrants from other South Asian countries. Only 17 per 
cent of Africans, 25 per cent of Vietnamese and only 5-6 per cent of Afghans 
and Kurds were prepared to consider return and many respondents argued 
that returning home was impossible (IOM 1995). This demonstrates that at 
that time, migration to Russia was primarily forced migration.
By the beginning of the 2000s, economic push factors had become more 
important, especially for migrants from CIS states. The majority, 77 per cent, 
noted ‘lack of economic opportunities’ as the major reason for emigration. 
Still, however, over a quarter of migrants explained their choice of Russia 
due to the belief that ‘it is easier to obtain refugee status’ there (see annex 
to this chapter, table 6.5). Meanwhile, the ‘student channel’ was also widely 
used to enter Russia, notably by 30-40 per cent of migrants from Africa, 
South-East Asia, and the Middle East.1 At the same time, only half of those 
migrants who declared studies as the purpose of their arrival did actually 
become students. The majority of migrants from Afghanistan and Middle 
East countries who used the ‘student channel’ to enter Russia had rela-
tives there and came to join their families. This was often a step to further 
migration to the West.
It is noteworthy, however, that for migrants who wished to move on to 
another country, disillusionment with living standards and tolerance in 
1 Off icial data from ROSSTAT differ from those from sociological surveys, however, employ-
ment and studies are also the most important reasons to come to Russia (see annex to this 
chapter, table 6.4).
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Russia have become the most signif icant push factors. Indeed, 70 per cent 
of the informants stated that they would never advise their compatriots 
to immigrate to Russia (Centre for Political Information 2002). Among 
migrants from former Soviet republics the percentage of ‘disillusioned’ is 
also high, though they were better informed about living standards in Russia 
prior to their arrival and therefore less surprised and disappointed. The 
main disappointment was the reserved reception by Russian authorities, the 
lack of support and general attitude towards them as being ‘second class’.
According to Interpol (2010), the major routes of irregular transit migra-
tion, often facilitated by smugglers, generally ran from South-East and 
South Asia through post-Soviet states in Central Asia or the Caucasus, 
and on through Russia and Ukraine to the European Union. Russian law 
enforcement bodies have detected the following transit routes (IOM 2002: 
37-38), and it can be assumed that many are still active:
– Middle East/South-East Asia – Turkey – Georgia/Armenia/Azerbaijan – 
Moscow – Saint-Petersburg – Estonia/Latvia – Poland.
– Afghanistan – Tajikistan – Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) – Almaty (Kazakhstan) – 
Aktyubinsk (Kazakhstan) – Uralsk (Kazakhstan) – Saratov (Russia) – 
Samara (Russia) – Saint-Petersburg – Scandinavia.
– Afghanistan – Tajikistan – Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) – Pavlodar 
(Kazakhstan) – Moscow – Kaliningrad – EU.
– Central Asia – Russia – Ukraine – Moldova – Romania – Hungary – 
Western Europe.
– Vietnam/China – Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) – Almaty (Kazakhstan) – Saratov 
(Russia) – Moscow – Kaliningrad – Poland – Germany.
It is assumed that Russian smugglers and traff ickers have close contacts 
with like-minded actors in countries of origin and transit so that clients 
are handed over to them from the previous transit stage. Smugglers’ net-
works are flexible and transit routes change frequently in response to the 
control situation in certain border regions. In 2006, Russian border guards 
detected a group supposedly specialised in the smuggling of people to the 
EU through Finland. A special operation was conducted in cooperation with 
the Russian Federal Security Service and the Finnish Border Guards with 
the aim of identifying witnesses and prosecuting the organisers (interview 
with Deputy Head of the Russian Federal Border Service Troufanov, 27 May 
2006). Meanwhile, experts from Poland argue that citizens of Afghanistan, 
India, Pakistan and Iraq (principally Kurds) transit through the Southern 
Caucasian countries (mainly Azerbaijan) and then through Russia, while 
migrants from Afghanistan, China, Vietnam and Bangladesh enter Russia 
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mainly via the Central Asian states (Jaroszewicz & Szerepka 2007: 52). In 
2008, it was suggested that the route to Southern European countries ran 
via Ukraine, Moldova and Romania, with smugglers relying on Moldavian 
networks in Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal (interview with Deputy Direc-
tor of the Federal Migration Service Tiurkin, 21 February 2008).
Forged travel documents are a common practice when transit migrants 
move with the help of smugglers. Passports may be forged, or false data may 
be printed on legal blank passports. In Russia, visas are not usually forged 
but the data contained therein (especially the expiry date) may be falsif ied. 
But in Kyrgyzstan, forged visas are the most common type of violation. In 
Tajikistan, too, forged visas may be found, but irregular migrants most often 
use forged Tajik and Kyrgyz passports (IOM 2006). Chinese, Indian and Sri 
Lankan migrants reportedly purchase forged passports in Singapore and 
Hong Kong, where the market for such documents is f lourishing. Middle 
Eastern migrants often seem to purchase forged documents in Lebanon 
and Turkey. Until recently, there were no foreign consulates in Afghanistan 
and Afghans f irst had to travel to Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in order 
to obtain visas to Tajikistan and Russia (IOM 2002: 39). Finally, in Moscow 
there is a growing market for forged passports with legal Russian, Belarusian 
and Ukrainian visas.
Transit migrants’ profiles
In the early 1990s, transit migrants in Russia were mainly young males, two 
thirds of them under 30 years old, and originating from metropolitan centres 
or large cities (IOM 1995). Migrants from Afghanistan and CIS states were 
primarily married, most often with children, while migrants from Africa 
and other countries were usually single. Half of the migrants were Muslims 
and 30 per cent were Christians. In most cases (73 per cent), migrants arrived 
in Russia directly from their countries of origin. The majority of transit 
migrants from non-former Soviet states were well educated: 30 per cent were 
students, every third respondent had a university degree and 6 per cent had a 
college diploma. Approximately half of all migrants could speak a European 
language other than Russian. In 2002, another survey of irregular migrants 
was conducted in Saint Petersburg, Saratov, Stavropol, Ulan-Ude, Khabarovsk 
and Vladivostok (IOM 2004:86-160). It involved 210 irregular migrants who 
declared that they were ‘transit migrants’. According to this survey, 12 per 
cent of them had f inished higher education, 32 per cent had graduated from 
professional colleges and 20 per cent had secondary education. Over 40 per 
cent stated that they had no, or poor, Russian language proficiency. Hence, 
the educational level of this cohort was lower than that for 1994.
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The comparison of the two surveys conducted in 1994 and 2001 also 
reveals differences in the employment experiences in countries of origin. 
In 1994, migrants had a stable livelihood: half of the respondents had a 
full-time or contract job, or their own business. Among those who were 
employed, 20 per cent worked in the science and education sector, 27 per 
cent were off ice workers, engineers, technicians, or medical workers and 
only 7 per cent were unemployed before emigration. Accordingly, three 
quarters of the respondents stated they had ‘normal’ or ‘high’ living stand-
ards. Chinese and Vietnamese migrants, however, were an exception and 
one quarter described their living standard as ‘very poor’ (IOM 1994). In 
2001, 31 per cent of respondents said that they had a full-time job in their 
own country, 12 per cent said that they had their own business, and 22 per 
cent were students. However, 55 per cent said that their income was insuf-
f icient and living conditions were poor, considerably more than in 1994; 56 
per cent were residents in big cities (Centre for Political Information 2002). 
This demonstrates that by 2001 more migrants from poorer backgrounds 
had arrived than in 1994.
The majority of migrants have long-standing contacts with Russia. The 
IOM (1995) survey found that two thirds of the informants spoke some 
Russian, 42 per cent of the migrants with university degrees graduated 
from Soviet/Russian universities and schools of higher education. Around 
10 per cent of the migrants were Vietnamese unwilling to leave Russia after 
the expiry of their work contract. Of the Afghans, many were in Russia 
for training purposes. Every third migrant from Afghanistan and every 
fourth migrant from a Middle Eastern country had family members who 
had previous experience of living in Russia. In contrast, three quarters of 
the migrants from African countries reported that they had no relatives or 
friends in Russia. This implies that they could rely less on ethnic networks.
Over 60 per cent of Afghans and 75 per cent of Africans complained 
about their poor situation in Russia. They lived mainly in hostels and homes 
rented by the UN; for instance, one room for a family or several persons. 
Three quarters of those interviewed found the situation in Russia much 
worse than they expected. Forty per cent of migrants from Middle East 
countries received money from their families in the homeland and about 20 
per cent from their relatives living in other countries. Among migrants from 
African states, who were generally poorer, over 80 per cent did not get any 
assistance from their families. Only two groups seemed to have benefited 
from migration to Russia: the Chinese and Vietnamese respondents. They 
came in search of jobs and mainly became petty traders. Their level of 
employment in Russia is higher than in their homelands, 58 per cent against 
140 IrIna Ivakhnyuk 
43 per cent; 60 per cent were satisfied with their standard of living in Russia, 
hence their migration project could be considered a success. Nevertheless, 
one third of all Chinese and Vietnamese respondents preferred to leave for 
Europe or the USA (Gelbras 2002).
So far, the overwhelming majority of all migrants have entered Russia 
through regular channels. Since 1992, migrants from the CIS – except the 
Baltic States, Georgia and Turkmenistan – have been able enter under 
visa-free agreements. Migrants from countries that were not part of the 
USSR require a visa in order to enter Russia. In 1994, it was found that only 
14 per cent of respondents lacked a visa; by 2002, this had diminished to 
8 per cent.
Chinese migrants in Moscow and their smuggling networks
The Chinese ethnic community in Moscow is growing rapidly both in size 
and economic relevance. Experts estimate its size to be 40,000-50,000 
individuals (Gelbras 2001, 2002). Gelbras’ survey of the Chinese ethnic 
community in Moscow has proved that it is a strong and active economic 
and social organism which is developing ‘in parallel’, that is, not integrat-
ing with local society and industry. It has developed a separate f inancial 
system, various companies, independent media, hotels, hostels, shops 
and restaurants. The Chinese community in Moscow is closely connected 
with Chinese communities in other parts of Russia; there they are rapidly 
developing in similar ways to the patterns observed in Moscow.
As early as in the mid-1990s, western media suspected that Chinese 
migrants were using Moscow as a transit stage on their way to Europe and 
America (see Gelbras 2001). Newspapers in China published advertisements 
of tourist agencies specialised in this kind of business. It was reported that 
the price for smuggling a Chinese migrant to the USA via Moscow, includ-
ing acquiring subsequent legal status in the USA, was USD 40,000-50,000 
(Sumay & Rumyantsev 1999: 114). The cost of the Moscow part of the chain 
was USD 6,000-10,000. According to Sumay and Rumyantsev (1999), the 
group of persons who wish to be smuggled, the so-called ‘snake’, is organised 
and headed by the ‘snake head’ (sha-tow). Chinese migrants on the move 
were associated with flocks of duck (yatzy) that cross state borders without 
permission, just like irregular migrants.
Gelbras’ survey (2002, also see the annex to this chapter, table 6.6) of 
Chinese migrants in Moscow has shown the emergence of Chinese f irms 
dealing with invitations and visa support for Chinese nationals who would 
like to immigrate to Russia or to other countries using Russia as a transit 
stage. The community’s institutions seem to provide their compatriots 
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with the full scope of services for illegal or semi-legal transit migration to a 
desired country. Chinese newspapers issued in Moscow published advertise-
ments of agencies that openly offer services to smuggle Chinese migrants 
to Schengen countries, the USA, Canada, Australia, South Africa and Latin 
America (Gelbras 2002: 27). Thus, the Chinese appear to be an exception 
from the ‘norm’, according to which transit migrants usually resort to the 
help of Russian smugglers. Gelbras’ survey also illustrates the popularity of 
the ‘study channel’ as a transit stage: 41.5 per cent of the interviewees openly 
admitted that they intend to go to another country after graduating from a 
Russian university (see annex to this chapter, table 6.5). Others who enter 
with a study visa do not even attend lectures and instead use their stay in 
Russia to prepare their move to another country of their choice.
Timing and destination of on-migration
Earlier surveys show that Western countries are the general destination 
of migrants in transit (IOM 1995). Refugees from the former Soviet states 
were mainly eager to reach the USA and Canada. Africans, Asians, Middle 
Easterners and Kurds prefer Western Europe; indeed, they indicate ‘any 
other country except Russia’ as their aim. Among countries of destina-
tion, migrants most often mentioned the USA, Denmark, Sweden, Canada, 
France, Great Britain and Germany. This can be explained by the network 
effect of immigration communities. A quarter of those who aimed to move 
west had family members already living there, so their choice of destination 
was inspired by the wish to reunite with their family. The geography of 
family connections is very wide – the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Scandinavia and Canada were the most com-
monly reported. In general, migrants had twice as many or more relatives 
and friends in Western Europe than in the United States and Canada.
However, in spite of these ties, the overwhelming majority of those mi-
grants who wished to move on to the West had a very poor understanding 
of immigration rules and possibilities in destination countries. The majority 
made no precise statement regarding their intentions and terms of departure. 
Of the total, 60 per cent said that they had made no practical efforts to ar-
range their departure from Russia but were just waiting for a ‘better chance’; 
indeed, 35 per cent reported that they lacked the financial means for moving 
onward. In contrast, 18 per cent asked their relatives for an invitation and 15 
per cent applied to the UNHCR Office for assistance in departing. About half 
of the respondents who wished to move on believed that they had sufficient 
documents. Several, however, admitted that they had paid a very high price 
for these; thus, it is plausible to assume that they were not obtained legally.
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The 1994 survey also revealed an interesting correlation between the 
duration of the stay in Russia and the migrants’ intentions (see annex to 
this chapter, f igure 6.1). It seems the longer the migrants stayed in Russia, 
the less likely it became that they moved on; instead they adapted to life in 
Russia, engaged in businesses and obtained legal status or got used to their 
irregular position (IOM 1995).
The 2001 survey has detected that at least 38 per cent of transit migrants 
in Moscow were in contact with professional smugglers (Centre for Political 
Information 2002). The real percentage was likely to be even higher because 
not all respondents were prepared to admit such contacts, as these services 
are illegal. Generally, of the total number of migrants who aimed to leave 
for another country, 72 per cent said that they would agree to move ‘il-
legally’ in case they did not have legal alternatives. However, the majority 
preferred to live in Europe or the USA legally (ibid.). Their hopes to legalise 
their status in destination countries were related to the presence of family 
members there, assistance of international charity organisations, asylum 
opportunities, regularisation programmes and general respect for human 
rights and dignity in liberal democratic societies.
6.3 Interstate cooperation in counteracting irregular 
migration, human smuggling and trafficking
Generally, in the post-Soviet, CIS and Central Asian region, international 
migration is an area of active interstate cooperation, both on a bilateral 
and multilateral basis. Whilst no interstate policy specif ically addresses 
transit migration, various policies are concerned with irregular migration, 
smuggling and traff icking. The Declaration on Concerted Migration Policy 
adopted by the CIS member states in 2007 summarises the number of previ-
ous agreements on migration. Irregular migration, human smuggling and 
trafficking in human beings are believed to be widespread in the region and 
the governments of all the states of the Eurasian post-Soviet space are aware 
of the problem. They commonly agree with the need for collaboration in 
order to counteract these phenomena. In the past few years these issues have 
found their way onto the agendas of regional organisations, namely the CIS 
and the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC).2 The citizens of most 
post-Soviet states enjoy the privilege of visa-free cross-border movements 
2 EURASEC was founded in 2000. Presently, its member states are Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
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inside CIS territory. Therefore, efforts of CIS member-states to counteract 
irregular migration mainly target migrants from third countries; this 
includes those who are in transit in the CIS area making their way to the 
West. Efforts to prevent human traff icking are concerned rather with the 
citizens of the former Soviet states who are often thought to be victims of 
human traff ickers, both for sexual and labour exploitation.
In counteracting irregular migration, governments of the region act 
within the framework of the 1998 CIS ‘Agreement on Cooperation in Fighting 
Irregular Migration’ and the CIS ‘Concept of Cooperation in Counteracting 
Irregular Migration’ adopted in 2004. The major instruments to suppress 
irregular migration are detection and restraining channels of irregular 
migration, cooperation in the f ield of information exchange, elaboration of 
a common database on migrants, harmonisation of migration legislation, 
prosecution of human smugglers and other types of people aiding irregular 
migration, and improvement of border control and identif ication document 
technologies. On the other hand, the EURASEC agreements in this f ield 
focus mainly on the development and encouragement of regular forms of 
labour migration as an alternative to irregular migration.
All countries of the post-Soviet space, with the exception of Turk-
menistan, have adopted the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime and its supplementary Protocols Against Traff icking in 
Human Beings and Smuggling of Migrants. Following this, efforts were 
made to bring national laws in line with the provisions of the convention. 
This included introducing relevant articles into the criminal codes of these 
countries; qualifying the traff ic in human beings as a separate crime, de-
termined in accordance with the definition of the UN Protocol; developing 
mechanisms for the implementation of measures aimed against human 
traff ickers; and conducting information campaigns and rendering aid to 
victims. For instance, in 2003, the Russian Criminal Code was amended 
with articles on organisers of irregular migration, human traff ickers and 
modern slavery.
The position of Russia as a country transited by migrants discourages 
the government from signing bilateral readmission agreements with its 
western neighbours. This is because readmission agreements with the 
transit migrants’ destination countries require similar agreements with the 
origin countries; otherwise a country of transit risks becoming a reservoir 
for irregular migrants. Therefore, the implementation of the Agreement 
on Readmission signed between Russia and the EU in May 2006 and put 
in force on 1 June 2007 suffers from the absence of bilateral readmission 
agreements between Russia and the transit migrants’ countries of origin. 
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So far, during an initial period of three years from signing this EU-Russia 
agreement, it is limited to citizens of the Russian Federation and nationals 
from the countries that have signed readmission agreements with Russia 
– to date only Lithuania (2006) and Ukraine (2008). Other agreements are 
under consideration.
6.4 Conclusion
This contribution has revealed the ambivalent position of Russia with 
respect to transit migration. On the one hand, it is a geographic region 
with social structures that facilitate transit migration. On the other hand, 
the evidence presented here demonstrates that Russia is also a barrier for 
migrants who are on their way west. Transit migration in this region tends 
to be extensive in duration, and is closely related to irregular migration 
and smuggling. When choosing their transit route via Russia, migrants 
from Asian and African countries do not seem to anticipate the diff iculties 
of staying in Russia and trying to pass the EU border. Relatively simple 
entry regimes at Russia’s southern and eastern borders contrast with well-
organised and sophisticated border controls on the western side. This results 
in a phenomenon which could be called ‘failed transit migration’, that is, 
migrants who, because of tight control at both sides of the Russian-European 
border, get stuck in the supposed country of transit.
Russian authorities have become concerned that Russia is becoming a 
reservoir for irregular migrants (IOM 2004: 47). These concerns are based on 
two grounds: f irst, migrants are not eager to legalise and integrate but main-
tain the view that their stay is only strategic, temporary and forced. Second, 
irregular migrants, because they lack proper status, subsequently engage in 
further unlawful activities, notably irregular employment. Irregular transit 
migration through Russia challenges various security considerations of the 
Russian state. The State is confronted with large numbers of migrants who 
get ‘stuck’ there in an irregular situation and who maintain their aim to 
reach Western countries, though many will not succeed. Migrants face a 
hostile welcome, poor living standards, criminal or semi-criminal environ-
ments, an infringement of their dignity and uncertain futures. This situation 
calls for solutions to be sought.
It seems likely that transit migration through Russia westward will con-
tinue. So, the government will continue to improve its border and migration 
management in order to integrate it in a ‘civilised’ framework and reduce its 
criminal segments. The Federal Border Service is likely to improve entry and 
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border controls, in particular on the extensive eastern borders, in order to 
address irregular (transit) migration. In addition to this, Russia already leads 
intergovernmental initiatives regarding migration management within 
the framework of the Eurasian migration system, and thus demonstrates 
its interest in regulating migration and combating irregular international 
movements of populations. However, if migrants are already within Russian 
territory, they need to be treated with respect and according to human 
rights standards. The transit migrant issue is not only a challenge for the 
transit countries. The origin countries are also held responsible for their 
own citizens. As a consequence, they are included in the development of 
cooperation with host countries, for example, with respect to readmission 
agreements. Moreover, to be effective, measures to manage and protect 
transit migrants need to be integrated into existing human rights, civil 
society and institution-building activities in the countries of destination, 
transit and origin. Acute problems relating to the situation of migrants 
in transit necessitates the issue being regarded as an integral part of the 
general migration policy debate.
Transit migration, as demonstrated in this chapter, cannot be seen as 
separate from other forms of migration, such as student or temporary migra-
tion, as these are closely interrelated. Despite the scale of this phenomenon 
it is not recognised in national and international legislation. Notably the 
occurrence of irregular transit migration with all its negative consequences 
seems to result from the absence of clear and transparent migration policies.
Annex
Table 6.1  Numbers of transit migrants (persons)
Years Entered Russia Departed from Russia Net transit
2006 574,229 380,934 193,295
2007 463,503 308,552 154,951
2008 382,761 214,060 168,701
2009 282,368 152,347 113,002
Note: Data from the Border service of the russian Federation (number of entries/departures, by 
purpose declared when passing the border)
Source: national statistics Committee of the russian Federation (rossTaT) (2008, 2010)
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Table 6.4  Immigration to Russia from other countries by reasons, 2009 compared 
to 2006
Reasons to depart for Russia From CIS and Baltic 
countries
From other countries
2006 2009 2006 2009
employment-related 12,018 7,562 203 586
repatriation 10,087 2,484 1,541 141
ethnic conflicts 4,646 404 17 9
highly criminal atmosphere 402 37 4 1
ecological troubles 434 60 9 1
Inadequate climate conditions 450 99 22 -
Personal, family reasons 113,003 27,163 3,021 975
other reasons 12,261 2,798 548 77
reason not indicated 3,932 11,739 1,089 644
Total immigration 157,233 52,346 6,454 2,434
Note: Migrants 14 years and older
Source: national statistics Committee of the russian Federation (rossTaT) (2010: 124)









employment 27 6 6 44 5
study 10 40 14 30 32
Family reunification 27 1 6 - 11
It is easier to get visa - 16 27 5 23
It is easier to get 
refugee status
- 24 8 9 14
I knew russia before 27 - 18 2 2
Source: IoM (1995: 25)
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Table 6.6  The plans of Chinese students after graduating from Moscow universities 
(percentage)
To get russian citizenship and stay in russia 2.4
To get permanent residence permit in russia 7.3
To leave for another country 41.5
To return to China 48.8
TOTAL 100.0
Source: Gelbras (2002)
Figure 6.1 Duration of stay in Russia and migration intentions
Legend: black: ‘I am planning to leave russia’; grey: ‘I am not planning to leave russia’; white: ‘I 
have not decided yet’.
Source: Transitnaia migratsia v rossiiskoi Federatsii [Transit Migration in the russian Federation] 
(1994), Migration Information Programme (IoM), Budapest
List of interviews conducted by the author for the purposes of 
this study
Deputy-Director of the Federal Migration Service Vyacheslav Postavnin, 18 December 2007.
Deputy-Director of the Federal Migration Service Mikhail Tiurkin, 21 December 2008.
Deputy Head of the Russian Federal Border Service Vladimir Troufanov, 27 May 2006.
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The role of EU frontier countries has usually been that of a buffer against 
illegal migrants and asylum seekers travelling West. For example, Hungary 
has functioned as a buffer between East and West for more than half a 
century. Already during the Soviet era, the Hungarian western border was 
the frontier of the Socialist system. After its collapse and the opening of 
the western border, Hungary constituted a contentious barrier against 
illegal migrants and asylum seekers to the West. After the enlargement of 
the EU in 2004, the Hungarian eastern border became the EU frontier and 
in December 2007 Hungary was brought into the Schengen zone, hence 
controls of the external borders were raised to EU standards whilst controls 
on internal borders with other Schengen states were abandoned.
Hungary’s role as a frontier is also related to its reputation as a transit 
country for the last twenty years (IOM 1994, 1995, 2000; Tóth 2005; HHC 
1999, 2003; Juhasz 2003). The number of migrants and applicants for asylum 
in Hungary is small in comparison with other EU borderland countries. It 
is currently participating in the realisation of the EU Eastern European 
Neighbourhood Initiative (ENI). Nevertheless, Hungary has a special posi-
tion in terms of its relation with the wider neighbourhood, in spite of the 
adoption of the common EU migration regulations. Indeed, Hungary is 
a good example of dualism and ambiguity in the implementation of EU 
migration policy. It is manoeuvring ‘in between’ the obligations of the 
Acquis Communautaire of the EU and obligations to compatriots living in 
neighbouring non-EU countries.
Since Hungary fully implemented the Schengen agreement it has per-
formed its frontier role through a variety of border relationships with its 
neighbourhood. Hungary had until 2013 at least three different types of 
external border relations: the f irst is with EU but non-Schengen member 
states (notably Romania); the second is with non-EU but candidate member 
states (Croatia); and the third is with non-EU third countries (notably 
Ukraine and Serbia). In addition, Hungary implements a special system of 
liberal border crossing zones for the migration of ethnic Hungarians from 
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Ukraine and Serbia, creating a ‘window of opportunities’. This ‘window’ 
functions as a specif ic asymmetric ‘f ilter’ that allows relatively free move-
ment for ethnic Hungarians and also other citizens of non-EU countries, 
who live in a frontier zone of 55 kilometres within the border. Both Serbia 
and Ukraine are well known in Western Europe for irregular and transit 
migration, in spite of various political and f inancial efforts made by the EU 
to establish a protected border against irregular migrants. Furthermore, in 
2010 the EU lifted the visa requirement for citizens of the Western Balkans1 
and allowed their citizens to freely pass the Hungarian border. This EU 
decision provoked changes in the flows of asylum seekers into Europe: on 
one hand, the number of applications for asylum in Hungary halved; on the 
the other hand, this reduction contrasted with a rise in the level of asylum 
applications in Germany and Sweden. It is suggested that refugees are 
more likely to enter and pass through Hungary undetected in order apply 
for asylum in a preferred country. This further substantiates Hungary’s 
reputation as transit state.
To understand the nature of transit migration in Hungary we must 
analyse the processes and types of migration flows over recent years in the 
context of the behaviour of different migrant groups and in the changing 
realities of the EU borderlands. It is essential to ask if the term ‘transit 
migration’ has the same meaning now as in previous realities, or whether 
it is a new political construction. What are the most important factors that 
facilitate the transit of migrants through the country? For which groups of 
migrants does the country appear to be a country of transit? What is the 
difference between the groups of migrants who want to remain in Hungary 
and those who try to pass through Hungary into Western Europe? Does the 
recent readmission agreement create new realities for transit migration 
between the East and West?
In order to answer these questions, we looked at the migration processes 
around Hungary using a broad approach. We assumed that the ‘non depar-
ture’ regime of the Cold War has been replaced by the ‘non-arrival regime’ [of 
the] New World order’ (Castles 2002: 9). This meant that as well as examining 
the peculiarities of the migration context in Hungary, we also examined 
the opportunities and willingness of neighbouring third countries to sup-
port the EU policy on f ighting illegal migrants and preventing unwanted 
migrants. Additionally, highlighted here are the adaptation strategies of 
persons who asked for asylum in Hungary after they successfully passed 
the EU (Hungarian) border.
1 With the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo.
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7.2 Theoretical and methodological approaches to research
There are different approaches in the research on transit migration that look 
at migrants trying to reach particular destination countries such as those 
in the European Union or the United States; in particular, unauthorised 
migration raises most concerns. Migrants use the geographical location 
of countries that neighbour their destination to get easier access to, for 
instance, the EU or USA (Haas 2005, Düvell 2007, Kimball 2007).
In the case of Hungary, transit migration has several dimensions: the 
f irst is the process of passing a country; the second is being stranded 
in a transit space and unable to move on; and the third is the pushing 
of migrants by off icials to move through Hungary to another country 
(HHC 2003, 2010; HRW 2010; Molodikova 2009). These situations often 
deteriorate on account of the illegality of entrance, as is the case for about 
90 per cent of asylum seekers in Hungary (OIN 2011). In addition, there 
are many other factors which inf luence the transit nature of territory 
and that can create favourable conditions for transit migrants. Often, 
the economic prosperity of local populations bears a strong relation to 
the border-zone activities, as the opportunity for using these activities 
for economic income is used by both ordinary citizens and local off icials 
(Donnan & Wilson 2001).
In the context of the European Union, the discussions of the factors of 
transit should evaluate the network of relations that composed the eco-
nomic, cultural and political ties of the EU with third countries that hold 
the transit flows (Fawcett 1989; Gurak & Caces 1992; Massey et al. 1998). The 
existing networks of persons or groups of persons (diasporas) in combina-
tion with different types of visa regimes establish social infrastructures 
between sending and receiving countries and create sustainable interac-
tions (Gurak & Caces 1992). In the context of network theory (Massey et al. 
1993) the existence of networks and diasporas simultaneously increases the 
potential social capital (access to resources, information and contacts) that 
supports the integration opportunities of migrants in a particular country.
Based on this proposition one can argue that a relatively homogene-
ous Hungarian society can attract only Hungarians from neighbouring 
countries. Other migrants (especially asylum seekers) in the absence of a 
friendly and helpful milieu, friends or a diaspora, in combination with a 
diff icult, indigenous language, have few opportunities for rooting there. 
This is the reason why people who are not from neighbouring countries, 
and without a support network, do not consider Hungary a viable destina-
tion country.
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Research methodology
In order to research the function and history of Hungary as a transit country 
and the changes in Hungarian migration policy as well as in the directions 
and types of migration flows, different methods of analysis were used. So 
far, there is neither an agreed definition as to what transit migration is, nor 
any reliable statistics on the transit flow. Therefore, scholars who investigate 
this phenomenon use data from different surveys, interviews and available 
statistics on irregular migration and border crossing (Kimball 2007; Düvell 
2007; Haas 2005; ICMPD 2007, 2010; IOM 2000).
For this chapter, f irst, desk research conducted on migration from third 
(non-EU) countries to Hungary was used to assess the issue of Hungary’s 
attractiveness as a destination country for different types of migrants 
(labour, education, ethnic migration and asylum seekers). For this purpose, 
various reports of international organisations (HHC 2010; HRW 2010) were 
consulted. In addition, different statistics from the Off ice on Immigration 
and Nationals (OIN) of Hungary, the Statistic Committee, the Demographic 
Research Institute of Hungary and other relevant sources were used. Second, 
a f ield trip was conducted in July 2010 involving four passages of borders in 
the Ukrainian borderland with Poland, Hungary, Romania and Moldova. In 
the course of these research trips, interviews were conducted with border 
guards (3), two smugglers and with the local population (5). Additional 
meetings were held with (a) the Ukrainian head of migration services in 
Uzhgorod and (b) with regional experts. Third, in order to study off icials’ 
perceptions of migration flows, the author analysed 12 in-depth, qualitative 
and semi-structured interviews with Hungarian civil servants from various 
organisations. These interviews were conducted in 2005, 2007 and 2011.2 
They involved questions about transit migration and the externalisation 
of EU migration policy. Fourth, a small-scale longitudinal data survey was 
conducted involving 30 asylum seekers in Hungary with different forms of 
protection (refugees, subsidiary protected persons and persons authorised 
to stay). They were interviewed twice, f irst at the end of 2007/beginning 
of 2008 (at the time of Schengen inclusion) and second three years later in 
mid-2010. This enabled the gathering of data on their integration strategies. 
Questions on the development of their general life plans in Hungary and 
outside helped the author to investigate their transit intentions.
2 State agencies: Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, Ministry of the Interior, OIN, 
administration of refugee camp. Non-governmental organisations: Helsinki Committee, 
UNHCR, Menedek and lawyers who are involved in advocacy for asylum seekers.
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7.3 Main types of legal migration flows in Hungary
In 2011, the population of Hungary dropped below 10 million people and was 
counted as 9.9 million; this decrease was due to an ageing population (KHS 
2010). The decline was observed in spite of a stable positive migration balance. 
As of 1 January 2011, the number of migrants was 216,084, up from 184,358 in 
2009 (OIN 2011). Nevertheless, the share of the immigrant population in Hun-
gary continues to remain at around 2.2 per cent (table 7.1). The general trend 
over the past 20 years indicates the prevalence of European migration flows 
(73.9 per cent of the total), with the EU-27 countries being the main sources 
of immigrants into Hungary (55.7 per cent in 2010). Typically, Romania is the 
main sending country, but its share declined from a maximum of 54.7 per 
cent of all migrants in 2004 to 27.8 per cent in 2011. Similar trends have been 
observed for migration flows from Serbia, which peaked at 19.4 per cent of 
the total in 2007 and decreased to a mere 4.7 per cent in 2010. Migration flows 
from Ukraine peaked at 16.3 per cent in 2004 and then fell to 7.4 per cent in 
2011. In contrast, the number of Chinese immigrants increased and in 2011 
occupied third position, ahead of Serbian immigrants. This demonstrates 
that the process of ethnic Hungarian migration typical over the past 20 years 
is now slowly decreasing in relevance and that migration flows to Hungary 
are becoming more diverse and international (OIN 2011).
Table 7.1  Immigrants and those staying for more than three months in Hungary, 
number of persons 2009-2010 (without refugees and others with protected 
status)
Status of permit/year 2008 2009 2010
Immigration permit 47,205 47,205 42,659
permanent resident permit 28,522 23,475 20,588
residence permit 15,304 33,682 32,897
eea residence permit 30,579 20,855 12,990
registration certificate 48,527 70,248 72,938
permanent residence card 6,560 8,319 14,272
third countries nationals who are family of the Hungarian 
citizens 4,733 5,562 7,025
third countries nationals who are family of eea citizens 322 382 432
eC permanent residence permit 242 206 398
national settlement permit 2,568 4,063 5,504
temporary resident permit 6 6 9
Total 184,568 214,003 209,712
Source: Homepage of office for Immigration and nationalities www.bevandorlas.hu/statisztikak.php
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Ethnic migration
Hungary still lacks a comprehensive migration policy; existing policies, 
however, favour ethnic Hungarians and thus reflect an ethnic migration 
policy. These target migration from neighbouring third countries to the 
‘motherland’ and are noted with concern by other countries. This policy 
was reinforced in 2010, when the new ruling Hungarian coalition (FIDESZ 
and Christian Democratic Party) changed the Hungarian Citizenship 
Law on May 26th, 2010.3 This act allows the preferential naturalisation of 
non-Hungarian citizens with Hungarian ancestors and accelerated the 
naturalisation procedure. All holders of ethnic Hungarian certif icates 
(923,000 on 31 July 2010) can potentially apply for citizenship. According 
to expert opinion, the Hungarian government has already allocated an 
additional budget for these tasks. The OIN and Ministries (Interior, Public 
Administration and Justice) will receive an additional 200 civil servants, 
which will cost €1.4 million within two budget years (Tóth 2010). The process 
of obtaining citizenship under the new regulations will take 3-4 months and 
does not require passing the language test or knowledge of the Hungarian 
constitution and history. Also in 2011, a special residence permit for close 
relatives of Hungarian citizens was introduced. But the introduction of this 
card has created signif icant problems in Hungary because of the unclear 
status of these documents for different organisations.
This policy of selective immigration of Hungarian ethnic minorities from 
the neighbouring countries potentially creates an area of free movement 
between Schengen and non-Schengen countries for certain categories of the 
population in the third countries. The implementation of new amendments 
to the Citizenship Law could thus cause considerable changes in geogra-
phy and types of migration to and through Hungary. In a short time, all 
Ukrainian and Serbian border areas may actually be inhabited by citizens 
of Hungary. Taking into consideration the percentage of mixed families in 
these countries, one can propose that the ‘Hungarisation’ will involve big 
areas of neighbouring countries. This national policy could thus potentially 
undermine EU policy and geo-strategy concerning the control of external 
borders. Notably due to high levels of corruption in Ukraine and Romania, 
soon the number of potential applicants for naturalisation could be several 
times higher than the f igures forecast by the Hungarian government.
Already, ethnic Hungarian political parties in Ukraine aim to attract the 
voters among co-ethnic populations through the issuing of ethnic cards 
(guaranteeing the above privileges) and through providing assistance in 
3 By the new Amendment Act XLIV to Act LV of 1993 on the Hungarian Nationality.
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granting free Schengen visas in exchange for support in elections. One 
informant explains:
Our families got the Hungarian cards and Schengen visas very simply. 
We just have to go to our Hungarian party meetings and promise to vote 
for them (from two interviews by the author in March and April 2009).
Labour migration
Another important f low of immigrants is related to labour migration; this 
is also closely related to ethnic migration as well as to transit migration. In 
2011, 16,060 work permits were issued, mainly to Chinese, Vietnamese and 
Mongolian labour migrants who are now among the top f ive nationalities 
of labour migrants in Hungary (OIN 2011). According to Gördi (2010: 8), 
however, ethnic migration to Hungary is mainly economic and until 2007 
the share of ethnic Hungarians among economic migrants was about 65 
per cent. In 2006, before Hungary acceded the Schengen zone, new laws 
were adopted which came into force in 2007: Act I ‘About the entry and 
residence of persons from EEA countries’ and Act II ‘About the entry and 
residence of persons from third countries including families of members 
of EEA citizens’. From that time, Romanian citizens were entitled to a 
residence permit called a ‘lakókártya’ which included the right to work 
after Hungary joined the EU. According to the view of an off icer from 
the OIN in 2007, about 20,000 Romanians applied for f ive-year residence 
permits in Hungary and the majority were granted. However, no one 
actually checks whether the recipients of such permits really work in 
Hungary and it is implied that instead they only use this provision to 
transit Hungary legally.
With the expansion of the Schengen zone Hungary will probably increase 
its role as a transit country. Romanians of Hungarian ethnicity would 
prefer to move further to the West … The information obtained shows 
that Romanian migrants received 5-years residence permits but when 
checked they turn out not to have resided in the place of registration for 
many years (expert from the OIN, February 2008).
The series of survey panels in 2004-2005 and 2008-2009 conducted in Roma-
nia supported the observation that only ethnic Hungarians still have some 
interest in migration and intention to migrate to Hungary as a place for work 
and residence. Nevertheless, this intention depends on their occupation 
and level of education.
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Recent surveys conducted in Romania (Kiss 2007; Gördi & Kiss 2009), 
however, suggest that ethnic Hungarians who live in villages and towns with 
a mixed population have increasingly non-ethnic networks. In particular, 
they have begun joining Romanian migration networks and are now also 
moving to western or southern European destinations. According to these 
surveys the role of Hungary as an attraction to potential ethnic Hungarian 
migrants is diminishing. Nevertheless, the surveys for 2002 and 2009 in 
Romania also highlight the fact that family and kinship networks play an 
increasing role in migration to Hungary. The majority of ethnic migrants 
that arrived in Hungary (89 per cent) indicated different forms of assistance 
through the personal contacts either from migrants who arrived early in 
Hungary or persons who were born in Hungary (Gördi 2010: 27).
Being ethnically Hungarian opens up opportunities for people from 
surrounding countries to settle in Hungary, though this is less and less 
utilised. Vice versa, people of ethnicities other than Hungarian have fewer 
career opportunities and as a consequence lose interest to migrating to 
Hungary. Thus, the absence of ethnic capital among migrants from Romania 
is not compensated through social capital.
Education migration
Ethnic migration is also well represented and visible in the higher education 
sector. The internationalisation of education in Hungary is marked by a 
relatively modest rise in the number and variety of countries of origin of 
students. In 2008/2009, there were 16,299 foreign students out of about 
400,000, or 4.1 per cent of the total (MoE 2009). Students from Romania, 
Ukraine, Slovakia and Serbia constituted 42 per cent of all foreign students. 
Their share has been increasing over the years according to data from the 
Ministry of Education.
Conditions to stay after graduation from Hungarian higher educational 
institutions are strict and even genuine students who graduate from Hun-
garian institutions but have no immediate job contract in Hungary are not 
able to stay for some months to f ind work in the country. Interviews with 
alumni who managed to remain and work in Hungary indicated their low 
level of integration into Hungarian society; also it turned out that many 
were ready to migrate to another Western country, especially English-
speaking countries, thus a certain potential for onward-migration became 
apparent in this group (Molodikova 2008).
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7.4 Illegal migration in the Schengen zone: Old or new 
migration patterns?
During the early 1990s, after the collapse of communism, Hungarian migra-
tion policy underwent systemic change when the country adopted a very 
liberal entry system. As a consequence, Hungary became a target for both 
irregular and transit migrants who attempt to pass the western Hungarian 
border with Austria. In 2006, the year before Hungary joined the Schengen 
zone, irregular migration dropped by 10 per cent as compared to 2005, to 
16,508 known cases. One explanation given was that this decrease was due 
to eff icient control and enforcement measures (ICMPD 2007). More than 
half (62 per cent) of all apprehensions in Hungary before Schengen were 
made along the western borders at the Austrian border section, the then 
external border of the EU, but in 2007 and 2008 this number decreased be-
cause of improved border control (table 7.2). The number of illegal migrants 
who were caught on the eastern border of Hungary was on average only a 
third of the number of illegal migrants stopped on the western border (with 
Austria). This indicates the intensity of the westward migratory flow, but 
can also be partially explained by the much stronger migration control at 
the Austrian border (ICMPD 2007, 2010).
A comparison with a survey conducted in 1998 implies that the pat-
terns of irregular migration and smuggling have since changed. In the late 
1990s, human smuggling across the green border was dominant. Ten years 
later, smugglers more often hide irregular migrants in vans and vehicles 
as observed on the Romanian and Ukrainian border sections (IOM 2000). 
This is, to some extent, related to cross-border labour commuting between 
Hungary and its neighbouring countries (see table 7.3). Another difference is 
that in the late 1990s, groups who were making clandestine border crossings 
consisted of up to ten individuals, whereas in the late 2000s groups were 
smaller. Also the number of refusals of entry at different border sections of 
Hungary changed from 2002 to 2006; refused entry on the Austrian border 
decreased after 2004-2005 but slightly increased on the Ukrainian and 
Romanian borders. These changes can also be explained according to the 
improved control of the green borders (ICMPD 2010).
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2005 2006 2007 2008
on road border crossings 1,106 10,394 5,794 6,790
on rail border crossings 637 387
on green (land) border 2,193 2,158 2,413 3,425
at the sea border (river) 17 10 not relevant not relevant
at airports 303 254 492 434
In the country 2,848 2,866 711 1,284
In other places 66 74 - 47
Total 18,295 16,508 8,939 10,215
Source: ICMpd (2007, 2010)
Since 21 December 2007, Hungary has had a relatively short border with two 
non-EU countries, Ukraine and Serbia. Consequently, the Hungarian gov-
ernment came to the conclusion that it would no longer need large numbers 
of border guards (7,000 in 2007). Instead many of them were merged with the 
police and retrained and a concept called ‘deep control behind the border’ 
was established.4 In addition to that, the cross-border cooperation efforts 
were supported by different EU programmes related to ENI. For example, 
joint patrols of borders are implemented on the Hungarian-Romanian 
border. But for the Hungarian-Ukrainian border, a Hungarian border guard 
complained that it is diff icult to organise operational cooperation with 
Ukrainians: ‘With Ukraine we use only high-level cooperative contacts 
– phone-call-based relations’ (from interview with border guard off icer 
17 February 2008). Three years later, in 2010, Human Rights Watch (HRW 
2010) assessed this cooperation as well developed, whilst Ukrainian border 
guards on the Hungarian-Ukrainian border section explained that they 
only have a low and very formal level of cooperation with their Hungarian 
partners (interview in 2010).
In order to regulate regional cross-border movements of people, a special 
petty traff ic border zone ‘kis határ forgalmi’ with special visa regulations 
was established for residents from both sides in 2008.5 This arrangement 
4 ‘Deep control’ means internal policing of highways, markets, and other areas where irregular 
migrants are suspected to be.
5 From 2007 for Ukraine and Hungary and Ukraine/Poland and Hungary with Serbia, and 
from 2009 for Moldova and Romania.
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aims to facilitate cross border movements of the large ethnic Hungarian 
population that settled within a 50 km zone in the neighbouring countries. 
This innovation was negatively evaluated by Ukrainian experts and the 
population. According to them, it has actually become more complex and 
difficult to obtain an employment visa, which is considered a negative result 
of Hungary’s accession to the Schengen zone. The consequence is that this 
special petty border visa is valid only for this zone, which happens to be poorly 
developed so that people do not find jobs there. The system for obtaining this 
particular type of visa is even more complicated than that for a Schengen 
visa, which is why locals prefer to get Schengen visas instead to seek jobs in 
EU countries. However, the petty border visa is also used legally to get into 
Hungary but then transit to other countries.
Many of my neighbours use … the ‘kis határ forgalmi’ document and go 
to other countries to work … there are no proper jobs in this 50 km area 
for us … I have a work visa, but of course the place of work is faked. I am 
not going to work there. For a fee, a Chinese businessman organised 
everything for me (Ukrainian woman who lives in the border region, 
January 2008).
Over the past years, for Ukrainians the situation has improved, though 
not because of improvements of the visa service itself but because of the 
Hungarian policy to support ethnic Hungarians abroad. The local popula-
tion was given the opportunity to obtain a f ive-year Schengen visa based 
on Hungarian ethnic cards. This liberalisation of the border regime for co-
ethnics seems to facilitate increasing border violations by citizens of other 
CIS countries (Malynovskaya 2009). This is related to the visa-free travel 
regime of the CIS countries, which also grants citizens of these countries 
the right to stay in Ukraine visa-free for 90 days. These CIS migrants also 
took an interest in and utilised the opportunities of liberal visa regime 
meant to be for Ukrainian border zone populations only. As one local citizen 
reported in an interview, his friends from Georgia incessantly ask him to 
organise his family registration in this zone in order to also obtain these 
petty border traff ic documents.
After Hungary’s accession to the Schengen zone, the EU f inanced the 
improvement of the passing capacities of border check-points with third 
countries. This has both positive and negative effects: shorter waiting times 
for cars and the future development of private passenger minibus services are 
positive results. Nowadays regular private bus connections already link all 
regional centres of Ukraine with many regional centres of Europe (the Czech 
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Republic, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Poland, etc.). This, however, also 
has negative side-effects. The rise in the intensity and number of small buses 
commuting is so high that, according to experts from the regional branch of 
the Ukrainian Institute of Strategic Research, twice a week the border guards 
have to organise a special lane at check points for these small buses. This 
facilitates the quicker passing of minibuses carrying people and goods across 
the borders. An unofficial ‘tax’ of about €200 per minibus is requested from 
the drivers; this also includes a request for no further declaration of goods 
normally taken from West to East. Vice versa, the regular weekly East-West 
commute creates a transit corridor for people and goods flows.
Eastern vector of flows of illegal migrants
In 2006, Ukraine ranked amongst the top three countries, together with 
Turkey and Hungary, with respect to the number of migration-related 
border apprehensions (respectively, 12,363, 51,983 and 15,219) (ICMPD 2007). 
The country is said to be one of the hubs in human smuggling activities. 
Ukrainian anti-smuggling police estimated that they detected only 20 per 
cent of those trying to cross the western border (Franchetti 2008). In the 
case of Ukraine it seems that assisting people in illegally crossing borders 
has become a thriving business which involves citizens from all walks of 
life as well as off icials at all levels. A smuggler explains, ‘getting an illegal 
from his home village somewhere in South-East Asia all the way to Europe 
is complex. There’s a huge organisation behind it all, which in the Ukraine 
involves dozens of people’ (Franchetti 2008).
The EU, as a donor, invests signif icant f inancial resources in the 
strengthening of the Ukrainian border. For example, the total EU funds for 
Ukraine from 1991 to 2004 amounted to €1 billion. From 2007, a Ukrainian 
programme on border management development cost the USA and EU 
about €1 billion.6 In addition, FRONTEX joint operations to control the EU’s 
eastern borders were calculated at another €992,500 (HRW 2010). These 
funds do not include other EU activities with similar aims. Unfortunately, 
flourishing corruption in all state structures in Ukraine supports the illegal 
migrants’ f lows. A Ukrainian migrant in Hungary who lives in a village in 
the border area revealed that
My relative is involved in this business. He is a border guard. He bought 
this position for $5,000 and of course he wanted the money back. He told 
6 Söderköping Process (2007), €1 billion for border management in Ukraine, http://eapmigra-
tionpanel.org/page14769.html?template=print.
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me that at the top level they demanded money from operational border 
guards and if he wants to work he has to pay … I know that many people 
around us in the villages are involved in this business (interview with a 
Ukrainian labour migrant, 17 March 2008).
According to information from smugglers, migrants pay from £5,000 to 
£10,000 for the journey from the non FSU Asian region to the EU. The fees 
paid by migrants are divided amongst several actors, notably smugglers, 
border guards, drivers and minders. In an interview with Franchetti (2008), 
a Ukrainian smuggler explains that he is paid £500 per illegal immigrant, 
of which he keeps only £100. Hence, the bulk of the money goes to his ac-
complices on both sides of the border.
The human smuggler claimed to be part of an international criminal 
network that routinely pays off guards on Ukraine’s borders:
‘Senior border guard off icers are bribed’, he said. ‘I’m given a so-called 
“window” – a time and a place when a particular stretch of the border 
won’t be patrolled, … not all border guards are corrupt, of course, but 
we have no problem f inding enough who are willing to turn a blind eye’ 
(Franchetti 2008).
Whilst Kiev and Odessa seem to be the national hubs in irregular transit 
migration, migrants also mention some regional centres in the border 
regions, such as Lvov, Uzhgorod and Mukachevo. Smugglers usually conceal 
migrants in cellars and abandoned farmhouses before guiding them across 
the border. A senior Ukrainian police off icer confirmed that ‘people in vil-
lages along the border have been involved in smuggling illegal immigrants 
across the border for years. It’s their main income’ (Ukrainian senior police 
off icer, 20 October 2008).
The next staging post in the transit migration process is Hungary, where 
similar practices were observed. Sometimes appartment owners do not 
even know how their apartments are being used. A Ukrainian interviewee 
and landlord of apartments in Budapest experienced the following in 2006:
[In 2006], I let out the apartment to Ukrainians. One day my neighbour 
from that apartment gave me a call and told me about strange people in 
the flat. I was shocked when I found about 15 Asian people (Ukrainian 
emigrant in Budapest, July 2007).
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Research carried out by the author suggests that citizens from FSU and 
non-FSU countries have developed different strategies for getting to the 
West. Citizens from Asian and African countries usually need a visa in 
order to enter and stay in Ukraine, and they are frequently checked by 
the various law enforcement bodies (Düvell 2008). In contrast, travellers 
from the FSU do not need a visa to stay in Ukraine. They are less visible 
and thus less troubled by the police. Many have networks of relatives or 
friends, dating back to Soviet times, who assist them in getting a tempo-
rary residence permit. This enables them to apply for a visa to the West 
in Ukraine or alternatively to purchase a ticket to an African country 
travelling via an EU country where they can apply for asylum. Certain 
agencies provide visas and arrange international travel, and these are 
widely known in Ukraine.
I visited my aunt in Kharkov. When we chatted she asked me if I wanted 
to go to work abroad and gave me the choice of three phone numbers. I 
called the f irst and that was a Lvov f irm … After almost one month I still 
had not received any response and complained to my mum in Russia. She 
had a friend in Kiev in the KGB [meanwhile rebranded SBU] and gave 
me his phone number … I called him and complained that this f irm may 
have cheated me. He contacted them [the f irm] and threatened them that 
if I did not get a visa the f irm could have problems doing business. The 
following day I received an employment visa (Russian migrant woman 
in Hungary, November 2007).
This example demonstrates the complexity of obtaining an illegitimate 
visa: the migrant needs to know the right person with information about 
agencies that deal with such matters, and he/she may also need access to 
someone in power to support the case. It also suggests that secret service 
staff may be involved in such matters. The evidence that the intervention 
of a KGB off icer helped to get a working visa supports the supposition 
that the system of off icial internal registration for a temporary residence 
permit in Ukraine can also be used for the facilitation of visa applications, 
because foreign migrants need a residence permit in Ukraine to apply for 
a visa there. Refugees from Central Asia seem to have a similar experience 
though they face more obstacles:
It took about four months to organise my journey from Ukraine to 
Hungary … It was diff icult to f ind the right person who could help me. 
I travelled all across Ukraine searching in Kharkov, Uzhgorod, Lvov. I 
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arrived in Kiev and went to the German embassy and told them that I 
was a refugee. They told me that it was not their business. I left in tears, 
crying and sat down on the stairs. A young man approached me and 
asked what I was crying about. He was ready to help me and registered 
me as his sister temporarily at his apartment. I lived in Kiev for one and 
a half months while he prepared all the documents for Hungary. I paid 
for a travel tour, got a visa and crossed the border (female refugee from 
Uzbekistan in Budapest, 17 January 2008).
The method of visa application was similar: (a) identify and contact facilita-
tor; (b) obtain registration in Ukraine as a relative (for migrants from the 
FSU it is not diff icult to claim that the person is a relative); and (c) f ind an 
agency that arranges the (tourist or other) visa and the trip.
Analysis of different cases provides evidence that irregular migration 
business at the EU’s eastern border is a joint undertaking between off icial 
and unoff icial structures (e.g., interior service registration, border guard 
services, mediators, travel agencies) and the local population. This cre-
ates an infrastructure and plenty of opportunities for transit migration 
to the West. Nevertheless, some positive facts were mentioned during the 
interview with the head of Migration Service in Uzhgorod/Zakarpattya. 
He said that the level of illegal migration in the crisis years declined, but 
he argued that it cannot be related to any success of the EU in controlling 
the situation but to a global trend in declining migration flows due to a 
decreasing demand for labour during the crisis.
Southern vector: Evidence of illegal transit
To the south of Hungary lies Serbia and the route of illegal migration through 
Serbia is also well established. Interviews conducted with migrants who 
passed through Serbia and Romania illustrate that they were transported 
through Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria until they finally turned up in Hungary 
near the town of Szeged close to the Serbian border. According to an IOM 
(2000) survey, about 25 per cent of the migrants detained at the Hungarian 
border for illegal entry used the territory of the Former Yugoslavia (FYU). 
Overland trips by van, bus, or car are particularly popular and were used in 
half of the authors’ thirty interviewees’ cases, mainly because flights or boat 
journeys are more strictly controlled. Often, there is a combination of means 
of transportation and lengths of journeys depending on money or the level 
of assistance by intermediaries (Düvell & Molodikova 2009). Meanwhile, 
a readmission agreement has been signed with Serbia by the EU. In 2009, 
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the cases of illegal migrants’ transit clearly indicate that smugglers are 
constantly changing tactics and sometimes use very complicated methods:
We passed the Turkish border legally and had a f light to Belgrade. From 
Belgrade our instructor who is located in Ukraine and whom we contacted 
by phone told us to take a local bus to Montenegro, to Podgorica. We had 
no visa to this country but nobody checked us. There we took a local bus 
directly to Novi Sad [Serbia] and also nobody checked us. In this city we 
took a taxi and asked the taxi driver to take us where possible to the 
border. We passed through the forest and reached Hungary where we 
applied for asylum (women from Georgia, 17 July 2009).
This case highlights the international nature of the smuggling business. 
The Georgian family was managed by a Ukrainian traff icker by phone 
through Serbia and Montenegro. This made sense because at the time of 
their journey Ukraine had already adopted the readmission agreement and 
the risk of being returned to the country of origin was higher, especially for 
people from the FSU, thus the route through Serbia was safer.
An interview with a Serbian resident of the borderland zone reflects a 
situation similar to that described in interviews on the Ukrainian border-
land:
The place I was born, near the Hungarian border, is very rundown. 
There are no jobs at all for the youth and I know that many of my former 
classmates work as smugglers of either goods or people. Of course, it is 
dangerous work. One of them was even captured, but they have to make 
a living. They have no other options (Serbian migrant, January 2008).
Several African interviewees mentioned that after being captured by 
Serbian border guards they had spent several days in a detention camp. 
They then tried to apply for refugee status in Serbia; instead, the Serbian 
border guards encouraged them to go to the West rather than applying for 
asylum. Subsequently, they were even directed to the Hungarian border, 
‘they gave us directions to the Hungarian border and told us it would be 
better to apply for asylum in an EU country’ (Ethiopian migrant, June 2008).
In December 2009, visa controls were lifted on the Hungarian-Serbian 
border; this led to an increase in the transit of illegal migrants to and 
through Hungary. An expert from OIN Hungary responsible for asylum 
affairs stated that they have clear monthly data supporting the fact that 
as soon as the EU lifted the visa controls with Serbia – hence for Serbians 
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and Kosovars (who are allegedly able to quickly obtain a Serbian biometric 
passport) – they went straight on to Germany and Scandinavia to ask for 
asylum. From that time, the number of asylum seekers in Hungary actually 
halved in 2010 (table 7.4).
Table 7.4  Asylum applications in Hungary and procedure: Persons transferred to 
Hungary
Number of applications for asylum 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
total 1,609 2,117 3,419 3,118 4,672 2,104
percentage of non-europeans of all 
asylum seekers 64% 70% 66% 43% 44% 73%
entered the country legally 569 586 595 239 196 63
entered the country illegally 1,040 1,531 2,824 2,879 4,476 2,041
dublin procedure: persons transferred 
to Hungary 159 273 239 334 934 742
Source: office for Immigration and nationalities www.bevandorlas.hu/statisztikak.php
7.5 Transformation of migration flows after Schengen 
extension
In fulf illing the Schengen obligations, Hungary has strengthened its 
migration controls whilst opening a back door, widely and warmly, for 
compatriots to enter the Schengen zone . This situation supports the illegal 
border crossings that have prevailed over legal entry across the entire period 
covered in this chapter (82.6 per cent). In addition, the level of applications 
for asylum has been constantly increasing from 1,600 in 2004 to 4,672 in 
2009. However, in December 2009, visa-free travel between Serbia and 
Hungary was introduced, which resulted in changes in the flows of asylum 
seekers to many countries. In Hungary, as mentioned above, the number 
of applications halved in 2010. In contrast, an overall rise in the number of 
people seeking asylum (especially Serbs, Kosovars and Macedonians) was 
reported in Sweden, where the number of asylum seekers in 2010 reached 
31,901 compared to 24,232, in 2009, including 6,343 Serbs, Kosovars and 
Macedonians (United Press International 2011). A similar situation was 
reported in Germany (Netzwerk Migration in Europa 2011; Migrationsrecht.
net 2011), where Serbs rose to third position among the top three nation-
alities of asylum seekers, followed by Kosovars and Macedonians. These 
facts clearly demonstrate that Hungary functions as a transit country. As 
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a consequence of the drop in the number of European asylum seekers, 
the number of non-European applicants from Asia and Africa in Hungary 
exceeded the number of asylum seekers from European countries. Afghan 
and Palestinian people are among the three top groups of countries in terms 
of origin of asylum seekers (table 7.5).











kosovo 1,786 38.23% 379 18.01%
afghanistan 1,194 25.56% 702 33.37%
Serbia 536 11.47% 67 3.18%
georgia 116 2.48% 68 3.23%
turkey 114 2.44% 59 2.80%
Somalia 75 1.61% 51 2.42%
West Bank and 
gaza
23 0.49% 225 10.69%
other 828 17.72% 553 26.28%
Source: office for Immigration and nationalities www.bevandorlas.hu/statisztikak.php
During the years after the EU accession, the procedure of asylum has become 
much stricter and, by and large, recognition rates of asylum seekers are very 
low, although due to a mix of reasons they have successively increased from 
3 per cent (HHC 2003) to 11.7 per cent (HHC 2010). It is noteworthy, however, 
that according to an OIN expert from the Asylum Seekers department, 
many people abscond during the course of the procedure, thus their claim 
is rejected, which decreases the recognition rate. But if one only considers 
the recognition rate for those who stay in Hungary until the end of the 
procedure, the rate is actually 27 per cent (Lászlo 2011). As early as the 1990s, 
the phenomenon of absconding asylum seekers was mentioned in several 
surveys (HHC 1999; IOM 2000); then, about two thirds of migrants in refugee 
camps usually continued their journey to the West. The research that was 
conducted by IOM in 2000 noted that about 75 per cent of applicants disap-
peared during the time of evaluation. The situation nowadays is very similar 
to that in 2000. According to IOM data (2011), among a total of 4,672 persons 
in 2009 and 2,104 persons in 2010, interruptive decisions were conducted 
for 1,360 and 698 respectively. This constituted about 75 per cent of the 
total number of applicants. According to OIN expert information, the main 
reason for such an interruptive decision was the absconding of applicants 
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during the procedure. Thus, many applicants’ behaviour has not changed 
during the last 20 years. Representatives of the refugee camp administration 
have the view that Hungary’s accession to the Schengen zone has actually 
made it easier for these people to travel within the EU.
Before enlargement, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (HHC) believed 
that the insuff icient and limited asylum legislation facilitated irregular 
migration:
There was a lot of evidence that the asylum policy in Hungary pushed 
people applying for asylum to illegally travel further west. The policy 
is not aimed at integrating refugees. Hungary has remained a transit 
country for asylum seekers and migrants … more asylum seekers disap-
pear during the procedure (HHC 2003: 3).
At that time there were only two categories of protection: asylum seekers 
and ‘refugees’ and persons ‘authorised to stay’ (befogadó). The latter group 
has to remain in the country permanently, is not permitted to travel and 
has no access to social benef its. Due to the requirements in place for for-
eigners, they have to obtain permission for employment, but opportunities 
for legal work are limited. If a person’s papers expire, their children can’t 
attend schools. Some people lose jobs or are not able to get them legally. 
Before accession to Schengen in 2006, in addition to the previous two types 
of asylum seeker, the new law introduced a third category: ‘subsidiary 
protection’ – ‘alkalmazott ’, that is, between refugee and humanitarian 
status.
Unfortunately, there is a signif icant gap between reality and the 
obligations of Hungary, as an EU member state, to uphold human rights 
and protect refugees and asylum seekers. This can be partly explained 
as resulting from a scarcity of funds. A positive achievement, however, 
is the new accelerated procedure for applications, which now must not 
take more than 90 days. However, its implementation requires the asylum 
seekers to stay in closed detention centres during the f irst stage of screen-
ing, which has negative psychological consequences. The new regulation 
on asylum seekers came into force in January 2011 and clearly shows 
Hungary’s commitment to reducing asylum applications by using as a 
deterrent the prospect of the detention for 12 months during investigation 
processes.
All the people, who ask for asylum, have the experience that they are 
under arrest. They feel that they are in prison there. They don’t under-
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stand why it is happening with them. So, they try to run away from there. 
Sometimes the procedure takes longer, weeks, months. Inside, there is no 
school, or shop. Children are also locked in (interview with NGO social 
worker, March 2010).
After the screening procedure the applicants are released into open camps 
where asylum seekers spent a minimum of 6 months. But conditions are 
not sensitive enough to religious, political or cultural tensions. Over the 
last two years there were several protests by asylum seekers in Hungary. 
The UNHCR report (2009) on Refugee Homelessness in Hungary says about 
integration:
There is no government agency with a statutory responsibility for refugee 
integration at community level. These cannot provide solutions to what 
are often structural problems of integration requiring a strategic, cross-
departmental response.
Integration of persons authorised to stay with humanitarian status is even 
more complicated. This is because their residence permit is valid for only 
one year and every year they have to renew their humanitarian status; they 
can spend years in this situation. In addition, they need special permission 
for working, which is a considerable bureaucratic undertaking. Usually, the 
duration of the processing time is counted into the time of the work permit. 
Thus, a vicious circle emerges that they are unable to overcome, of applying 
for prolongation of their humanitarian status and applying for work permits.
Most of the refugees, once their status is recognised, seem to leave the 
CEE countries and move to other EU states.7 Most of the asylum seekers’ 
destination countries are England, France, Germany or the Netherlands, 
often because they have family there or there are large diasporas. Many 
asylum applicants, once released from detention, also believe that is the 
right moment to leave Hungary. Sometimes, they disappear for good but 
sometimes they are sent back. Notably when they claim asylum in other EU 
countries and the authorities discover they already had a status in Hungary, 
they are usually returned under the Dublin II Convention.
Thus, the implementation of the Dublin II Convention creates circular 
f lows of asylum seekers in the EU. From 2005-2010, 2,681 persons were 
7 Though there is no statistical database for all CEE countries on how many asylum seekers 
and refugees stay in the country and how many disappear from the camps, after rejection or 
after their toleration status is withdrawn.
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returned to Hungary, mainly from Germany (261 in 2009 and 198 in 2010), 
France (229 in 2009 and 100 in 2010) and Austria (159 in 2009 and 194 in 2010). 
Consequently, Hungary too returned Dublin II cases to other EU countries 
261 persons for 2009–2010, mainly to Greece and to Romania (table 7.6).
Table 7.6  Dublin procedure: Received by Hungary from another member state by 






received by Hungary from 
another member state by 







2009 2010 2009 2010
kosovo 409 218 greece 16 120
Serbia 182 79 romania 15 20
afghanistan 110 217 austria 13 2
georgia 40 52 poland 8 3
other 193 176 other 32 32
Total 934 742 Total 84 177
Source: office for Immigration and nationalities www.bevandorlas.hu
In addition to that, the number of assisted returns to country of origin, 
which is based on an agreement between the IOM and the Ministry of 
Interior, has also increased. HHC criticised the Hungarian government 
for the implementation of the Dublin II procedure and for sending the 
applicants to Greece. Hungary has f inally decided to stop this practice until 
Greece creates proper asylum legislation (table 7.7).
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Table 7.7  The number of return travels by country of origin, based on the Ministry of 








Percentage of all 
applications
kosovo 228 78.35% 301 70.66%
Mongolia 16 5.50% 13 3.05%
Serbia 11 3.78% 1 0.23%
Macedonia 8 2.75% 4 0.94%
turkey 6 2.06% 7 1.64%
other 22 7.56% 100 23.47%
Total 291 100% 426 100%
Source: office for Immigration and nationalities, www.bevandorlas.hu
Finally, the readmission agreement with the non-EU neighbouring countries 
Serbia and Ukraine does not seem to be working properly, according to the 
opinion of an expert from the OIN off ice. In particular, because these can-
not be accepted as safe countries, returns have to be carefully considered. 
This is especially the case when people smuggled, for instance, to Odessa, 
were hidden somewhere and did not get used to Ukrainian realities. And 
the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (2010) complained that the readmission 
agreement creates a ping-pong situation used by EU countries when people 
are not able to apply for asylum and can thus be sent back to Ukraine or 
to Serbia.
7.6 Adaptation strategies of refugees and protected migrants: 
The results of three years’ life in Hungary
In order to evaluate the process of the integration of refugees and their suc-
cess or failure, and to identify reasons for their possible on-migration, a pilot 
survey was conducted with 31 refugees and protected people – including 
those with a humanitarian status – from December 2006 to March 2007 
and again in spring 2010 with the same sample. This was done to f ind out 
what happened to the people who got a different status of protection in 
the three years since they were f irst interviewed at the end of 2007, begin-
ning of 2008. Thirty interviews were conducted with persons of different 
protection status; 11 were from Asia, 6 from former Soviet countries and 
14 from Africa. Only eight people have families that arrived together, 17 
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of the 30 interviewees obtained refugee status from the moment of their 
f irst interviews.
In 2006-2007, only two of all the respondents claimed that Hungary 
was their destination country. Many of the immigrants mentioned that 
the destination country was not specif ically important, ‘just Europe’ was 
where they wanted to go. But others pointed to the UK, Sweden, Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland as their destination countries. They indicated 
these countries because they had relatives and friends there and expected 
their help. We classif ied the interviewees into f ive groups based on their 
future plans:
1 Those who would wait and remain to see if they obtained legal status: 
‘It depends on what the authorities decide: if I get refugee status, I will 
stay here, learn Hungarian and get a legal job. If I don’t get status, I will 
go.’
2 Those who wanted to go to the West even if they got status: ‘If we have a 
legal job and all off icial papers, we will try again to get a visa to England’.
3 Those who planned to remain in Hungary because of a Hungarian spouse 
or partner: ‘I don’t want to go to another country. I want to marry my 
boyfriend’.
4 Those who would remain in Hungary because of family reasons: ‘children 
need to go to school’.
5 Those who were undecided whether to stay or to go: ‘stay here and live 
a legal, normal life or leave for Italy or France.’
Some of the immigrants planned to stay in Hungary for two to three years, 
learn Hungarian and f ind a regular job, especially those few people who 
had Hungarian partners. Those who had children were concerned about 
schooling. Other interviewees, however, who were waiting for new docu-
ments or who were without children, were not so determined to stay in 
Hungary. Notably language remained the main problem, especially with 
f inding jobs. For example, some migrants thought that the solution was to 
go to Sweden to their relatives, but they soon returned to Hungary:
Four months after arriving, we organised a journey to Sweden. My sister 
is living there. We left Hungary in June, but in August we came back 
because we couldn’t legalise our residency permit there: we couldn’t get 
a work permit, nor school for the children (Iraqi refugee, February 2008).
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Internet and mobile phones now enable people to very quickly acquire 
information and asylum seekers know well the best places to apply for 
asylum or to f ind jobs when passing through other EU countries:
All these persons tried to f ind jobs in Hungary during the f irst year but 
this turned out to be diff icult due to their lack of language prof iciency, 
as well as due to a lack of social support. Social workers from the NGO 
Menedek have doubts about the immigrants’ plans to stay, ‘immigrants 
always say that they are planning to stay, but the most diff icult time they 
face is after they have obtained legal status. The reality of life pushes them 
to go west’ (Menedek NGO’s social worker, March 2008).
Indeed, migrants and refugees only had limited sources of support in 
Hungary from the government, a few NGOs and some churches. That is why 
they thought that the solution was to join their relatives or acquaintances 
in other countries, who promised jobs or support.
I am going to Sweden, because I know from my Iraqi acquaintances that 
in Hungary the conditions in the camps are very bad and the provision is 
very poor. I have relatives in Sweden and they promised to help me (Iraqi 
migrant who was travelling through Hungary to Sweden, April 2008).
Three years on, some positive and negative changes have happened in the 
lives of people with humanitarian status called befogado. For example, 
f ive out of 14 people changed their status from humanitarian to subsidiary 
protected or to refugee (alkalmazott). Unfortunately, such positive changes 
only affected African people. Among others with humanitarian status 
we should consider some negative changes: two of three families from 
the former socialist countries left Hungary for other countries in the EU; 
one family resettled in Slovakia and the other family f led to Austria. A 
third family, after staying in Hungary for eight years with a humanitarian 
status, was awaiting deportation; the HHC had been representing them in 
court based on the fact that one child is going to school and does not even 
speak the language of the country of origin. The tragedies of such people 
are evident.
Another f inding is that only 13 of the original 30 interviewees were 
still in Hungary after three years. The others had either disappeared or 
we had information that they now work in other countries. Two of them 
reached the UK, illegally. One man regularly commutes between the UK 
and Hungary and his family wants to resettle there as soon as their child 
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has f inished school. So, of those 13 families who still lived in Hungary, 
eight (more than half) nevertheless worked for shorter periods, 3 months 
to one year, illegally, in a Western country. According to their stories they 
usually used the network of the refugees and asylum seekers that they 
became acquainted with during their months in the camp. From time to 
time they returned to Hungary, though for different reasons: because (1) 
they were sent back by the authorities of another country; (2) they needed 
new papers; (3) for family reasons; or (4) due to health problems. After the 
Schengen zone was expanded to the east, new circulation flows of refugees 
and other protected people between Hungary and Western countries were 
observed. Usually people did not want to return, but they had to when their 
documents expired or because of some urgent needs.
Almost all refugees I had known went to the West when passports were 
issued for two years; now, the police changed the rules and they are 
issued for only one year … But people usually return for papers and go 
back (interview with an advocate, April 2010).
The circulation of job-seeking refugees trying to support their families has 
become a new phenomenon since the extension of the Schengen zone to the 
east. This is because the new member states (NMS) offer few opportunities 
for integration into the labour markets or society as a whole. They use their 
networks to access the diasporas in other countries. In one interview with 
a female refugee, the informant described how for one and a half years, her 
husband had been unsuccessful in f inding a job in Hungary. As a conse-
quence, he and his 20-year-old son took the long journey through Germany 
and some other Northern countries to go to the UK illegaly without a visa; 
for this undertaking they were receiving support from some acquaintances 
they had made in the refugee camp. Several times, they travelled to the UK 
without visas. In the UK, they worked irregularly and rented rooms from 
Lithuanian migrants. Only when the husband needed some urgent surgery 
did he have to return to Hungary; his son, however, still lives and works 
in the UK. Meanwhile, the son’s family is also planning to move to the UK 
as soon as the youngest child has f inished Hungarian school. It seems that 
since the expansion of the Schengen zone, this kind of circular transit has 
become a new reality of migration within the EU.
Summing up, one could say that the only group of migrants that is not 
going to leave Hungary consists of people who have local spouses or part-
ners. These are typically Africans; among the 30 cases, six had Hungarian 
partners or wives. Thus they also had better chances to learn Hungarian 
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and to get access to housing and jobs. All of them had either refugee or 
subsidiary protection status. The other 24 people complained that they do 
not see a future in Hungary because there are few opportunities to f ind jobs 
and to support themselves. In addition, the impact of the f inancial crisis on 
Hungary’s economy has further undermined their desire to live in Hungary.
7.7 Integration plans as officials see them: New laws and new 
opportunities
In the 1990s, the Hungarian system of asylum protection had an ethnic 
dimension and put particular emphasis on the Hungarian minorities 
abroad. After 1998, amendments were made to the Refugee Law; now 
Hungary accepts refugees not only from Europe but from all over the world. 
Nevertheless, off icials still have strong feelings about ethnic Hungarian 
immigrants and believe that they should be prioritised. A survey conducted 
in the various Hungarian ministries (Molodikova 2005) generally revealed 
the perception that ‘Hungary does not expect and does not need migrants 
other than ethnic Hungarians in our country’ (from numerous interviews in 
April 2005). This conclusion is also confirmed by the report of the Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee:
Hungarian authorities do not intend to integrate people granted a stay 
status. The aim of the asylum policy concerning such persons is to see 
them returning to their country of origin as soon as possible (HHC 2003: 
3).
Meanwhile, Hungary is nevertheless gradually becoming a recipient country 
for non-Hungarians. Though the country does not allocate or have sufficient 
funds to implement the new legal provisions for refugees and immigrants 
of other statuses:
The new ‘alkalmazott’ status will give many immigrants a new opportunity 
for a normal life. But unfortunately the government simply has no money 
for the reforms they started (interview with HHC, March 2008).
On the one hand, Hungary, against strong public opposition, has gradually 
improved immigrants’ legal status and the social position of refugees and 
protected people, which should increase the propensity of legally protected 
migrants to actually stay in the country. Nevertheless, the reality of life is 
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more complicated for non-Hungarian migrants and they are not particularly 
welcome in Hungary. In addition, experts mainly agree that Hungary has 
a high degree of xenophobia toward migrants (Hárs 2008; MIPEX 2007, 
2010). Such conditions are not conducive to immigrant integration, which 
is why non-Hungarian migrants generally do not aim to stay in Hungary. 
Finally, free movement within the Schengen zone is a strong incentive for 
immigrants in Hungary to move on to other destinations.
In the mid-2000s, a migrant management strategy was proposed and 
there was a thorough assessment of the future professional, economic and 
social needs of the country’s work force. The conclusion was that in order 
to improve its economic performance, Hungary required an increasing 
number of immigrants. The suggestion was made that many immigrants 
were likely to come from non-neighbouring countries. This was heavily 
criticised by the political opposition for being pro-immigrant and neglecting 
the interests of the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries.8 Thus, 
after heavy opposition by the media, the draft strategy was withdrawn and 
the policy failed. In the eyes of an off icial from the Ministry of Justice, this 
is a dilemma:
There is no such law in Hungary on integration. Refugees now have three 
years, legal status and some social assistance related to this status. Other 
migrants don’t get this assistance, but they need to be integrated (Official 
from the Ministry of Justice, May 2008).
In 2008, as part of the Migration Management Strategy, the Hungarian 
Parliament intended to introduce a law on integration. An off icial from 
the Ministry of Justice concluded with resignation, ‘if we want to pass a 
law on integration in parliament we have to be very ingenious, because of 
political interpretations of it by the opposition’ (off icial from the Ministry 
of Justice, May 2008). At present, the new right-wing ruling coalition has 
clearly indicated the political course of attracting ethnic Hungarian im-
migrants. Meanwhile, their selective integration offers few opportunities 
for migrants of other ethnic backgrounds to live in Hungary.
8  In fact this strategy was indeed pro-immigrant, but not more so than most Western Euro-
pean countries’ migration policies, as can be seen from the calculations it makes on population 
changes and workforce needs. The strategy can be found at the website of the Christian Demo-
cratic Party, which criticized it most heavily (www.kdnp.hu/index.php?type=cikk&cikkid=1544).
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7.8 Conclusions
The analysis of the situation in Hungary and the surrounding countries 
gives rise to some conclusions about the key features which facilitate transit 
migration through Hungary. The f irst, essential, characteristic is Hungary’s 
geopolitical location. For more than 20 years, Hungary has been a frontier 
for the Western European countries and shares borders with major migrant-
sending countries of Europe, such as Ukraine, Romania and Serbia. But this 
feature is not the only explanation for the high level of transit migration in 
Hungary. It is compounded by a wide range of legislative, geographic and 
cultural features which make controlling migration f lows in Hungary a 
diff icult and complex task.
The selective (or exceptional) liberalisation of the visa regime between 
Hungary and the surrounding countries, which includes ethnic cards, petty 
border traffic zones and dual citizenship, creates asymmetric relations with 
neighbouring non-EU countries. This prompts various flows of migrants 
into Hungary. There are huge gaps in the levels of economic, political and 
cultural development between EU and non-EU countries. The economically 
poor regions surrounding the EU borderland are characterised by flourish-
ing large-scale corruption in all state structures, from top to bottom. This 
corruption is quintessential for the organisation of illegal transit migration, 
for instance, through Ukraine to Hungary. The evaluation presented in this 
chapter of the border-passing strategies in the eastern and south-eastern 
sector of the EU borderland clearly highlights the existence of illegal mi-
gration and therein the proportion of transit migration. Liberalised visa 
regimes provide ample opportunities for migrants to cross borders legally, 
but then visa conditions are ignored and often the visa holders remain in the 
country, seek work on onward travel or apply for refugee status somewhere 
else, in one of the more developed Western countries.
Transit flows through Hungary are also stimulated by Hungarian ethnic 
policy. Hungary made considerable amendments to its migration regula-
tions which resulted in the liberalisation of migration policy for ethnic 
Hungarians who live in neighbouring third countries. Almost one million 
third-country nationals – and soon also their relatives – are thus able to 
benefit from some Schengen visa liberalisation. In fact, Hungary external-
ises this influence and expands the opportunities for migrants’ movement 
to and through Hungary. The lifting of the visa regime with Serbia led to a 
further increase in the transit f low through Hungary.
Once a migrant reaches Hungary, the strengthened migration policy 
towards third-country nationals and asylum seekers facilitates transit flows 
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of migrants. The flaws in the refugee status determination and integration 
processes facilitate high levels of absconding of asylum seekers, who usually 
move west to other EU countries. Further to this, the implementation of 
the EU’s Dublin II regulation in Hungary and the readmission agreements 
with non-EU countries have facilitated some involuntary circulation of 
migrants, supported by off icials of all EU countries. Asylum seekers now 
try again and again to cross the borders and are sent back to another EU or 
non-EU country. This mainly results in the return of migrants to Hungary 
from Germany, France and Austria, and from Hungary to Ukraine, Greece 
and Romania.
Underlying the decision of a migrant to remain in Hungary or to only 
use it as a country of transit is the presence or absence of social networks. 
Network theory suggests that settling down is only feasible for co-ethnic 
Hungarians from neighbouring countries who already have human capital 
in terms of language proficiency and social capital in the form of a network 
of compatriots. For other migrants, and particularly, for asylum seekers, the 
absence of compatriot networks in Hungary combined with the existence of 
such networks in other Western countries facilitates migrant transit f lows. 
Such networks offer immediate social capital in the Western destination 
countries. In Hungary, there are few opportunities for settling down and 
integrating, particularly given the absence of any special integration policy 
and indeed actions against introducing any such policy. Our interviews 
with migrants suggest that the only chance for a migrant to settle is to 
establish a Hungarian family. The presence or absence of networks for a 
migrant is a key determinant in shaping Hungary’s character as a transit 
f low country.
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8 Irregular Transit Migration of 




Since the Republic of Moldova became independent in 1992, diverse pecu-
liarities have shaped Moldova’s migration flows. Moldova is one of several 
small newly formed states in Europe after the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and the Eastern bloc. Following a short civil war in 1991, Moldova was di-
vided into two parts, the internationally recognised Moldovan Republic and 
the unrecognised breakaway territory of Transdnestria. The main industries 
are located in Transdnestria; Moldova is mostly agricultural. Hence, the 
Moldovan Republic has, as a consequence of the conflict, lost control of its 
industrial potential. In addition, because the internal conflict has also led 
to tensions with Russia, a subsequent Russian economic embargo on wine 
in 2004 almost destroyed Moldova’s main export industry. The conflict also 
explains in part why Moldova is one of the poorest countries in Europe 
(UNDP 2006); indeed, 55.4 per cent of the population live below the poverty 
line (Milanovic 1998).1 Notably rural communities have experienced severe 
poverty; not just lack of money or even food, but also lack of opportunities.2 
These conditions have forced the rural population in particular to abandon 
their life in the countryside and migrate to other countries in search of a 
better life.
As a result of the high level of poverty, Moldova has one of the highest 
rates of international migration; a survival strategy chosen by many in its 
population. Located in the south-east of Europe, Moldova is sandwiched 
between Romania and Ukraine. Both countries are among the main sources 
of labour migrants to the EU and have relatively low economic development 
and wages. Thus, they are not considered by Moldova’s migrants to be at-
tractive destination countries. Instead, the choice for Moldovans has always 
1 The World Bank (2000) suggests that the absolute poverty line for the CIS countries should 
be $2 a day.
2 For this def inition of poverty see Walker & Walker (1997).
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been either to migrate to the East (Russia) or to the West (EU countries). 
Russia offers a visa-free regime for CIS citizens and this partly explains why 
the main migration flow from Moldova runs in this direction. Nevertheless, 
in recent years migration flows have gradually re-routed west; this can be 
explained by the greater economic attraction of Western countries but 
also by the development of the migrant network in EU countries. At the 
same time, migration to the EU is complicated by the need to obtain a 
Schengen visa, which determines the various border crossing practices 
into the EU. Until December 2007, Moldovans travelling overland to EU 
countries had inevitably to transit non-EU countries, notably Romania and 
Ukraine, before EU territory could be reached. However, since Romania’s 
accession to the EU, Moldova now immediately borders the EU. This fact 
has given rise to some negative processes – according to surveys on illegal 
migration and human smuggling (ICMPD 2007, 2010), Moldovans still transit 
through multiple CIS and EU countries in order to reach their destination. 
This article demonstrates how the process is organised. The study is based 
on empirical data and provides an analysis of migrants’ journeys and 
trajectories of movements.
8.2 The push factors of Moldovan migration
In Soviet times, the population of Moldova was multiethnic. According to 
the last Soviet population census in 1989, the majority of the population 
(69.9 per cent) was Moldovan (or Romanian, according to ethnicity and 
language). Russians constituted 9.8 per cent, Ukrainians 11.3 per cent, and 
Gagauz, a Christian Turkish people, 3.5 per cent of the population. Russians 
and Ukrainians generally lived in urban settlements, predominantly in 
the breakaway region of Transdnestria, which is the most industrialised 
part of Moldova. The indigenous population was predominantly rural and 
was mainly involved in agricultural activities. The country’s population is 
currently decreasing due to a signif icant migration outflow. By 2008, it had 
dropped to 3.37 million people; this does not include Transdnestria, which 
has a population of another 600,000 to 800,000.
The conflict between Moldova and Transdnestria has had a dramatic im-
pact on both the demography and the economy of Moldova. As soon as the 
country claimed independence and declared the priority of Moldovans over 
the other ethnic groups, conflict erupted between the Russian-speaking 
industrial region of Transdnestria and the rural, relatively agrarian re-
mainder of Moldova. Transdnestria refused to recognise the new Moldovan 
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state, and declared its own independence as the Transdnestrian Republic. 
This entity, however, is not recognised by the international community. 
Separatism in Transdnestria led to military conflict in 1992 and to the 
secession of the province; ethnic tension persists between the Russian 
and Romanian populations (Dressler 2004). The conf lict was the f irst 
push factor for forced migration from Moldova, especially of the Russian-
speaking population. The shrinking number of Russians and Ukrainians 
due to migration has led to an increasingly mono-ethnic structure of 
Moldova. As a result of the partition, the Moldovan state lost its main 
energy and industrial potential and has therefore suffered from energy 
shortages. Currently, Moldova has one of the lowest rates of urbanisation 
and 54 per cent of the population live in rural areas. Its economy is heavily 
dependent on the agricultural sector, in which more than 50 per cent of 
the population is employed. Nature has appeared to conspire against the 
emerging country, with severe floods in 1992, 1994 and 2006, and problems 
of drought in 2000, 2004 and 2007.
Employment rates fell dramatically after the collapse of the USSR in 
1989, which has affected all sectors of the population. In terms of full-
time jobs, unemployment was more acute for women than men. Women 
comprised 68 per cent of the total number of unemployed by the mid-2000s 
(ILO 2005). Moldova also had one of the highest youth unemployment 
rates in South-Eastern Europe, representing around 30 per cent of the 
entire registered number of unemployed (UNICEF 2000). Even for the 
employed population, the level of salaries was insuff icient to meet the 
cost of living. These economic and political hardships stimulated a mass 
exodus to other countries in search of employment opportunities. Similar 
to migration in other CIS countries, the f irst type of labour migration was 
the so-called ‘petty trade’ migration, predominantly to Russia, Romania, 
Ukraine, Turkey and Poland. The difference in currency exchange rates, 
prices of goods and commodities between countries, in combination with 
the CIS visa-free space and cheap transportation, were among the driving 
forces for this type of migration (Dolghih 2003). But the economic crisis 
in Russia in 1998 undermined and f inally ended this activity, simultane-
ously triggering an interest in EU countries as an alternative destination. 
The strengthening of visa regimes in Central European countries pushed 
Moldova’s population from short-term, petty-trade migration into more 
long-term economic migration to more distant Western European coun-
tries and to Russia. In addition, the paucity of opportunities for legal 
incomes has pushed increasing numbers of Moldovans towards illegal 
immigration, particularly female workers (Weeks 2005: 123, Mosneaga 
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2003). It is estimated that about 20,000 to 30,000 women from Moldova 
were or are involved in forced or voluntary sex migration and traff icking 
(Mosneaga 2003).
There are different sources for the evaluation of labour migration in 
Moldova. For example, several surveys (Mosneaga 2007a; IOM 2005; UNDP 
2006; World Bank 2005) in Moldova have estimated the number of people 
emigrating (legally or illegally) and working abroad to be between 200,000 
to 800,000, which is 6 to24 per cent of the total population or 10 to 40 per 
cent of the working-age population (around 2 million). The majority of 
migrants (about 60 per cent) go to Russia, whilst about 30 per cent go to 
the EU, especially to Italy, Portugal and Greece (IOM 2005). Romania and 
Ukraine are of little interest to Moldovan labour migrants because they 
have relatively low living standards and incomes. According to estimates 
by various experts, the dispersal of Moldovan migrants across destination 
countries is as follows: Russia 240,000 to 270,000; Italy up to 130,000; Portugal 
up to 80,000; Greece, 50,000; the Czech Republic, 40,000; Spain, 20,000; 
Israel, 20,000-25,000; Ukraine, 12,000; Germany, 10,000-15,000; Cyprus, 
5,000-7,000; and Romania, 5,000 (Mosneaga 2003). However, this is subject 
to change; notably the flow to the EU has been increasing in recent years 
(Mosneaga 2008). The factor that makes migration outflow from Moldova 
particularly distinct from other countries is its sustained nature throughout 
the period since independence.
The consequences of emigration for Moldova’s economy and society 
are complex. Remittances sent by – often irregular – migrants to Moldova 
constitute 30.8 per cent of Moldova’s GDP (as shown in table 8.1) and it 
is estimated that migration has reduced poverty by up to 25 per cent. 
Remittances have been a major aid to the economy of the country though 
they contribute very little to its growth, because they are mainly used for 
everyday consumption. For example, several surveys suggested that 20 per 
cent of the money went to repay debts, 44 per cent on food, clothes and so 
on, 11 per cent on health, education or household equipment, 19 per cent 
on household improvements or family festivals such as weddings, and less 
than 1 per cent on land purchase or business investment (IOM 2005). Other 
negative consequences are related to the signif icant brain-drain resulting 
from out-migration: for instance, from 2000 to 2004, Moldova lost 36,000 
doctors and 28,000 teachers due to emigration to other countries (Mosneaga 
2007a). Out-migration also negatively impacts the family structure; most 
signif icantly, at least 100,000 children in Moldova live without their parents 
because they work abroad. This has in fact become a national problem.
irregular TransiT MigraTion of MoldoVan CiTizens To eu CounTries 189
Table 8.1  Remittances of Moldovan labour migrants in 1995-2008 (million US 
dollars)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
us $ 121.0 109.8 159.0 223.0 268.0 461 701 915 1.182 1.286 1.612
% gdP 7.1 9.3 12.3 15.1 16.5 23.5 27.1 31.7 38.2 36.2 30.8
Source: national Bank of Moldova (2009)
8.3 Theoretical and methodological approach
This chapter draws on social capital theories (developed by Glenn Loury 
in 1977 and further elaborated by Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman). 
These theories were applied to the study of migrant networks as a form of 
social capital by Douglas Massey to explain how people seek to migrate 
abroad using the ties of people who had already migrated. In the context 
of Massey’s research, these ties ‘are transformed into a resource that can be 
used to gain access to foreign employment and all that it brings’ (Massey et 
al. 1998: 43). The research presented here applies these theories to explain 
the observed migration patterns, notably to analyse the development of the 
stages of migration and the trajectory of transit migration. In particular, 
our research confirms the following:
Because of the nature of kinship and friendship structure each new 
migrant creates a set of people with social ties to the destination area. 
Migrants are inevitably linked to non-migrants to gain access to employ-
ment and assistance at the point of destination (Massey et al. 1998: 43).
This chapter mostly concentrates on the transit migration of Moldovans and 
other citizens on their way to the EU and does not focus on migration to 
Russia. It is based on (a) more than 200 in-depth interviews with Moldovan 
economic migrants in various EU countries, including Italy, France and 
Portugal, (b) a survey conducted in Moldova in 2006-2007 and (c) interviews 
with off icers of the diplomatic, migration and border guard authorities of 
Ukraine (February 2008), Slovakia (December 2007) and the Republic of 
Moldova (October 2008).
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8.4 Government efforts on migration management
The Moldovan government approaches migration within the context of 
social policy. The authorities have recently approved and are implementing 
new approaches to try to reduce labour migration through the introduction 
of poverty reduction measures and by improving the employment situation. 
Therefore, programmes such as the ‘Modernisation of the Country for the 
Sake of the People’s Well-Being’ that ran between 2005 and 2009 are aimed 
at improving the economic situation of the country. The Moldovan state 
is also implementing the ‘Moldovan Countryside Programme’, a series of 
measures aimed at the revival of the rural regions. The main policy vehicle 
for the revival of Moldova’s economy is to be based on the growth of direct 
investment in a programme called ‘Revival of the Economy is Revival of 
the Country’. This programme proposes to include the remittances from 
Moldovan citizens working abroad as primary sources of direct investment 
in the national economy. Under the programme, these remittances are 
to be stimulated and channelled towards investment in local projects, 
with the aim of developing Moldovan settlements and communities from 
which economic migrants originate, including their birthplace and the 
communities that they left behind. In addition, since 2006, engagement 
with the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Moldovan communities and diasporas abroad has 
been intensif ied; for example, the ‘Programme to support the Moldovan 
Community Abroad’ was introduced (Schwarts 2007; Mosneaga & Rusu 
2008).
The authorities also try to prevent unregulated economic migration both 
into and out of the country. Moldova has a relatively well-developed legal 
base for migration management. It has adopted the concept of migration 
policy and laws ‘on migration’, ‘on citizenship’, ‘on entry and stay in the 
Republic of Moldova’, ‘on the legal status of foreign citizens and persons 
without citizenship’ and ‘on the status of refugee’. The law ‘on labour migra-
tion’ was passed in March 2008 and introduced control over the activity of 
agencies engaged in the employment of Moldovans abroad. Such companies 
are now required to submit quarterly reports to the National Bureau of 
Statistics and to the Agency for Employment of Population indicating the 
number of migrants who have left the republic, their destination and the 
duration spent abroad. Parents who are going to go to work abroad are 
required to provide evidence to the agencies of their provision for care 
of their children. Moldova has established close cooperation with the EU 
in the sphere of migration management and control. Most measures are 
implemented within the frame of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) part of the 
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European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Initially, the main policies were 
in the f ield of border controls, such as the EU Border Assistance Mission 
(EUBAM) on the borders of Transdnestria. In 2007, an integrated EU visa 
centre was opened to simplify visa applications for travel and migration 
to the EU, with the aim of facilitating legal migration. In another step, a 
readmission agreement was signed and upon implementation, the visa 
regime was further liberalized in January 2008. Finally, in June 2008, the 
Republic of Moldova was selected by the EU as one of the countries with 
which the EU pilots mobility partnerships in order to facilitate circular 
migration. Other new programmes focus on Moldova’s capacity to tackle 
immigration and the inflow of refugees, notably through cooperation with 
third countries in the sphere of asylum and migration, and agreements on 
visa regimes and facilitation of readmission were improved.
The Moldovan government is also taking steps to eliminate human 
traff icking. Laws have been adopted ‘on the prevention and elimination 
of traff icking in human beings’ and national plans for the prevention of 
traff icking in human beings have been developed. These have resulted in 
the creation of a department for combating organised crime, mainly related 
to traff icking in human beings, which was established within the Ministry 
of the Interior. In 1998, an article (Article 105) was accordingly added to the 
Penal Code. In July 2001, further modif ications related to the traff icking of 
human beings were introduced. Article 113-2, which penalises traff icking in 
human beings, was modif ied so that this criminal activity can now result 
in long prison terms for the perpetrators. Finally, in August 2005, a new 
national plan to f ight against traff icking in human beings was adopted.
8.5 Irregular (transit) migration from Moldova
It is diff icult to give an unequivocal, precise number for Moldovan migrants 
involved in irregular transit migration processes. The off icial data from 
Western European countries indicate that there are 100-150,000 regularised 
Moldovan citizens in the region (Baldwin-Edwards & Kraler 2009). In 
particular, no fewer than 100,000 Moldovans were regularised in the early 
21st century in Italy, Greece and Portugal alone. However, there are also 
increasing opportunities for Moldovan citizens to become irregular citizens: 
for example, companies are increasingly looking for students through ‘work 
and travel’ programmes. A considerable proportion of the students who 
leave Moldova on these programmes do not return home. Instead, they 
prolong their stay abroad and become engaged in irregular employment. 
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Recently there have been attempts to plug the gap in the database on issues 
of irregular transit migration from countries in the southern EU neigh-
bourhood region. In this respect the Söderköping Process, Swedish-funded 
‘enhanced cross-border co-operation between the Western Newly Independ-
ent States (NIS) and the EU’ provides some information on peripheral EU 
countries located on the EU’s eastern border. The information resulting 
from the Söderköping Process reveals that Moldovan citizens make up a 
signif icant a share of the violators of border and residency regimes. Over 
a period of two and a half years (2004 to May 2006), Moldova was second 
on the list of violators among the EU’s neighbouring states (Pribytkova & 
Gromovs 2007). Of the 46,220 migrants arrested in the territories of Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, 4,293 were 
Moldovan citizens, or almost 10 per cent. Of the 32,203 migrants detained 
at the borders of these countries, presumably for irregular entry, 4,770 
were citizens of Moldova (14.8 per cent of the total) (Pribytkova & Gromovs 
2007). The ICMPD yearbook (2010) information about those apprehended in 
2007-2008 at the Ukrainian, Hungarian and Romanian borders reveals that 
5,621 people in 2007 and 5,138 in 2008 were Moldovan citizens.
Destination countries, determinants and migrants’ choices
The selection of a destination country within the EU is determined by 
various factors such as the level of wages, the host country’s migration and 
reception policy, population attitudes, language and even similar climatic 
conditions. From the Moldovan migrants’ perspective, the Mediterranean 
countries are particularly well suited. Nevertheless, by the end of 2010, 
Moldovan diasporas had appeared in many other EU and non-EU coun-
tries too. Sociological surveys demonstrate that the largest proportion of 
Moldovan economic migrants is currently found in Russia, where 60 per 
cent of migrants are concentrated, Italy (20 per cent) and Portugal (5 per 
cent); but small numbers are also found Spain, Turkey, Greece, France, the 
UK, Ireland, Romania and Ukraine. Around three quarters of all Moldovan 
economic migrants are concentrated in ten cities: Moscow, Rome, Saint 
Petersburg, Istanbul, Odessa and some other Russian oil industry cities 
(Lucke, Mahmoud & Pinger 2007). These statistics indicate a trend towards 
the concentration of migrants in major urban centres. The destination coun-
tries can be characterised according to the professions and gender of the 
migrants that they attract. Russia, Ukraine, Spain, Portugal and the Czech 
Republic attract mainly male migrants, who are employed primarily in the 
construction industry. In Italy, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, Moldovans f ind 
employment in the service sector and this attracts mostly female migrants. 
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Thus, countries can almost be distinguished as ‘male’ and ‘female’ countries 
of destination (Mosneaga 2007a).
The availability of social and migration networks also plays an important 
role in migrants’ choices. It can be assumed that the role of occasional or 
accidental choice in the selection of a country of destination has decreased, 
not least because the journey is expensive and the migrants’ time spent in 
the EU for economic purposes is usually not less than six months. Previous 
research suggests that cases of unprepared migration with the random 
choice of a destination country have diminished (Mosneaga & Rusu 2008). 
Indeed, networks of Moldovan diasporas have already been well established 
and developed. These prompt prospective migrants to choose a country 
where friends or relatives already live. Indeed, as argued elsewhere, ‘ethnic 
corridors’ of Moldovans have emerged, running through various countries, 
facilitating transit migration (Mosneaga 2008).
According to research f indings, only a few migrants travel without 
making preliminary arrangements for their trip (Mosneaga 2007a). Before 
leaving for a foreign country they seek to establish contacts with relatives, 
acquaintances, friends and natives of their home village who are working 
abroad, with a view to collecting information about the labour market in the 
potential destination country and to actually f ind a job prior to departure 
(table 8.2). Research f indings (see, e.g., Mosneaga 2007a; IOM 2005; World 
Bank 2006) confirm that nowadays virtually no one goes abroad on a hit-
or-miss basis. Frequently, migrants make efforts to arrange a visa, legal 
residence and employment abroad on the basis of a legal labour contract. 
There is also an informal labour market where economic migrants often 
engage their friends and neighbours in the recruitment of migrants for 
jobs. Relatives and friends provide great help in the search for a labour 
contract signed by an employer in the country of reception. These people 
negotiate the details of the labour contract for their relative (or a friend or 
fellow countryman) with their employer in the country of reception and 
residence. Usually an employer who has a positive opinion of one migrant 
applicant agrees to make a labour contract with another potential labourer 
from Moldova. A labour migrant who already works for this employer acts 
as a guarantor for the professionalism, diligence and law-abiding character 
of the potential labour migrant. The new migrant will pay his or her friend 
for the invitation and employment.
Making the necessary arrangements for migration costs a signif icant 
amount of money. Interviews conducted by the author with migrants 
suggest that, on average, the fee taken by a facilitator is approximately 
€100 to €500. The total cost of a labour contract for a potential migrant 
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depends on the number of intermediaries between an employer and his or 
her future employee. Each of these intermediates takes a commission fee 
and, therefore, the relatives, fellow-countrymen and friends of a potential 
migrant get some money in return for their efforts to f ind work for a new 
migrant from Moldova. The cost of procuring a labour contract for a poten-
tial migrant is about €2,000, which may exceed the real cost of the labour 
contract ten times.
Every step of the preparation of a migrant’s journey, as table 8.2 demon-
strates, involves at least one migrant-supporting individual or institution, 
though the involvement of these individuals or institutions differs. If the 
person undertakes a legal journey, they usually reach their destination 
easily, but in the case of an illegal journey, the number of steps increases 
and consequently, the institutional involvement also increases depend-
ing on f inancial opportunities and the specif ic institutions involved. In 
this context, the weakness of the Moldovan state creates problems for the 
control and regulation of migration flows that use the institutional forms of 
organisation. Therefore, flourishing corruption in governmental structures 
supports a black market in migration services.
The journey to the EU: Transit migration and border crossing strategies
The majority of Moldovan economic migrants seek and enter their destina-
tion legally. There is evidence that signif icant numbers of migrants seek 
to use the opportunity of dual citizenship through acquiring citizenship 
status in neighbouring EU countries. They are particularly interested in 
Romanian and Bulgarian citizenship because both countries joined the 
EU in January 2007. According to expert calculations (Mosneaga & Rusu 
2008) and statements of the Romanian authorities, no fewer than half a 
million Moldovan citizens have submitted all the required documents and 
are waiting to obtain Romanian citizenship. Similarly, about 50,000-70,000 
Moldovans have put in a claim for Bulgarian citizenship. This is almost a 
f ifth of the total population of Moldova. By 2009, at least 130,000-150,000 
Moldovans already held citizenship of an EU country.
If a potential migrant does not have the opportunity of EU citizenship, he/
she is required to have a visa for legal travel to an EU country, though such a 
visa does not guarantee that all migration is regular. Visas can be obtained 
through tourist or travel agencies. For the visa application they must state 
the reason for their visit (employment or tourism) and they must be able to 
provide evidence in the form of an employment contract or invitation from 
friends or relatives. Although there are considerable Moldovan diasporas 
in Western Europe, in many countries these are often not well established. 
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Therefore, many Moldovans living abroad lack the legally required resources 
and indeed even the legal status to invite friends or relatives. Alternatively, 
a potential migrant could try and f ind locals to agree to provide such invita-
tions, if they know any well enough. But sometimes procuring an invitation 
becomes problematic due to lack of money or networks. A dilemma may 
therefore arise, leaving prospective migrants with no option other than to 
try to reach their destination countries irregularly, thus violating the rules 
for crossing state borders. Where a migrant does have a visa, he or she uses it 
to reach the destination country legally but, often, after the short-term visa 
expires, the migrants stay in the destination country illegally and take up 
irregular employment. It should be noted that opportunities for legal entry 
to EU countries for employment purposes are very limited and demand 
for tourist visas is increasing. Tourist and travel agencies of the Republic 
of Moldova and Ukraine often use their licences to help people migrate for 
employment. One migrant interviewed commented ‘we left Moldova with 
the help of a tourist company, which instantly found jobs for us for a fee of 
$400 dollars a head. All in all, this trip cost me $2,000’ (Jonah, age 50).3 But 
in order to counteract the irregular activity of pseudo-tourist companies, 
the Moldovan authorities have tightened controls over them and now have 
the power to withdraw licences.
If it proves impossible to obtain a visa through legal channels, Moldovan 
migrants may also use forged documents, or authentic documents that 
belong to other people, to enter non-EU and EU countries at regular border 
crossing points. The documents may be in the person’s real name but involve 
faked visas and passports. The following quote illustrates how this strategy 
was used for a migrant’s journey to Ireland.
I had a girlfriend at that time … This girl found a channel that we could 
use to reach the country of destination. I went together with her sister. 
Two faked passports were produced for each of us. In addition, we had our 
own legal passports with a tourist visa. We travelled from Kiev to Riga 
… From Riga we came to Ireland using the other passport. We arrived 
in Ireland and lived with my girlfriend … Our visas expired a week after 
we arrived in Ireland but we stayed on (Julia, age 32).
Alternatively, clandestine strategies are frequently used to cross borders. 
Migrants who seek to cross a state border illegally may hide in trucks car-
rying timber, wool, cigarettes, toys, metalware, nails and carpets. Such 
3 All names of interviewees except government off icials are aliases.
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violations of the state border are most often discovered on the section of 
border between Moldova and Romania. Alternatively, they walk across 
state borders. The representatives of Ukrainian, Moldovan and Slovakian 
border guard services and migration structures have identified the forested, 
mountainous section of the Ukrainian-Slovakian border (a stretch of about 
100 km) as the most attractive section of the border for irregular migrants. 
The Moldovan media often present news on such cases on the Romanian, 
Slovakian, Italian, Slovenian, and other states’ borders. The following 
interview with a labour migrant is quite eloquent in this respect.
I found my way to Italy after illegally crossing the mountain border. 
Earlier, I made an attempt to enter Italy legally, on the basis of a tourist 
visa. But I was sent back at the border. My visa was fake and my name was 
put in the computer. The money I spent for the visa was wasted. I was not 
admitted to Italy. And the debt remained … I decided not to spend money 
for a visa anymore and to cross the border illegally. I shall not tell you 
where and how I crossed the border. It is my secret. I’ll tell you only that 
I went through three pairs of shoes before I reached Italy (Peter, age 25).
Table 8.2  Migrants’ preparation steps for a journey to the EU
1. Information-gathering to search for potential work
2. Search for legal ways to cross the border and enter the EU/Schengen zone
3. Preparation of documents
4. Journey
regular irregular
1. legal border crossing based on available 
permits for legal residence and work 
activities in the eu countries
1. Clandestine crossing of the ‘green border’
2. Clandestine crossing of the border hidden 
in a motor vehicle
2. legal crossing of borders with tourist 
visas
3. irregular crossing of the border at legal 
entry points using fake (forged) documents 
or authentic documents that belong to 
other persons
3. Pretended legal crossing of borders 
with the help of passports issued in other 
countries for other persons
4. Crossing of the border with the help of an 
intermediary service or human traffickers
5. Arriving and settling
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8.6 The services for illegal migration and trafficking
Migrants cannot cross the state border irregularly without intermediaries 
who act in the borderland territories of different countries and provide 
transit channels. For example, when a visa regime between Romania and 
Moldova was introduced in 2007, the introduction of an online procedure 
to obtain a Romanian visa in the consulate off ice of Romania in Chisinau 
caused a proliferation of so-called ‘well-wishers’. These are people who for a 
fee of €2,000 to €2,500 offer counterfeited Romanian documents or identity 
cards/passports of other persons. These people can usually be found around 
the Romanian consulate off ices where they offer their services, often from 
vans (Pop 2007).
For the clandestine crossing of green borders, migrants need guides 
who are familiar with the local conditions, topography and the situation 
on the border, including border guards’ locations and routines. Sometimes 
migrants’ fellow-countrymen act as guides; for a fee they provide services for 
the organisation, implementation and travel of irregular transit migrants.
I am from a small town … There is a company in our town. And this 
company provides tourist services … We paid an enormous sum, €3,000 
per person … We reached Italy as tourists. Then we left the bus and were 
met by a man at a station. He was a Moldovan who had to take us through 
the mountains to Switzerland … We reached the border which ran along 
a mountain ridge there. Our guide brought us to the pass and said: ‘Go 
along this path and descend to the valley. It will be Switzerland. There is 
a village below and you will f ind a bar there. Go to the bar, our man will 
wait for you there’ … We came to the village and found the bar. There 
was only a bartender there. We asked him whether he was the person 
we were looking for. He cast a strange look at us, … then he left the bar, 
within a few minutes he came back and a bit later the police arrested 
us in that bar as irregular migrants. We were permitted to make a call 
from a mobile phone and we called this company which had organised 
taking us to Switzerland … We told them that they did not fulf il their 
obligations. If they deport us we’ll come back, burn their off ice down 
and kill them … I do not know what that man said to the police … but 
we were released (Feodor, age 43).
The structures – social networks and criminal organisations – that facilitate 
the irregular (transit) migration process continue to play a role at the point 
of arrival. It was found that relatives and friends provide great help in 
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the search for employment. An excerpt from an interview illustrates the 
situation:
There is a black market in Rome where Moldovans deal in jobs. Two jobs 
were offered to me and my partner. After some discussion and bargaining 
we paid a certain amount for our jobs. But for our money we were sure 
that we really had jobs (Igor, age 40).
The groups can either be nationally and ethnically homogenous, or mixed 
and composed of citizens of different states. State sources claim that this 
process is controlled by international criminal groups that have developed 
networks in many countries. Indeed, law enforcement bodies detect many 
organisations and people engaged in the technical support of this form of 
migration. Companies that produced forged documents were also identified 
in Moldova. The director of the Centre to Combat Traff icking in Human 
Beings noted the following:
In 2007, off icers of the centre initiated 516 criminal cases connected with 
irregular migration, traff icking in humans … In the same year, the off ic-
ers of the Centre detected 40 channels for channelling Moldovan citizens 
abroad, to EU countries … In 2008, an international criminal grouping 
was detected and recorded. A mini-printing off ice equipped with the 
most advanced accessories was found in the apartment rented by the 
criminals. More than 100 forged documents including 21 identity cards of 
Romanian citizens and 17 Romanian driving licenses, 43 faked Moldovan 
passports, nine faked passports of the Czech Republic, 13 permits for 
staying in Italy, several counterfeited passports of citizens of Romania, 
Turkey, Latvia and Belarus were found and confiscated (Pop 2008).
Criminal activities facilitating irregular transit migration have often been 
found to be supported or shielded by the governmental off icial institutions 
that are supposed to f ight against these processes.
I am unable to understand why the Republic of Moldova cannot acquire 
special devices capable of distinguishing whether a migrant presents 
authentic or forged documents and installing these devices in the airport 
and at border crossing checkpoints. These devices can determine whether 
passports, permits for staying in EU countries and other documents are 
authentic and true or not. I do not want to draw conclusions even though 
they are obvious: someone considers that availability of such devices is 
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detrimental to his interests (Conversation with Romanian Consul in the 
Republic of Moldova, April 2009).
Notably, cases of human traff icking were reported which were organised 
under the protection of law enforcement off icers in Moldova. For example, 
in 2006, a criminal group headed by Ion Bejan, director of the Ministry of 
Interior’s Department for Fighting Human Trafficking (DFHF), was detected 
and broken up. Police off icers of different positions and high-ranking of-
f icials were involved in this criminal organisation and directly involved in 
the process of irregular transit migration and its support (Pop 2007; also 
see Radu 2007). Such practices are labelled as ‘roofing’, meaning that senior 
off icials provide a secure ‘roof’ under which such activities can unfold.
The US Department of State’s reports ‘On Traff icking in Humans, 
2007’ and ‘On Traff icking in Humans, 2008’ reached similar conclusions. 
It accused the Moldovan authorities, notably senior representatives of 
the Moldovan Ministry of Interior who were supposed to f ight against 
irregular migration of passivity and double standards. However, nothing 
is known with respect to the investigation of senior police off icers who 
were suspected of providing coverage or a so-called ‘roof’ for facilitators 
of irregular migration. After that critique the Moldovan authorities were 
forced to undertake some organisational measures with respect to the DFHF 
off icers and installed the devices required for identif ication of documents’ 
authenticity in October 2009.
8.7 Main routes for transit migration from Moldova to the EU
Moldovan migrants, due to their poverty and lack of appropriate docu-
mentation, usually travel overland. First, they travel from Moldova to a 
neighbouring non-EU or EU countryhood. Migration from Moldova to 
the European Union involves various routes: the main ones run through 
Ukraine and Romania, though there are also alternatives available through 
Turkey. Once in the EU, various member states may have to be crossed until 
the destination country is reached. Accordingly, routes are often complex 
and journeys long, as the following interview illustrates.
We left for Portugal with some friends. We departed legally as tourists. 
We reached Italy by bus. We knew nobody in Italy and did not speak 
Italian. We disembarked from the bus and wanted to get to the railway 
station. Luckily, one of us could speak a bit of English. He asked people 
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and f inally we got to the station. We bought railway tickets and went 
to France. Then we went to Spain. And f inally, we found ourselves in 
Portugal (Michael, age 34).
Citizens of Moldova, like those of other CIS republics, are not required to 
have a visa to enter Ukraine and thus rarely enter the country irregularly. 
Usually, Moldovans enter Ukraine on the south-eastern border of Moldova, 
which runs across the Odessa region of Ukraine, or the north-western bor-
ders in the Chernovtsy and Khmelnitsky regions, mostly using railways or 
motorways. First, they take the bus and train to Odessa, from there they 
can reach Turkey by sea. Until recently, the route to Turkey required visas, 
which could be obtained with the help of tourist and travel agencies in 
Moldova or Ukraine. In the meantime, Turkey has changed its visa regula-
tions for many countries and three-month visas are now issued on the 
border. Alternatively, from Odessa migrants take the bus or train to the 
western or north-western regions of Ukraine where it borders Slovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Belarus. From there they enter Slovakia, Hungary and 
Poland through the regular border crossing points using tourist visas, faked 
documents or original documents of other persons; alternatively, they make 
a clandestine crossing of the ‘green’ border (see Molodikova, this volume). 
Usually these migrants intend to move on to one of the ‘old’ EU countries. 
The f inal option for onward travel from Odessa is to take a bus or train to 
Kiev or another Ukrainian city that has a port or airports with connections 
to Austria, Cyprus, Israel and Turkey or the states of the Middle East. This 
last route is often used for purposes of traff icking women for sexual labour 
migration (Malarek 2008).
The other main route runs through Romania. Before 2007, Moldovans 
could enter Romania legally and visa-free on the basis that they were visit-
ing relatives or were tourists. From Romania, Moldovan migrants may try 
to cross over to the ‘old’ EU countries either using visas obtained at EU 
countries’ embassies in Bucharest, at regular border crossings but with faked 
documents, by hiding in transportation vehicles, or irregularly through the 
‘green’ border. When Romania joined the EU in January 2007, a new visa 
regime was introduced for citizens of Moldova. This led to modif ications in 
irregular migration tactics. The majority of Moldovans still enter Romania 
legally, with visas obtained from some agencies and issued by Romania’s 
embassies and consulate off ices in Moldova (in Chisinau) and Ukraine (in 
Kiev, Odessa or Chernovtsy). Some try to enter Romania illegally and move 
to other EU countries (see Futo 2008). Usually, Moldovan migrants enter 
Romania through the Moldova-Romania section of the state border on the 
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bus and train route to Lasy/Galati/Bucharest or on the bus and train route 
from Bucharest to Arad/Oradea/Timisoara.
Data from interviews suggest that after a short one-to-two day stay in 
some Romanian cities near the eastern borders, migrants obtain faked 
passports or establish contact with guides. Afterwards, they move on to 
the western, south-western or southern borders of Romania. Many of these 
routes are associated not only with labour migration, but also with human 
traff icking for sexual exploitation. The routes were particularly popular 
in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Analysis of border violations com-
mitted by Moldovan citizens at Romanian border crossings suggests that 
the number of Moldovan citizens who try to enter Romania or leave it for 
other EU countries, by hiding in motor vehicles, is rising. Simultaneously, 
the number of Romanian border violators who seek to leave Romania for 
the old EU countries with the help of faked documents has also increased.
An alternative migration route is air travel from Moldova to Turkey (Istan-
bul or Antalya). However, this route generally forms part of a longer journey, 
either to the Middle East or to the countries of the Southern Mediterranean 
(Morocco, Tunisia, etc.), from where Moldovan economic migrants may 
seek entry to EU states. It could be expected that the opening of the new 
Danube passenger terminal in Giurgiulesti (Republic of Moldova) and the 
introduction of regular sea-passenger services to Bulgaria and Turkey will 
lead to the emergence of legal as well as irregular labour migration via 
these countries too.
Finally, Moldovans also cross various EU countries until they reach their 
destination.
We went to Poland by bus … in Poland we waited until night, swam 
across the Oder river and reached Germany … and went further across 
Germany. We crossed a wood, came to the railway line, walked along it 
to the nearest station where we bought tickets to the West and left for 
France (Nicholas, age 27).
Two criteria, earnings and attitudes of the police, are given as reasons for 
migrating on to other countries instead of staying in the f irst EU country 
of arrival: ‘I went to France to earn money. In this respect France is better 
than Germany or Austria. At least the French police are more lenient and 
less severe’ (Nicholas, age 35).
It is diff icult to identify the principal or preferred routes of Moldovan 
irregular migrants within the EU. As already noted, when people choose 
routes they evaluate various options with respect to the geographical and 
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political conditions, the migration policy pursued by EU states, and the 
availability of social capital in countries of reception and transit. Due to 
the effects of situational factors related to the activity of smuggling and 
traff icking networks, these routes change. From the interviews, various 
routes can be identif ied:
Moldova – Ukraine – Slovakia – the Czech Republic – Germany – 
France – Spain – Portugal;
– Slovakia – Austria – Italy – France – Spain – 
Portugal;
– Poland – Germany – Belgium – France – UK;
– Latvia – Ireland;
Moldova – Romania – Hungary – Austria – Italy;
– Bulgaria – Macedonia – Croatia – Slovenia – 
Italy – Switzerland.
Moldova – Turkey – Middle East or Southern Mediterranean.
More generally, three main passages seem to be used: the eastern passage 
from Moldova to Romania, the northern passage from Moldova through 
Ukraine and then to Hungary, Slovakia and Poland; or the southern passage 
from Moldova through Bulgaria, Serbia or the sea and even Turkey.
8.8 Return transit migration to Moldova
Return to Moldova can be as complicated as the actual out-migration. It 
can be assumed that irregular migrants are unable or unwilling to stay 
permanently in the host countries. This could be because of the increasing 
disadvantages that come with a lack of status. Alternatively, they may wish 
to visit their relatives back home and for this reason need to travel back to 
Moldova. If they wish to travel back home cheaply, they need to leave as 
they came: overland and, for instance, by bus, which will again take them 
across the borders of several countries. This increases the risks of being 
detected as ‘illegal immigrants’ on the outward-journey and may even 
include the risk of detention and deportation. In both cases, the irregular 
migrant’s personal data will be entered into the EU database, notably 
Eurodac and the Schengen Information System (SIS). As a result, such 
migrants will often be banned from re-entry to the EU for a signif icant 
period of time.
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It is suggested that Moldovan irregular migrants wishing to return 
to Moldova know about different practices in diverse EU countries and 
respond accordingly to these opportunities.
They seek to submit their application to the Moldovan consulates abroad 
under the pretext of ‘loss of national passports’ and to get ‘clean’ passports 
that allow them to go to the homeland unobstructed. It should be noted 
that such migrants who have got clean passports in the Consulate General 
in Frankfurt, Germany, do not leave for Moldova from Frankfurt but 
go to France and take off for Chisinau from Paris. The reason for such 
behaviour is that the German border guard service puts information on 
such migrants (those who lost their original passports) into a database 
while their French counterparts are satisf ied with a person’s departure 
from France and do not put the information into the European database 
(conversation with Consul General of Republic of Moldova in Frankfurt, 
Germany, February 2009).
Irregular migrants who were apprehended, deported and served with a 
re-entry ban also resort to various tricks to address this issue. Some change 
their family name and adopt their mothers’ or their wives’ family names 
and when they enter the EU with their new family name they circumvent 
the re-entry ban. Others forge or counterfeit their passports or migrate with 
documents that belong to other people.
8.9 Irregular transit migration via the Republic of Moldova
Transit or onward migration through Moldova is a new phenomenon in 
immigration processes and has only been observed recently. Such flows 
include people who arrived in Moldova and either do not want to return to 
their homelands (e.g., students) or who cannot return (refugees), as well as 
irregular transit migrants who take advantage of the relatively porous CIS 
borders between Ukraine and Moldova, and try to get to Western European 
countries. However, if this route is chosen, the irregular transit migrant has 
to cross one more border into Moldova, then from there to Ukraine and 
f inally to an EU country, instead of going directly to Ukraine and then on to 
the EU. This involves extra risks and additional f inancial and organisational 
costs related to the search for organisers/carriers. Therefore this route seems 
less popular.
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Transit migrants in Moldova are predominantly natives of Central Asian 
and South-East Asian countries who first travel through Russia and Ukraine. 
The main countries of origin are Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Senegal, Mali 
and also other countries. These migrants try to f ind new routes to enter 
the EU. Other cases of irregular transit migration were exposed in the 
mid-1990s, when citizens of Iran crossed the Romanian-Moldovan border 
illegally and entered into Moldova with the purpose of moving further to the 
east on their way back to Iran. Despite the fact that this route is less popular 
than other migration routes, there are cases emerging of migrants being 
caught using Moldovan as a transit country. For instance, in April 2008, 
Moldovan border guards discovered seven Afghans who had been trying 
to get to Italy. At the point of their arrest they had already been travelling 
for two years. Another instance involves a group of Malians travelling via 
Odessa and Transdnestria who aimed to get to the EU by sea, but found 
themselves abandoned by their smugglers in Moldova. According to infor-
mation released by the Moldova Security Service in cooperation with other 
state bodies, in 2008, approximately 18,000 irregular migrants from Turkey, 
India, Pakistan, Sri-Lanka, Bangladesh and other countries were arrested 
(see Nezavisimaya Moldova, 3 October 2008).4 More than 250 foreign citizens 
who are suspected organisers of irregular migration and more than 300 
of their suspected Moldovan accomplices have been detected. Of these, 
98 were subsequently tried by the courts; it is claimed that eight criminal 
groupings engaged in this illegal activity have been smashed.
8.10 Conclusion
Moldova is a small and divided country with a labour market of limited 
capacity that is unable to provide suff icient jobs and salaries to support 
the entire population. As a consequence, Moldovans move abroad in 
signif icant numbers to seek livelihoods there. But Moldova is sandwiched 
between Romania and Ukraine, which have also experienced the hardship 
of transition and poverty and are both major sending countries of labour 
migrants. Hence, Moldova’s immediate neighbours lack the capacity to 
absorb labour migrants. Thus, Moldovans who choose to move abroad for 
work have no other option but to cross neighbouring and various other 
countries in order to reach their destination. Over the past 20 years, almost 
the entire economically active population of Moldova has been involved 
4 This number seems implausibly high and should be interpreted with great care.
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in various forms of migration. Due to the character of the economic and 
political situation, it can be assumed that the outflow of labour migrants is 
a phenomenon that will persist. The remittances sent back to the country 
by migrants working abroad are used for basic household consumption and 
to support the population in their everyday life. Thus they contribute little 
to boosting the economy and future development of country.
After the accession of Romania to the EU, Moldova has become an 
adjacent country just outside the EU. As a result, it seems to be emerging 
as yet another transit territory for migrants from more distant countries on 
their way to the EU. The illegal transit migration through Moldova and from 
Moldova relies heavily on well-developed migration networks of relatives, 
friends and intermediaries. The Moldovan diasporas in all EU countries 
actively facilitate the migration processes and function as ‘ethnic corridors’ 
and points of reference in the destination countries. In addition, criminal 
structures and corrupt off icials provide travel services to support entry to 
EU countries. Finally, irregular migration, transit migration and smuggling 
are connected with human traff icking, and the discourses are intertwined 
and confused.
The Moldovan government is making enormous efforts to develop its 
migration management. Nevertheless, the scale of migration outflow is 
so high that in spite of all these measures it is barely possible to organise 
eff icient controls. Effective combating of unregulated labour migration is 
a complex and extensive process, which combines law enforcement and 
economic measures. These measures require multi-faceted cooperation 
between international and national structures, and between state bodies 
and non-governmental organisations. But in order to address and prevent 
irregular migration from Moldova, living conditions within Moldova would 
need to be signif icantly improved. Without the assistance of the EU, this 
goal will be very diff icult to reach.
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9 Transit Migrations in the European 
Migration Spaces
Politics, Determinants and Dynamics
Franck Düvell
There are many Europes: the Europe of the European Union with its 28 
member states, the Europe of the Council of Europe with its 47 member 
states, and some historical ideas of Europe that even included North African 
Mediterranean regions. Some aspects, such as whether or not Turkey is 
European or qualif ies for membership in the EU, are hotly disputed. Migra-
tion within this region and its neighbourhood, the European migration 
space, is diverse, complex and constantly changing over time. The principal 
poles of attraction for migration f lows are the European Union, though 
not all its member states, and Russia; other relevant destination countries 
are Kazakhstan, to some extent Ukraine, Turkey, Israel, Egypt and Libya. 
Four major migration systems can be identif ied: the post-Soviet migration 
system, the Central and Western European migration system, the Turkish/
Middle Eastern migration system and the North African migration system. 
Each migration system can be distinguished by sub-systems of destination 
countries as, for example, between Kazakhstan and some of its neighbours; 
Egypt, Libya and various refugee and labour migrants sending countries; 
or Turkey and various countries from the Black Sea or Middle Eastern 
region, such as Moldova and Iran. Migration within this space is not simply 
east-west or south-north as often suggested in conventional thinking, but 
far more diverse. Instead, any direction is possible. Indeed, considerable 
numbers of migrants move south-east, from Turkey to Russia, or from east 
to east, e.g., Kyrgyzstan to Kazakhstan, or south-south, such as from Mali 
to Libya. Finally, there are also north-south movements, as of citizens from 
France to Morocco, or Germany to Turkey, which is often either return, 
retirement or sunshine but also highly-skilled migration.
In many countries migration in general, either certain directions of flows 
(immigration, emigration) or certain types of migration (low or highly 
skilled, irregular or non-European) is considered a sensitive issue. In some 
countries, as in Ukraine, it is rather large-scale emigration that is considered 
a problem; also Turkey would prefer to pay attention to its diaspora in North-
ern Europe than to immigration. But usually it is immigration that raises 
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most concerns and is restricted accordingly. There are tensions, however, 
between individual aspirations, economic demand and political goals, and 
as a consequence some migration occurs in contravention to political goals 
and is considered unwanted and irregular (Düvell 2006a). It is assumed 
that in 2008 there were about 1.9-3.8 million irregular immigrants in the 
EU (Vogel 2009) and another 4 million or so in Russia (Moscow News 2009). 
Levels of irregular immigrants have decreased over time across Europe, 
mostly because various irregular migrant-sending countries (Poland, Lithu-
ania, Romania and others) became EU member states in 2004 and 2007, 
but also due to various regularisation mechanisms, because of the impact 
of the economic crisis and due to intensif ied controls. Nevertheless, the 
level of irregular migration is still considerable (see Düvell & Vollmer 2011).
The overwhelming majority of the irregular immigrants in the EU and 
in Russia arrive legally and enter either visa-free or with a visa but then 
overstay the expiry date of their visa or take up employment in violation of 
their visa restrictions (Düvell 2009). Only a minority enters clandestinely; 
nevertheless, clandestine entry raises the highest concerns. Notably pic-
tures and reports of so-called ‘boat-people’, migrants and refugees sailing 
across the Western Atlantic or the Mediterranean Sea to Europe, usually 
in small and overloaded vessels, prompt fears over ‘f loods of impoverished 
people’ from the global south. Often, numbers are exaggerated; indeed, 
some sources like to refer to millions of people who gather on the external 
borders of the European Union just waiting for a chance to penetrate its 
borders. Research, as well as apprehension f igures at the external borders 
of the EU (151,000 in 2008, 103,000 in 2009, 73, 000 in 2012), implies (a) that 
the total number of migrants trying each year to enter clandestinely over 
land or by boat is rather in the order of 100,000-300,000 and (b) that since 
2000 (Turkey) and 2007 (Ukraine) numbers are decreasing (Düvell & Vollmer 
2011). The external borders of the EU, however, are invested with a highly 
political and symbolic meaning and any violation is considered not only 
a violation of the law but an infringement of the integrity of the EU and 
almost perceived as an injury to the body of Europe.
Meanwhile, those migrants who do not qualify for regular entry and 
stay under the complex and often restrictive regulations of the European 
Union member states, but who nevertheless aspire to move to Europe, 
often do so in a (partially) irregular manner. For some, notably if they are 
from African, Middle Eastern or Asian countries, this means that they 
have to travel long distances in order to get to Europe. Most such journeys 
involve various legs or stages with stop-overs of various length, various 
means of transportation, such as f lights, coaches, trains, cars, lorries or 
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boats; and often some aspects of the journeys are regular whilst others are 
irregular or clandestine. These journeys, and the practices those migrants 
and refugees who lack visas use in order to get to Europe, are widely la-
belled as ‘transit migration’. In the introduction, we critically discussed 
the epistemological problems and limits of this concept. This chapter 
compares and contextualises the empirical f indings in this book provided 
by scholars from various countries in the borderlands, on the margins or 
in the neighbourhood of the European Union. The contributions in this 
volume focus on the efforts that migrants make to get to the European 
Union, as well as on the efforts undertaken by national governments to 
prevent what is usually considered politically undesired. This does not 
imply that the EU is the only destination; instead, as explained above, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Egypt or Turkey and sometimes Tunisia and Morocco 
are also destination countries and entered by migrants who transited 
various other countries before arriving there.
9.1 Contrasting geopolitical structures and migration regimes
Comparing the migration characteristics of the countries presented in this 
and other publications (e.g., Molodikova 2009; Düvell 2009) suggests that the 
countries affected by transit migration in the European migration space can 
be distinguished by five categories. First, some countries are predominantly 
receiving countries who also record some transit migration. This is certainly 
true for Russia, some EU countries such as the Czech Republic, Austria, 
Greece and Italy, or non-European countries such as Egypt and Libya (until 
2010). Other countries studied here seem to be simultaneously sending, 
receiving and transit countries, as is the case for Ukraine and Turkey. 
A third category of countries seems to be mostly transit countries and 
very few migrants do actually intend to stay, as seems to be the case with 
Morocco, Hungary and Slovakia. A fourth category of countries seems to 
be predominantly sending countries, notably Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Armenia; though Azerbaijan, Georgia and even Moldova now face 
the arrival of small numbers of migrants or refugees. A f ifth category is 
represented by Malta; it is neither a chosen destination nor exactly a transit 
country, but rather a dead-end road for migrants heading for other EU 
countries. To some extent this also applies to the Greek Republic of Cyprus.
From a political perspective there are f ive major regional and sometimes 
overlapping associations. These are the European Union (EU) with its 28 
member states, the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
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with its 11 members, the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) 
association, an interest group within the CIS which follows a more Western 
course (Molodikova 2009), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation area set up 
in 1992 which involves some EU countries (Romania and Bulgaria) as well as 
post-Soviet countries (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and others) and 
the Arab Maghreb Union with its f ive members. Major differences can be 
identif ied that distinguish these country groups or regions. The post-Soviet 
sphere is characterised by a common Russian empire and Soviet history, 
a common language (Russian), by kinship relations due to Soviet popula-
tion movements that span the former Soviet Union, and by an integrated 
transportation system (Molodikova 2009). Nothing similar exists in Western 
Europe or the Mediterranean region, where no one common language is 
spoken, except maybe English in Europe and Arabic in the southern and 
south-eastern rim, and transportation is largely nationally organised. The 
principle difference, however, between Western Europe and the former 
communist countries is that the countries in Western and Central Europe 
are moving towards more integration – with an ever expanding European 
Union, which involves several post-Soviet (Baltic) countries, whilst the CIS 
and the Black Sea region is characterised by mixed trends of integration and 
disintegration (e.g., Zaionchkovskaya 2009). Some countries, notably Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus are more committed to a common economic and 
political space whereas Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan are 
moving towards greater autonomy. On the one hand, the latter countries 
are historically, economically and culturally linked with Russia, voluntarily 
or not. On the other hand, they are more western-oriented and tend to be 
distracted by Russia’s omnipotence. Turkey plays a distinctly separate role 
and is emerging as a regional and even global power, a development fuelled 
by its economic growth – it is the 17th largest global economy – and political 
advances. On the one hand it is traditionally attracted by the USA and EU, 
on the other hand, because of some hesitation on the EU’s side, Turkey has 
begun to develop an alternative to EU membership. Indeed, the country 
has links with a variety of other regions, as with Russia, Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan, generally in the Balkan, Black Sea and Maghreb regions. 
Through introducing visa-free entry from many countries and through 
expanding the Turkish Airline network, some regional integration is being 
facilitated. Meanwhile, the other Mediterranean countries show little sign 
of integrating politically or economically. Instead, international relations 
are often driven by EU policies, such as the EU-inspired Barcelona Process 
(1995), the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (2004) and the Union for the 
Mediterranean (2008). These, however, are loosely and sometimes only 
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temporarily connected. Meanwhile, the Arab Maghreb Union had already 
become dysfunctional before the ‘Arab Spring’.
With respect to migration, movements of people within most regions 
are relatively liberal. For instance, within the EU people are almost free 
and the citizens of most EU countries can live and work indef initely in 
another member state, with the exception of some transitory limits for 
new member states. In the CIS countries the movement of people is also 
relatively free and no visas are required. Ten countries in Eurasia have 
established a free-travel zone: most notably, Russia offers visa-free entry 
to citizens from 10 out of 15 former Soviet republics. Thus, migrants from 
Moldova who aim to get to Moscow can travel unrestricted through Ukraine, 
as migrants from Kyrgyzstan can travel through Kazakhstan to Russia. 
Until 2007, employment and residence of more than three months within 
the CIS was restricted and required a permit. As a result, labour migration 
and immigration from one CIS country to another was often irregular. 
This has since changed; notably Russia made a U-turn and liberalised its 
migration policy (Molodikova 2009). Migrants can now regularise their 
residence and employment by a simple registration with the authorities. 
Turkey, too, has a rather liberal approach to international travel; nationals 
of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and the 
Central Asian republics can enter the country quite freely, either with or 
without visas that can easily be obtained at airports and other entry points 
(see Apap, Carrera & Kirişci 2004: 19). Also citizens from Morocco or Tunisia 
are exempted from visa requests in Turkey; others can apply for a visa on the 
border, as can citizens from Jordan. Only migration around the Maghreb is 
largely restricted, though visa regimes are not strict. In contrast, travel and 
migration between regions, notably the CIS, the Black Sea, and the southern 
and eastern Mediterranean region of the EU are largely restricted. Transit 
migration through Turkey, Russia and other countries, as, for example, 
Icduygu and Ivakhnyuk (both this volume) illustrate, is an aspect of the 
countries’ increasing integration into the global system of mobility of people 
and a consequence of international travel opportunities. Indeed, several 
chapters suggest tensions between often liberal regional arrangements 
and rather illiberal inter-regional restrictions that contribute to irregular 
(transit) movements. In other words, people can travel easily, from, for 
instance, Algeria to Turkey but not from Turkey to Greece; thus movements 
from one regional system to the other are restricted and this is one of the 
crucial conditions that brings about (irregular) transit migration.
From an economic and labour market perspective, the cases of the coun-
tries discussed in this chapter differ considerably. Russia and Ukraine, as 
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well as Turkey and Egypt, have huge shadow economies which offer many 
opportunities for irregular labour migrants. Hence, whilst immigration re-
strictions prevent and complicate regular immigration, there are incentives 
for migrants who are prepared to engage in the shadow economy. As a result, 
migrants who aim to move to the EU sometimes f ind reasons to instead 
stay in these countries. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are oil-producing and 
thus relatively wealthy countries with plenty of employment opportunities 
for migrants. By contrast, Ukraine and Turkey are rather middle-income 
countries with a developed labour market, though they offer different 
levels of scope for the integration of additional labour migrants. Hence, 
migrants f ind some opportunities but they are limited; they may consider 
a temporary stay but f ind it hard to settle down permanently. Hungary 
also is a comparably wealthy country, though hit hard by the crisis and not 
prepared to integrate international, that is, non-ethnic Hungarian migrants. 
Therefore, migrants on the way west have little reason to consider stay-
ing in this country (see Molodikova, this volume). Morocco is a relatively 
poor country with fewer earning opportunities for immigrants. Changes 
to these economic conditions could have an impact on transit migration. 
For instance, during the 1990s, under conditions of economic contraction, 
Ukraine was mostly a transit country; but for some years during the 2000s, 
when some sectors were booming, migrants from Africa and Asia began to 
stay and work or engage in businesses. But if conditions deteriorate again, 
as under the impact of the economic crisis of 2009, the country may again 
become mostly a transit country. This shows that the form migration takes 
is influenced by the economic conditions of the country concerned, though 
there is not always a link between the two.
Finally, certain hubs can be identif ied in all countries transited by mi-
grants. Some are staging posts of international migration where migrants 
en route concentrate, some are entry or exit points, but a few are bottlenecks 
or even dead-end roads where migrants get stuck. Entry points are, for 
example, Moscow, Van in Turkey, Oujda on the Algerian-Moroccan border 
and Al-Khofra in South East Libya on the border with Sudan. Kiev, Odessa 
and Moscow as well as Istanbul, Rabat and Tripoli are regional hubs; other 
stage posts, for instance, are Tamanrasset, Agadez and Timbuktu on the 
road from sub-Saharan countries to the Mediterranean shores. Real bottle-
necks between non-EU and EU countries are Zakarpattya in south-western 
Ukraine, more recently the Serbian border zone with Hungary, Izmir on the 
Aegean coast of Turkey, and the waters between Libya, Tunisia and Italy. 
Malta, as Mainwaring (this volume) demonstrates, as well as Cyprus are 
rather ‘dead-end roads’, as for some is also Greece. Such bottlenecks also 
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exist within the EU, such as the eastern Greek port cities of Patras and 
Igoumenitsa from where migrants aim to take a ferry to Italy, and Calais, 
from where migrants aim to reach the UK.
9.2 Causes, patterns and consequences of transit migration
Conventionally, transit migration – overland, time-consuming and 
partly irregular travel through various countries to a certain destination 
country – is explained with ‘porous borders’, lax entry controls, liberal 
visa regulations and the ‘geographic position’ of ‘transit countries’ at the 
crossroads between East and West (e.g., IOM 1995a; Narli 2003). It is also 
explained with some readily available informal migration industries and 
with human smuggling and traff icking (Futo, Jandl & Karsakova 2005). 
This suggests that the absence of eff icient border and internal controls, the 
existence of criminal networks, and the corruption of authorities almost 
invites (irregular) transit migration. Further to this, transit migration is 
commonly linked with the attractions of Western countries, implying 
that middle-income countries to the east and south of the EU cannot be 
destinations but only transit countries. Several of these perceptions appear 
too simplistic, referring either to almost natural, that is, geographical, 
causes or to rather simplistic social and economic causes and are therefore 
misleading. The research presented in this volume offers a more sophis-
ticated picture.
Some chapters suggest that certain determinants can be identif ied that 
facilitate transit migration or other onward movements. Notably, within 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the heritage of large-scale 
population movements within the former Soviet Union and an almost 
unrestricted mobility regime that emerged during the 1990s and 2000s, 
led to the formation of some national and ethnic diasporas and minorities 
in every former Soviet Union country. This trend is reinforced by migra-
tion traditions dating back to late Soviet times when citizens of ‘friendly 
countries’, such as Vietnam, India, Syria or even Cameroon, were recruited 
through special programmes to the Soviet Union to be educated as teachers, 
engineers, doctors and military personnel. Thus, ethnic diasporas have 
emerged, and certain migration networks, traditions and memories have 
become established that continue to facilitate various forms of migration 
including transit migration. In the case of Russia, Ivakhnyuk (this volume) 
argues that existing diasporas, such as the Chinese immigrant commu-
nity, provide an infrastructure that facilitates migration through Russia 
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to Western destinations. Also Mosneaga (ibid.) suggests that Moldovan 
migration has led to the emergence of a network of stage posts that together 
act as ‘ethnic corridors’ for Moldovans wishing to travel overland to more 
distant destinations. And Molodikova (ibid.) in her analysis of the Hungarian 
case argues that arrangements aiming to facilitate movements (of ethnic 
minorities and others) within a small zone along newly established borders, 
as between Hungary and Serbia, or Ukraine and Poland, are also utilised 
by transit migrants.
Research has also found that transit migration can be caused by lack 
of legal and/or economic opportunities in the f irst or second country of 
arrival. For instance, in earlier studies it was found that Kurdish refugees 
in Greece, who after struggling to survive whilst trying to regularise their 
position or obtaining refugee status f inally gave up hope and moved on to 
the UK (Jordan & Düvell 2002). Equally, the US Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants (2005) relates irregular transit migration through Turkey to the 
lack of an eff icient asylum procedure. Roman (2006: 7) found that refugees 
from Sudan and Somalia in Egypt were forced to move on to other destina-
tions because of ‘lack of local integration prospects’. The same could be 
said about Turkey: because so far most categories of migrants were refused 
permission to work (and indeed a proper immigration status) there are few 
incentives for migrants to stay, which prompts them to search for alternative 
destinations. Unwelcoming environments, in particular when characterised 
by additional hostility such discrimination, racism, racial violence and 
police harassment, as in the case of Africans in Istanbul (see Brewer & 
Yükseker 2005) and more recently in Greece, were also found to play a part 
in preventing migrants from settling down and instead provoked them to 
move on. In Ukraine, lack of legal status, unfair asylum procedures and 
unviable economic conditions make it diff icult for migrants and refugees 
to stay (Human Rights Watch 2005). In contrast, Danis, Pérouse and Taragh 
(2006) f ind that even under the most adverse conditions, Iraqi, Afghan and 
Maghrebi migrants in Istanbul who would conventionally be considered 
as in transit instead managed some ‘unoff icial integration’ and are in fact 
at least temporary immigrants. Other examples show that even where 
host societies are largely ‘tolerant and hospitable’, as it is said to be the 
case in Azerbaijan (IOM 2003: 11), it was observed that migrants neverthe-
less move on to other destinations. Hence, neither do adverse conditions 
inevitably provoke on-migration (or indeed return), nor can it be assumed 
that favourable conditions prevent on-migration. Thus, the socio-political 
and economic conditions are not the all-decisive factors in whether or not 
migrants stay or move on.
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Transit migration can also be explained with the limits in legal migra-
tion channels. As it becomes increasingly diff icult for certain categories of 
people to legally migrate to the EU, those who nevertheless wish to come, 
either as workers, refugees or family members, are driven into complex 
and hazardous circumventions and paths and face long overland and sea 
journeys. Empirical evidence suggests that migrants who are prevented 
from moving to Europe legally and who therefore turn to the services of 
human smugglers are often taken through a range of countries (e.g., Mavris 
2002; Futo, Jandl & Karsakova 2005). This implies that it is the destination 
countries’ policies that contribute to the emergence and construction of 
transit migration. Control politics impact on and determine transit migra-
tion. Each time controls on a popular route are increased, migrants and 
smugglers search for other opportunities and f inally establish new paths, 
or new strategies (see Molodikova and Ivakhnyuk, both this volume). As 
a consequence, f lows do not simply diminish but are redirected to other 
geographical areas. This already became apparent during the mid-1990s 
when it was observed that migrants from distant countries moved south 
through Romania and Hungary trying to f ind a loophole into the EU be-
cause of increasing controls along the Polish-German borders (FFM 1996). 
Equally, in the case of the Mediterranean, increased controls in the Straits 
of Gibraltar between Morocco and Spain f irst led to migrants leaving from 
Southern Morocco to go to the Canary Islands; and when controls in South 
Morocco were improved, migrants departed from Mauretania and even 
Senegal (German Foreign Policy 2006; De Haas 2007). Finally, when the 
western Atlantic path – from Morocco and Mauretania – became heav-
ily controlled, notably by concerted FRONTEX controls, the main point 
of departure to the EU was shifted towards Libya. From 2009, enhanced 
controls between Libya and Italy resulted in yet another shift of the flow 
to Turkey and on to Greece, whilst the breakdown of controls due to civil 
war in Libya again opened up this route. Equally, efforts made in 2012 in 
enhancing controls on the Turkish-Greek land border led to an increase in 
migrants departing from the Turkish coast to go to the Greek islands or to 
instead cross the border into Bulgaria. Similar developments were observed 
in the case of Georgian migration to Russia: when Russia introduced visas 
for Georgians in 2002, Georgian migrants began transiting Ukraine and 
Belarus to exploit the relatively open borders between these countries 
and Russia. There are hardly any legal opportunities for transit migration; 
only the UNHCR’s resettlement programmes from Egypt, Turkey, Malta 
and to a much smaller extent in Ukraine offer some limited opportunities 
(Kaytaz 2006; Al-Sharmani and Mainwaring, both this volume). Neverthe-
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less, sometimes, refugees strategically chose a country, such as Turkey, 
as they know there is a chance of being resettled legally in a country of 
their choice thus avoiding clandestine and risky journeys (Kaytaz 2006). 
Transit migration is a strategic response to the constantly changing control 
regime and usually increasingly strict immigration legislation. It reflects the 
complex interaction between migrants’ autonomy and states sovereignty 
and some ‘cat and mouse’ between the two.
9.3 Characteristics and strategies of transit migrants
Issues of social class and gender also play a role in transit migration. Travel-
lers must normally prove that they are bona fide tourists or businessmen. 
Tourists must convince off icers in the visa department of foreign embassies 
or at the borders of their honest intentions – that they have the means to 
subsidise themselves and they must demonstrate that they a life to which 
they will return, hence that they have jobs, a home and families. Equally, 
labour migrants must meet immigration criteria, such as higher education, 
high skills and of course job offers. Both categories must then be able to 
simply book a flight to their f inal destination. Those who have some funds 
but are unable to obtain a visa, for example, because they lack the required 
education or skills or do not otherwise meet the immigration criteria, may 
instead fly to a country close to their f inal destination, for example, from 
Nigeria via Cairo to Russia, and then try to move on. But those with few 
or no resources, who can only afford the cheapest transportation, need to 
travel on trains, buses, lorries or even walk through a range of countries 
toward their intended destination, like from Kabul through Uzbekistan and 
Russia to Ukraine. Often, however, they can only go as far as their money 
takes them, and some migrants need to work and earn money in order to 
f inance their next step. Hence, it seems plausible to suggest that the poorer 
the migrants, the higher the tendency to migrate overland; and the poorer 
they are, the more likely it is that they stay in countries en route to work, 
hence the longer they will stay in the transit country and the longer the 
journey will take.
Brewer and Yükseker (2005: 8) found that some individuals only became 
transit migrants by accident; whilst they were supposed to be taken by 
smugglers directly to Greece or Italy they were instead taken to and aban-
doned by human smugglers in Turkey and thus had to continue their journey 
to the nearest EU country, in this case Greece, on their own account and 
overland. Mainwaring (this volume) demonstrates that migrants who are on 
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their way to Europe may become involuntary transit migrants due to their 
apprehension. Migrants who take a boat from Libya to Italy have to cross 
an area that is monitored by Maltese authorities. If they are detected, their 
boat is taken to Malta where the passengers are detained. They are then 
kept on the island involuntarily; often they try to move on to Italy and then 
to other EU countries, or they apply to be resettled in another EU country 
or the USA, an option only offered to them since 2009. Equally, Mosneaga 
shows how Moldovans on their way to Italy were unaware that they were 
taken through Switzerland where they were apprehended. In such cases, 
transiting Turkey, Switzerland and Malta, respectively, was not intended but 
forced upon the individuals due to enforcement measures or the betrayal of 
some informal agents (smugglers). And Alioua (this volume) demonstrates 
that migrants aiming only to transit a country, such as Morocco, when faced 
with the progressive closure of EU borders, are forced to settle for a longer 
time. As a consequence they are compelled to redefine and reorganise their 
migration project.
Transit migration is sometimes depicted as ‘mixed flows’ of economic 
migrants and refugees (for an overview see Düvell 2008). For instance, the 
origins of transit migration of sub-Saharan Africans through the Maghreb 
countries towards Europe are varied in terms of location, motives and 
situations and are particular heterogeneous, as Alioua argues (this volume). 
On the one hand, reports on transit migration often refer to individuals from 
conflict countries, notably Iraqis, Iranians, Afghans, Somalis, Eritreans 
and Palestinians. Accordingly, it may be assumed that many are in search 
of international protection and may thus be considered refugees. On the 
other hand, reports equally often refer to Nigerians and Cameroonians, 
Bangladeshis and Chinese and often it is assumed that these are rather 
economic migrants who are in search of better opportunities. Sometimes, 
members of the same family are found in diverse countries. This, as Al-
Sharmani and Ivakhnyuk found in the case of Somalis (this volume; see 
also Horst 2003) is for two reasons. First, members in one country work 
and send money home that is then used to enable further family members 
to also escape Somalia. These then migrate to diverse other countries. This 
refers to the second reason, which is that through such strategies it is made 
sure that at least one family member makes it to a safe (European) country; 
this is thus a kind of risk-diversifying strategy. That these individuals then 
serve as anchor persons who help others to follow (e.g., through family 
reunif ication) seems a plausible assumption.
Some transit movements are straightforward and the individuals seem to 
know exactly where they want to go. Sometimes, they reach their destination 
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within weeks of departure. Others, however, seem to float within a certain 
region outside the EU for long periods of time in search of a suitable country 
or entry point. For instance, in 2008, I interviewed two Palestinian asylum 
seekers in Debrecen/Hungary; one made the journey in just f ive weeks ‘I was 
lucky’ he admitted the other took two years because he was apprehended 
and detained, exhausted his money and had to work to acquire new funds 
for his onward journey. Notably refugees, for instance; Somalis are reported 
to flee from Somalia and move to Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen or several of these countries before f inally turning up in a country 
in the neighbourhood of the EU, for example, Turkey, Ukraine or Libya, from 
where they hope to cross the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea or Carpathian 
mountains and enter the European Union (e.g., Al-Sharmani, this volume). 
Usually, migrants from the major sending countries are reported from 
countries as diverse as Ukraine, Turkey, Egypt and Malta. This suggests 
that there are many possible paths towards the European Union. It also 
suggests that from each conflict region there are various paths to safety 
and that refugees try all of them.
Migrants also change their plans according to the conditions they f ind 
and sometimes decide to settle down instead of pursuing their plan to 
move on. In particular, failed or frustrated transit migrants become almost 
involuntary or forced immigrants. This results in the emergence or at least 
expansion and certainly diversif ication of existing pockets and communi-
ties of migrants in the neighbourhood of the EU. These tend to gather in 
populous suburbs, such as in Rabat, Casablanca or Tangiers and Istanbul 
or Kiev, Odessa and Moscow; they settle down, some permanently, others 
temporarily, and superimpose new social relationships and new logics to 
these locations, as Alioua argues (this volume). From such observations, 
one may conclude that what began as transit migration sometimes heralds 
the transition of the migration characteristics of the respective country 
which turns from a transit to an immigration country. This could be true 
for Ukraine, certainly for Turkey and to some extent even Morocco.
Some of the conditions analysed above explain why some transit mi-
grants reside in a country en route for considerable periods of time before 
moving on. In case they must work to fund their onward-journey but can 
only f ind low-paid work in the shadow economy, they must stay and work 
longer to acquire the necessary f inancial resources. If they are requested 
to pay higher rents, unduly high fees to off icials et cetera, they are again 
compelled to stay and work longer. If controls are intensif ied and therefore 
smugglers ask for higher fees – either to compensate for the higher risks 
or for bribing more off icials – migrants must work longer to save more; 
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thus the duration of a transit migrant’s stay is prolonged even further. 
Finally, if migrants are prevented from leaving the transit country and are 
apprehended and detained – as analysed in the case of Morocco (Collyer 
2006) – then the total duration of stay in the transit country has to be longer 
and migration is de facto slowed down (Panagiotidis & Tsianos 2007) or 
even terminated. This might, however, result in unintended side-effects, 
as transit countries become ‘buffer states’ or involuntary immigration 
countries (see below). From the observations presented in this section, it 
can be concluded that some transit migration is a consequence of certain 
governments’ policies and laws and is socially and politically produced. 
Other transit migration, however, is by choice and can be considered a 
self-selected migration strategy.
9.4 The politics of transit migration
The migration of citizens from distant countries who cross several other 
countries before they arrive at the external borders of and f inally enter the 
EU or other European country, often in an irregular manner, has become of 
increasing concern for all countries affected. This phenomenon was labelled 
and became popular as ‘transit migration’; the individuals are often accord-
ingly called ‘transit migrants’ and the countries involved are sometimes 
branded ‘transit countries’. From a United Nations (UN) conference, the 
concept seems to have entered the migration policy discourse during the 
early 1990s (UN ECE 1993). Since then, it has become increasingly popular. 
In 1994, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) urged its mem-
ber states through a series of papers to recognise transit migration as an 
important matter in international migration and in particular in irregular 
and asylum migration (IOM 1994a, b, c, d, e). Widgren (1995), Director of the 
intergovernmental International Centre for Migration Policy Development 
(ICMPD, Vienna) at the height of the European asylum panic, warned that 
most asylum seekers were transiting Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. In 1998, a strategy paper of the then Austrian presidency of the 
Council of the European Union emphasised the importance of ‘transit 
migration’ and ‘transit countries’. This was followed by six action plans on 
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Albania, Somalia and Morocco, drafted by the 
High Level Working Group on Asylum and Migration (HLWG) in 1999. In 
2001, the Ministerial Conference of the 5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the 
Western Mediterranean (2001) reiterated the necessity of ‘joint management 
of the phenomenon’. Moreover, the United Nations High Commissioner 
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for Refugees (UNHCR 2001) alerted national authorities to the emerging 
phenomenon of transit migration in post-conflict Balkan countries. The 
Council of Europe (CoE) emphasised that ‘perhaps the most salient mi-
gration phenomenon currently affecting Central and Eastern Europe is 
that of transit migrants’ (CoE 2002: Part 1). This was followed by a regional 
conference on ‘Migrants in Transit Countries’ which raised attention and 
encouraged national authorities to take appropriate measures (CoE 2004). 
Meanwhile, in 2003, the ‘Söderköping Process’, a ‘cross-border cooperation 
process’ on migration matters, was launched under the auspices of the Swed-
ish government, bringing together the eastern EU countries and its non-EU 
neighbours. The process targets Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova in order to 
‘tackle the problems of irregular transit migration and asylum problems’ 
(General Directors’ Immigration Service Conference, GDISC 2001). In 2003, 
ICMPD set up the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue and invited 
concerned governments to enhance the ‘f ight against illegal migration’ 
transiting the EU’s Mediterranean neighbours (ICMPD 2005). The initiative 
is concerned with operational matters and intelligence aspects: routes and 
criminal activities are identif ied, intelligence exchanged, training provided 
and technical equipment shared amongst participants. This trend towards 
intelligence work and engaging in enforcement matters was reinforced by 
setting up a joint ICMPD/Europol/FRONTEX programme (ICMPD 2006).
Politics to prevent irregular and transit migration, notably the externali-
sation of surveillance and control policies (see below) and the emergence 
of ‘shadows borders’ (see below), increasingly acknowledge and respond 
to the emergence of spaces (see introduction) and thus go well beyond the 
conventional Westphalian migration model of sovereign states controlling 
their national borders. Instead, states or groups of states, that is, the EU, 
will now operate beyond their territories either through deploying off icers 
in foreign countries or through surveillance in other countries. Thus, the 
analysis of politics that targets irregular and transit migration reveals a 
trend towards post-Westphalian migration control, that is, states acting 
beyond their borders and within entire transit zones and migration spaces, 
and thus a new era of migration politics.
Expanded control regimes
European governments and EU agencies have integrated measures targeting 
transit migration in a range of policies. First, concerns have been associated 
with those countries which meanwhile became member states (2004: the 
Baltic republics, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Slove-
nia, Malta and Cyprus; 2007: Romania and Bulgaria); second, with present 
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candidate countries (Turkey); and third, with its other neighbours (Ukraine, 
Morocco and Libya). For example, the Romanian government, in order to 
satisfy EU policy expectations, claimed ‘a signif icant reduction of transit 
migration from third countries through Romanian territory’ (Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999). Equally Malta, since it became a full 
EU member state in 2004, has shielded the mainland and intercepts boat 
people on their way from Tunisia and Libya to Italy (Mainwaring, this 
volume). Thus, Malta was assigned the role of a watch tower and gatekeeper 
of the EU. ‘Combating’ irregular migration, often of nationals from distant 
countries who are transiting Mediterranean countries, is at the forefront 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Barcelona process 
(Lutterbeck 2006: 70). Notably, measures like the FRONTEX (EU border 
agency) operations Hera and Minerva, which aim to prevent the arrival of 
‘boat people’ on the Canary Islands and the Spanish mainland, reflect this 
trend. The fact that the migrants who depart from Morocco, Mauritania and 
even Senegal are often sub-Saharan migrants illustrate that such measures 
basically target ‘transit migrants’ aiming to leave the ‘transit country’. As a 
consequence, the control of land and sea borders is increasingly ‘militarised’ 
(ibid.: 64). This can be observed in the Mediterranean between Morocco 
and Spain, Turkey and Greece, Italy and Albania, Libya and Italy and Malta, 
where armed and naval forces are regularly deployed in border controls. 
Libya is another country integrated into such policies. In 2006, the EU 
considered Libya for its European Neighbourhood Programme (ENP) and 
drafted according action plans to formalise such practices. ENPs (see Guild 
2005) aim to improve the EU neighbouring states’ capacity to control and re-
strict migration to, and in particular through, these countries. Negotiations 
have also been conducted with Moldova, Morocco, Tunisia and Ukraine 
(Azerbaijan and Georgia are also on the list), to name the migration-relevant 
countries. For example, the EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Justice and Home 
Affairs in 2001 and the EU-Ukraine Action Plan of 2004 aim at improvements 
in such affairs. And in 2009, Italy had reached a bilateral agreement with 
Libya about joint sea patrols. Whilst the civil war interrupted these, they 
were resumed in 2012 and fresh collaboration has been established with 
the new authorities. With Tunisia’s new government, similar agreements 
have been negotiated.
A leading f igure of the conservative party in Germany (CDU) states that, 
‘we must also integrate countries of origin and transit. They must help 
to contain refugee flows and they must be obliged to readmit their own 
nationals. There is no other way than putting pressure on these countries. 
And money’ (Bosbach 2006). Apap, Carrera & Kirişci (2004: 19) confirm that 
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countries such as Turkey, ‘came under massive pressure from a number 
of EU member countries to curb … transit migration’. As a consequence, 
responsibility for preventing migrants unwanted in the EU from entering 
its territory has been shifted towards non-EU countries. This process is 
facilitated through the politics of ‘sharing the burden’ of protecting global 
refugees (Thielemann 2003), obligations under bilateral readmission agree-
ments between the EU, individual member states and its non-EU neighbours 
and in the course of candidate and membership procedures. Sometimes, 
there is criticism that EU countries simply ‘dump’ politically unwanted 
immigrants on their neighbours’ territories, for example, through migration 
containment and return policies, instead of recognising their international 
obligations towards refugees (Watson 2003). Therefore, some would argue 
the EU’s ‘burden sharing’ policy is a euphemism for ‘shifting the burden’ to 
its neighbouring countries who are held responsible for keeping unwanted 
immigrants off EU territory and who could therefore become a ‘buffer zone’ 
for migrants not wanted in the EU (Kirişci 2006). On the other hand, some 
non-EU governments also play a ‘transit migration’ card. Some use it in their 
negotiation with their neighbours and the EU as a whole, for example, to 
divert attention from irregular migration of their own citizens (e.g., see De 
Haas 2007 on Morocco) or in exchange for improved border controls they 
negotiate eased visa regulations for their own citizens (as in the case of 
Ukraine and Moldova).
The transit migration discourse coincides with the EU’s introduction 
of carrier sanctions obliging airlines, bus operators and shipping lines to 
return illegitimate migrants to their point of departure. Furthermore, 
efforts have been made by individual member states or the EU as a whole 
to negotiate readmission agreements with many non-EU neighbours and 
various sending countries to facilitate return and deportation (Cassarino 
2010). For instance, in autumn 2004, the Italian authorities in a dramatic 
move returned more than one thousand irregular migrants from various 
African countries back to their point of departure in Libya. This was almost 
a panic response and was executed in the absence of an adequate policy 
framework and criticised by a European Parliament committee as ‘refoule-
ment’, a breach of international obligations, notably the 1951 Geneva Refugee 
Convention (see Andrijasevic 2006). Similar instances were reported from 
Ukraine (2008), Greece and again Italy (2009). Also readmission agree-
ments were introduced with countries such as Senegal and Mali that seek 
to establish collaboration between transit and sending countries. Finally, 
within the EU the Dublin Convention was agreed, obliging refugees to 
apply for asylum in the f irst safe country in which they arrive. Thereby, 
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refugees are prevented from travelling through various EU countries to a 
f inal destination. For instance, Somali refugees who f irst enter EU territory 
in Hungary but move on, for instance, to the Netherlands, will be sent back 
to Hungary.
In Europe and its vicinity three contrasting trends can be observed. There 
are countries who fully comply with EU demands to take responsibility for 
protecting the EU’s territory from unwanted migration and collaborate 
in controlling (irregular) transit migration, such as Moldova, Morocco, 
Tunisia (with some interruption in 2011) and Libya (from 2009 until the 
uprising in 2011 and probably again from 2013). Additionally, there are 
countries that comply at least partially and make some efforts to prevent 
transit migration, such as Turkey and Ukraine. On the other hand, there are 
countries that are less enthusiastic and partially or fully reject responsibility 
in this matter, such as Russia. Some of those who fully comply are already 
candidate countries to the EU, such as Turkey, and are obliged to implement 
the various EU policies. Or they accept the EU’s idea of ‘good neighbourhood 
relations’ and therefore prevent migrants and refugees from moving to the 
Northern and Western countries. Those who partially or fully implement EU 
expectations seem to do so because they are hoping for EU candidate status 
in the future, such as Ukraine and Moldova. However, these hopes already 
seem to be frustrated and it remains to be seen how these countries respond 
to this rejection from the EU and whether they will accept EU policies. 
Compliance with EU expectations, however, does not seem to be without 
consequences, as several countries complain that they are becoming the 
‘dumping ground’ for migrants and refugees who are unwanted in the EU 
and in the EU neighbourhood alike (e.g., Lahlou 2009; Malynovska 2009). 
But whilst some of these countries have become immigration countries, 
sometimes rather involuntarily, they are often rather unprepared, for 
example, to cope with rising numbers of refugees, or they are unwilling to 
regularise labour migration, as in the cases of Ukraine, Turkey and Libya.
A separate trend is that certain countries, not in response to EU pres-
sure but out of genuine national interests, apply the concept of ‘transit 
migrants’ to specif ic groups of migrants, often people who require some 
kind of protection, for instance, because they come from conflict countries. 
This signals that these groups of migrants are not accepted as immigrants 
but are almost expected to leave again at some point, for example, to either 
return or, more controversially to move on to other countries. The mes-
sage is that the host countries reject any long-term responsibility. Such 
practice has been observed in Ukraine and Egypt, but also Turkey insists 
that refugees are rather ‘guests’. Thus, the discursive use of the concept of 
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transit migration sometimes also implies either some problems with the 
respective country’s interpretation of the international refugee conventions 
or some views that conflict with those held by EU countries.
The plethora of initiatives and the many actors engaged in ‘combat-
ing’ transit and other unwanted migration demonstrates that this has 
become a top policy aim. The policy goals are perfectly illustrated by an 
IOM document (1995b: 48, 47) stating that transit countries shall either 
‘pay attention to specif ic needs … of refugees’ and thereby prevent them 
from being prompted to move on; or they shall ‘return them … to their 
country of origin’. In other words, transit migration policies aim to identify 
and intercept potential transit migrants, prevent them from moving on to 
Western Europe, and either enable them to stay in their transit country, for 
example by improving asylum procedures, or return them to their country 
of origin.
The shadow borders of the EU
Conventional maps show the territorial borders of the European Union 
in conjunction with the borders of its peripheral member states: Finland, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, 
Slovenia, Italy, Malta and Spain. However, various EU migration control 
posts and operations are found well outside these territorial borders. For 
instance, the EU or individual member states fund detention camps in 
Lutsk/Ukraine, in Nouadhibou/Mauritania and in Libya; EU immigration 
and police off icers are deployed in Kiev and Ankara in order to prevent 
unwanted migrants and refugees from getting anywhere near EU borders; 
and in Libya the EU funded the return of migrants to sub-Saharan countries 
through the IOM’s ‘voluntary’ return programme. The EU is also investing 
in the establishment of asylum seekers’ reception centres and processing 
procedures, for example, in Ukraine and Turkey. The aim is to turn non-
EU countries into safe countries, so that refugees can be expected to f ile 
their claim in these countries and if they do not do this and move on to 
the EU, they might even be sent back to that country if apprehended. In 
various countries, governments have agreed to comply with EU demands to 
contain migration movements towards the EU. It would seem as if the EU 
is establishing another unoff icial border – a migration control border, well 
outside its territorial border. It is neither internationally agreed or deline-
ated nor properly regulated. Instead it is a second or shadow border which 
runs through Nouadhibou in Mauritania, 1,200 kilometres from EU territory 
(Canaries/Spain) and 2,000 kilometres from mainland Spain; through Kiev 
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in Ukraine, 600 kilometres away from Poland; and through Van in Turkey, 
around 1,900 kilometres from the nearest EU country (Greece).
Increasing risks and emerging protection gaps
Would-be migrants and refugees respond to the various migration and 
border control regimes described in this volume in three ways. They either 
abandon their aspirations and do not migrate, or they travel or migrate 
where it is legally possible, or they travel and migrate in an irregular fashion. 
In the latter case enhanced controls, notably the closing of previous routes, 
usually compel travellers to take alternative routes; often these turn out to 
be more dangerous, like routes through desserts, across the seas or across 
mountains. Thus, enhanced controls indirectly increase the risks for travel-
lers (see Weber & Pickering 2011). A good example of this is the closing of 
the land route in Thrace between Turkey and Greece in 2012, which pushed 
those who were nevertheless desperate to migrate to the EU to the more 
dangerous Aegean Sea route. Several maritime accidents usually reported by 
Turkish sources illustrate these risks. But also the absence of legal migration 
channels, which drives people into engaging with smugglers, increases 
the risks. This is because this type of arrangement is by its very nature 
unregulated and only based on trust, money and power; it can thus easily 
be exploited by the smuggler and there are some who do this. As a result 
those who are willing to travel clandestinely might either be betrayed for 
their money, subjected to violence or sexual abuse or sent on a journey 
where they risk or even lose their lives (see Khosravi 2010; Triandafyllidou 
& Maroukis 2012). Also certain reports highlight incidences in the no man's 
lands between two countries or on the open seas, referring to refugee boats 
rammed by coast guard boats or pushed back to where they were coming 
from (Amnesty International 2013). All these cases point to severe crimes 
as well as violations of refugee and human rights against migrants and 
refugees whilst travelling. Normally, they should be protected by national 
and international law in the countries on either side of their journey, the 
countries they leave and the countries they aim to enter, but they seem to 
be left unprotected whilst in-between these countries. This gives rise to a 
severe protection gap, and the international community needs to respond 
to this development.
Consensual versus conflicting migration diplomacies
Often, it has been the EU that communicates its concerns to countries that 
are transited by migrants and refugees in order to convince these countries 
to contribute to containing such movements. In exchange, the EU offers 
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funds, technology and training but also visa or trade liberalisation. This 
mechanism could be observed in the EU’s Eastern Partnership Programme 
with, for instance, Ukraine. Meanwhile, countries in the neighbourhood of 
the EU have also discovered the power of the transit migration argument 
and turned this into a card in their negations or arguments with the EU. For 
instance, in spring 2011, whilst the EU was pressing hard to get the Turkish 
government into an agreement over readmission – on the return of irregular 
immigrants in the EU that had transited Turkey – Turkey demanded that in 
return the EU lift the visa restrictions for Turkish nationals. Subsequently, 
this failed and neither did the EU get its readmission agreement ratif ied nor 
was Turkey granted any signif icant visa liberalisation. Also in spring 2011 
Libya’s dictator Gaddafi threatened to unleash a wave of illegal migration to 
the EU if the EU continued to support the liberation movement. And indeed, 
soon afterwards, as it was claimed, agents of the regime were pushing 
migrants into north-bound boats. Thus, third-country nationals residing in 
Libya were turned into an argument and subsequently a weapon against the 
EU. A few weeks later, however, the Transitional National Council of Libya 
reassured the EU that they would comply with all previous agreements 
regarding Libya’s commitment to control and contain migration across its 
territory and from its shores to the North. In this case, it was the rebels using 
the migration card to demonstrate that they would be reliable partners 
to the EU. In any case, transit migration has not only become an issue for 
diplomacy but indeed a ball to play with.
9.5 Countries transited by migrants: Similar and different
In spite of the diversity of migration flows, the causes of transit migration 
and types of transit countries, there are striking similarities between the 
very distant cases of Ukraine, Turkey, Morocco and Malta. All are described 
as cross-roads between East and West, and South and North respectively, 
and all are positioned in the borderland of the EU (between poor and send-
ing and rich and receiving regions). They are also situated on traditional 
trading routes between the South and East and the North and West. In 
many migrant-sending countries, there are vague memories of the routes 
through these countries and of the hospitality which traders and travellers 
encountered in the past. This is sometimes reinforced by earlier positive 
memories of citizens of migrant-sending countries who were educated at, 
for instance, a Ukraine or Russian university or military academy, or those 
who spent some time legally working in Libya, for example. Thus, when 
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the need arises to leave a country which is suffering from war or poverty, 
these memories seem to influence migration decisions and determine the 
paths taken and the countries transited. Such memories, however, can 
be treacherous and diff iculties become apparent as soon as transit turns 
out to be less easy than assumed and when a longer than intended stay 
becomes necessary.
Another similarity is that Turkey, Egypt and Ukraine have experienced 
large-scale emigration; meanwhile, they have also become receiving 
countries. Simultaneously, all face considerable pressure from the EU to 
keep unwanted migration away from the EU’s external borders, as well as 
to host refugees and process their claims for asylum. Some authors argue 
that these and other countries have become ‘reservoirs’ for migrants un-
wanted in the EU (e.g., Ivakhnyuk, this volume). Few are well prepared to 
receive or properly deal with and integrate large numbers of refugees and/
or labour migrants and offer no or insuff icient reception facilities for newly 
arrived migrants. Notably the asylum reception and processing structures 
are underdeveloped and are overwhelmed by the influx of refugees. The 
situation in the detention facilities of Chop (Ukraine), Edirne (Turkey) and 
Hal Far (Malta) seems similarly dire.
Migrants and refugees gather and mix in similar locations in most 
countries. These are usually found in the poorer neighbourhoods of the 
capital and other large cities (Istanbul/Tarlabasi and Laleli, Izmir/Basmane, 
Tripoli/Medina, Cairo/Nasr City and Rabat/Sale and Side Musa). In Istanbul, 
Izmir or Tripoli these neighbourhoods are located in the inner cities; in 
Moscow, however, they concentrate on the south-eastern outskirts (Vendina 
2002) and in Kiev, migrants are concentrated in Troieshchyna. In most 
cities, they occupy run-down and usually overcrowded apartments, whereas 
in Moscow and Izmir they live in hotels and hostels. Paradoxically they 
often pay even higher rents than the local poor, as their precarious status 
is exploited by unscrupulous landlords. In some cities, notably in Morocco, 
there seems to be no place for transit and other migrants; instead, they are 
compelled to live in makeshift settlements outside the cities, as in Missnana 
Forest/Tangier, in Gourougou outside Melilla or in the Bel Younech woods 
outside of Ceuta.
In most countries transited by migrants – and not only in these – dis-
courses can be found that portray migrants and refugees as a (security) 
threat, as taking jobs and other resources from the indigenous populations, 
as being involved in crime, and even transmitting diseases, even though 
there is little evidence for this (Lahlou 2009; Kaya 2009; Pylynskiy 2008). 
Related discursive threads are that (a) countries lack resources to host 
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migrants and refugees (Malta, Morocco and Egypt) or (b) that governments 
do not consider refugees a permanent immigrant population but a passing 
occurrence, assuming that refugees will either move on, return, or be reset-
tled to other countries (Russia, Ukraine and Turkey). The widely-held belief 
that migrants and refugees are only in transit also serves as an excuse so 
that governments do not need to introduce integration or refugee reception 
schemes.
In any case, in most countries in the neighbourhood of the EU no efforts 
are made to integrate migrants and refugees: instead this is prevented. For 
instance, access to employment is restricted, either by impractical require-
ments as in Ukraine and Egypt, or it is legally ruled out, as in Turkey. And 
if migrants wish to work they have to do so irregularly. Egypt even puts a 
social reservation on its refugee law which excludes refugees from almost 
all public services, including health and education. Often they are victims 
of heavy-handed police operations, as in Morocco (Smith 2006), or daily 
harassment, as in Turkey and Ukraine, and racial violence, as in Russia and 
Ukraine. These practices are without doubt contributing to the migrants’ 
and refugees’ feelings of fear and uncertainty and demonstrate on a daily 
basis that they are not welcome but should instead leave.
9.6 Conclusion
There are f ive main effects of the controls on the journeys of migrants. 
One is that migrants get stuck or stranded in the countries they only aim 
to transit. As a consequence, migrants become involuntary immigrants 
and the respective countries turn into places of involuntary immigration. 
Another effect is that in response to new or improved controls, migrants and 
smugglers develop new paths, routes and means of entry. The third effect 
is that migration is slowed down and that journeys take longer. The fourth 
effect is that the number of those who manage to navigate controls and 
subsequently arrive in the destination country or region, notably the EU, is 
reduced. And the f ifth effect is that a protection gap emerges, meaning that 
irregular migrants, whilst in the hands of smugglers or in the no man’s land 
between two sovereign countries, have no law or authority to protect them. 
The consequence is that the migration patterns, the geographies as well 
as the scope of transit migration are constantly changing whilst often the 
risks associated with the journeys are increasing (Weber & Pickering 2011).
By examining where migrants live and work and how they travel, it is 
not easy if at all possible to distinguish them as labour migrants or refu-
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gees, temporary immigrants or transit migrants, and regular or irregular 
migrants. Instead, the different types of migrants often mix with each 
other; they live in the same neighbourhoods, share the same apartments, do 
the same jobs, travel in the same coaches or boats and lose, gain or switch 
immigration statuses. Indeed, they also inform and inspire each other. Thus, 
migrants’ motives, legal statuses and flows are more often mixed than not.
Usually the criteria applied to define transit migration are (a) intentions 
to enter and cross a certain country in order to arrive at another country, 
(b) to do so in a limited period of time, and (c) not to integrate and thus 
temporarily immigrate to this country. All of these criteria, however, 
are problematic. Intentions are subject to change, either in response to 
experiences and information obtained whilst en route or due to structural 
constraints, whether due to lack of funding or to control politics. Time is 
another problematic criterion and set time limits inevitably appear arbi-
trary. Transit in the common understanding is a matter of hours or days and 
immigration is commonly defined as a stay of more than one year. Hence, 
two types of migration, temporary immigration and transit migration, fall 
into the same duration and are thus diff icult to distinguish by the duration 
of the stay in a country en route. What remains is the issue of the quality 
of the activities undertaken during the time spent in the given country, 
notably whether or not a person integrates with the social and economic 
structures. This, however, is diff icult to measure and the threshold for what 
qualif ies as integration is problematic to set.
The migrants considered in this volume, that is, migrants who cannot 
simply obtain a visa and a flight ticket and who therefore engage in long 
overland and maritime journeys, often change their migration project and 
flexibly adapt to constraints and opportunities, as well as to information 
received from others. Therefore, individuals cannot simply be categorised 
as one type of migrant or another. Accordingly, the various forms of migra-
tion – immigration, circular and other temporary migration, and transit 
migration – do not represent clearly separate types of migration but overlap, 
turn from one form into the other and are rather temporary expressions of 
dynamic and continuous human mobility.
Finally, the concept of transit migration is so highly loaded with politics 
that it has become problematic to use. Even though various contributions 
in this volume demonstrate that there are forms of migration that could 
be labelled transit, though these are less frequent and numerically smaller 
than commonly assumed, any such label would not only be a scientif ic label 
but a political label; it would not simply be the most appropriate technical 
term for a social phenomenon but a subject of political arguments. Thus, the 
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scientif ic value of the term has been severely undermined by its political 
use.
Several contributions in this book have shown that often those who 
are considered transit migrants are not; instead they are (temporary) im-
migrants or, in case people move on after a longer stay in a country en route, 
this must rather be considered on- or secondary migration; that some of 
those who are not considered transit migrants, such as foreign students, 
instead might consider themselves merely being in transit or that transit 
may not be an accurate but rather a misleading label, for instance, if mi-
grants are de facto ‘stranded’. Other contributions, conversely, demonstrated 
that certain migrants actually intend to and succeed in transiting certain 
countries within or outside the EU within short periods of time, days, weeks 
or a few months, and without interacting much with the structures and 
systems of the countries they transit, that is, without working or learning the 
language. Still, these seem to be fewer in number than commonly assumed. 
What remains, however, is the tension between how migrants perceive 
themselves, what type of identity they have, like certain types of foreign 
students in Russia, who present themselves as in transit, so they might be 
mentally in transit and thus not integrate, whilst de facto they would be 
categorised as temporary immigrants. Thus, in the end it is the researchers 
who have to consider both aspects and their impact on the individual case 
studied and make a plausible judgement they can defend.
The analyses presented in this volume imply that the labels ‘transit 
migration’, ‘transit migrants’ and ‘transit countries’ are applied far too 
often and unthinkingly. Instead, certain dynamic and continuous migra-
tion processes are far too complex to be captured by just one label; the 
contributions in this book rather illustrate that often the type of migrants 
considered are problematic to categorise. Even more so, the study of tran-
sitory migrations questions efforts to categorise migrants according to 
their motives, intentions and time spent in certain countries because time 
thresholds are problematic and ultimately arbitrary to set whilst motives 
and intentions are subject to change. Thus, it is suggested to categorise 
flows and individuals separately.
Therefore, it seems plausible and possible to identify certain forms of hu-
man mobility as ‘transit migration’, notably if these are observed retrospec-
tively and thus as an observable fact that migrants have transited a certain 
country (c) on their way from country (a) to country (b). But it seems much 
more diff icult to also label the individuals involved as ‘transit migrants’. 
Instead, through rigid comparison more fine-tuning is required: often those 
who are considered transit migrants are but involuntary immigrants (who 
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intended to only transit but got stuck), frustrated immigrants (who intended 
to stay and work but were frustrated and thus moved on) or on-migrants, a 
phenomenon sometimes also labelled secondary migration (migrants who 
intended to stay and work in a certain country for some period of time but 
developed an intention to move on to other countries). What remains an 
issue, however, and subsequently undermines any attempt to categorise 
certain groups of migrants, is that often the individuals considered in this 
book are highly flexible and adaptable to the constraints and opportunities 
found, that their aspirations and intentions are highly dynamic and change 
due to the information received and the experiences had so that initial 
decisions are changed or made en route and that as a consequence their 
trajectories are also flexible, dynamic and unpredictable.
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